Post by Rob Caprio on Nov 7, 2018 21:17:48 GMT -5
All portions are ©️ Robert Caprio 2006-2024
NSAM 263:
fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-jfk/nsam263.jpg
11/21/63 NSAM 273 Draft:
jfkjmn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/image23.jpeg.jpg
www.bibliotecapleyades.net/imagenes_sociopol/nwo176_02.jpg
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 263 is a very important memorandum that was based on over FIFTY meetings and multiple trips to South Vietnam by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor who was the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this time.
Some people like to act like this memorandum did NOT say anything about President John F. Kennedy’s (JFK) intention to withdraw the bulk of the U.S. personnel by the end of 1965. This is NOT true of course, but if one simply looks at the memorandum itself, they will come away with the idea that JFK only intended to withdraw 1,000 troops by Christmas 1963. The smart perpetrators of the assassination were able to hide the documents that NSAM 263 refers to.
Here is the full memo, sans attachments:
Quote on
Washington, October 11, 1963.
TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: South Vietnam
At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.
The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.
After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved an instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.
McGeorge Bundy
Quote off
The keys to the memo are the report by McNamara & Taylor and the No. 534 telegram as it outlines fully what the short-term plans were going to be in regards to our plans in Vietnam. JFK convened the final conference on South Vietnam before the drafting of NSAM 263 on October 5, 1963. Here is what was going to be dealt with:
Quote on
Memorandum for the Files of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, October 5, 1963, 9:30 a.m.
SUBJECT
Presidential Conference on South Vietnam
A conference on South Vietnam was held in the Cabinet Room at 9:30 a.m., October 5, 1963. Present were the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Harriman, General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Administrator Bell, Mr. Bundy and Mr. Forrestal.
The meeting discussed the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor and considered draft instructions to Ambassador Lodge.
It began with a discussion of commodities for South Vietnam. They then discussed suspending aid to Colonel Tung "...which were located in Saigon rather than in the field. The President emphasized that we should make clear the basis upon which we were suspending aid to these forces, i.e. that they were not directly contributing to the war effort and therefore we could not support them."
The McNamara-Taylor report was then presented at the conference for review. This report was finished on October 2, 1963, highlighted their visits to all the key operational areas (and were accompanied by CIA officials). Here are the key components of this report:
a. Endorsed the basic presentation on Vietnam made by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor.
b. Noted the President's approval of the following statement of U.S. policy which was later released to the press:
"1. The security of South Viet Nam is a major interest of the United States and other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet Nam to deny this country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet Nam.
2. The military program in South Viet Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.
3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet Nam are capable of suppressing it.
Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet Nam can be withdrawn.
4. The political situation in South Viet Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.
5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society."
Quote off
Here it is, in writing, the plans to withdraw the majority of our forces by the end of 1965 and the outline of the goal of making the SVN self-sufficient. This clearly shows that JFK was disengaging from Vietnam and was not planning to launch a major ground war as claimed by many WC defenders.
NSAM 263:
fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-jfk/nsam263.jpg
11/21/63 NSAM 273 Draft:
jfkjmn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/image23.jpeg.jpg
www.bibliotecapleyades.net/imagenes_sociopol/nwo176_02.jpg
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 263 is a very important memorandum that was based on over FIFTY meetings and multiple trips to South Vietnam by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor who was the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this time.
Some people like to act like this memorandum did NOT say anything about President John F. Kennedy’s (JFK) intention to withdraw the bulk of the U.S. personnel by the end of 1965. This is NOT true of course, but if one simply looks at the memorandum itself, they will come away with the idea that JFK only intended to withdraw 1,000 troops by Christmas 1963. The smart perpetrators of the assassination were able to hide the documents that NSAM 263 refers to.
Here is the full memo, sans attachments:
Quote on
Washington, October 11, 1963.
TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: South Vietnam
At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.
The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.
After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved an instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.
McGeorge Bundy
Quote off
The keys to the memo are the report by McNamara & Taylor and the No. 534 telegram as it outlines fully what the short-term plans were going to be in regards to our plans in Vietnam. JFK convened the final conference on South Vietnam before the drafting of NSAM 263 on October 5, 1963. Here is what was going to be dealt with:
Quote on
Memorandum for the Files of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, October 5, 1963, 9:30 a.m.
SUBJECT
Presidential Conference on South Vietnam
A conference on South Vietnam was held in the Cabinet Room at 9:30 a.m., October 5, 1963. Present were the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Harriman, General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Administrator Bell, Mr. Bundy and Mr. Forrestal.
The meeting discussed the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor and considered draft instructions to Ambassador Lodge.
It began with a discussion of commodities for South Vietnam. They then discussed suspending aid to Colonel Tung "...which were located in Saigon rather than in the field. The President emphasized that we should make clear the basis upon which we were suspending aid to these forces, i.e. that they were not directly contributing to the war effort and therefore we could not support them."
The McNamara-Taylor report was then presented at the conference for review. This report was finished on October 2, 1963, highlighted their visits to all the key operational areas (and were accompanied by CIA officials). Here are the key components of this report:
a. Endorsed the basic presentation on Vietnam made by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor.
b. Noted the President's approval of the following statement of U.S. policy which was later released to the press:
"1. The security of South Viet Nam is a major interest of the United States and other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet Nam to deny this country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet Nam.
2. The military program in South Viet Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.
3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet Nam are capable of suppressing it.
Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet Nam can be withdrawn.
4. The political situation in South Viet Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.
5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society."
Quote off
Here it is, in writing, the plans to withdraw the majority of our forces by the end of 1965 and the outline of the goal of making the SVN self-sufficient. This clearly shows that JFK was disengaging from Vietnam and was not planning to launch a major ground war as claimed by many WC defenders.