Post by Rob Caprio on Oct 18, 2018 9:21:26 GMT -5
All portions ©️ Robert Caprio 2006-2024
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The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) would interview people who had been interviewed by the Warren Commission (WC) as well as witnesses who were not. This post will focus on one witness who testified before the WC and the HSCA in regards to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (JFK). He was part of the motorcade and helped with planning of it.
The HSCA Says…Winston Lawson.
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The HSCA would write this about when Winston Lawson learned of his responsibilities for the Dallas portion of JFK’s trip to Texas.
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(42) In accordance with standard operating procedure in the Secret Service, a special agent from the White House Detail went to Dallas to advance the trip and arrange for the President's security once the speech site and motorcade route were selected. In this case, the White House Detail advance agent was Winston G. Lawson. Lawson testified before the Warren Commission that he arrived in Dallas on November 12, and that on the morning of November 13 he visited the Trade Mart with Dallas SAIC Forrest Sorrels, Dallas SA Robert Steuart, and with Jack Puterbaugh, an advance man serving the Democratic National Committee and the White House. Lawson gave Behn a positive report on the Trade Mart because of factors that Sorrels did not mention: (1) the Mart's internal security system, which barred entry to everyone but lessees of commercial space and their customers; (2) the absence of a kitchen at the Women's Building: and (3) the obstruction of proper TV coverage by the Women's Building interior. Lawson agreed with Sorrels that the interior decor at the Women's Building was unseemly for a President.
(67) ….Winston Lawson, advance agent for Dallas, knew of his role in the Dallas trip no later than November 8, 9 days before Kellerman, his supervisor who ostensibly had the overall responsibility, began to undertake basic trip planning. (HSCA, XI, pp. 517 & 523)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0262a.htm
www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0265a.htm
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We see that Lawson learned of the trip to Dallas on November 8, 1963, and was in Dallas by November 12 to begin planning the trip. He would recommend the Trade Mart as we saw in a post in the series “Statements That Sink The WC’s Conclusions” and this decision caused some serious opposition from JFK staff who preferred the Women’s Building. This is very important as the Women’s Building would have put the motorcade on the opposite side of Dealey Plaza (DP) and would have made shooting JFK much more difficult due to the high speed the motorcade would have been travelling at.
Here is what the HSCA wrote about this topic.
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The route necessitated by the Kennedy staff's preference for the Women's Building would have led eastward along Main Street toward the fair grounds, which lay to the southeast of the Main Street business district. The motorcade's access to the western end of Main Street on the western side of Dealey Plaza would have been provided by a cloverleaf exit that led into the Plaza from the expressway, just west of the Dealey Plaza triple overpass. After passing through the overpass, the motorcade would then have continued, at what Bruno stated was the President's customarily high rate of speed to or 50 miles per hour--into Main Street within Dealey Plaza. The distance on Main Street from the bottom of the triple overpass to the point where crowds would be gathered (at the Houston Street intersection) would have been crossed at that speed. Deceleration of the motorcade would have commenced when the crowds were reached. (HSCA XI, p. 515)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0261a.htm
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Clearly we can see that trying to shoot JFK under these conditions would have been very difficult if not impossible. Thus, the selection of the Trade Mart was a key part of the assassination. JFK’s advance man had an issue with the Trade Mart due to the many catwalks that covered its ceiling. The HSCA wrote this about Jerry Bruno and the catwalk issue.
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Prior to November 5, Bruno had returned from Dallas with photographs of the Trade Mart's interior to show Behn. These photographs revealed, in full detail, the catwalks suspended above the floor. Bruno was concerned about the catwalks because of an incident involving Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. Other members of the President's political staff were also well aware that, while visiting Dallas during October 1963, Stevenson had been insulted and spat upon by right-wing extremist hecklers. Bruno was concerned that someone could use the catwalks as a vantage point from which to embarrass the President. (Ibid, p. 516)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0261b.htm
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Gerald Behn was the Special Agent In Charge (SAIC) of the White House detail and he agreed with Bruno’s feelings and said the Women’s Building should be the site for the luncheon.
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(40) After Behn met with Bruno and Ken O'Donnell, Behn announced on November 5 that he favored the Women's Building. According to Bruno, Behn was in charge of trip security. Therefore, Behn had instructed O'Donnell that the Women's Building was his selection. Bruno stated that O'Donnell personally confirmed this version of the course of events…Regardless of where ultimate power resided, a consensus was reached between Behn and O'Donnell. Because of the catwalks and many entrances, Behn announced to Bruno in Washington, D.C., on November 5 his decision favoring the Women's Building. It was Bruno's impression at this time that the report from the Dallas field office was neutral, since the local office was capable of securing either place. (Ibid, pp. 516-517)
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This shows us that the Women’s building was agreed on as both Bruno and Behn felt the Trade Mart was more of a security risk. Despite the blame going to Kenneth O’Donnell for the change to the Trade Mart we see Bruno said the power resided with Behn.
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(41) For Bruno, the input of the Dallas field office was of secondary import. It has been his impression from working with Behn that he was the Secret Service official who had power, as SAIC of the White House detail, to make final decisions in matters of security. The basis for this assertion by Bruno was that Bruno had personally accompanied and observed Behn during the advance work for the entirety of the President's 11-State conservation tour that had begun on September 24, 1963. He and Behn had looked at every stop on that tour.*
*In his 1978 deposition (p. 35), Bruno stated that Behn disclosed to Bruno that Behn, implicity having ultimate power to decide where to send the Presidential motorcade, chose the Women's Building, and in the Nov. 6, 1963, entry in Bruno's typewritten notes (p. 8), Bruno indicated that the decision favoring the Women's Building was reached on Nov. 5. In contradiction of his 1978 deposition, however, the entry of November 6, 1963 clearly stated that O'Donnell held and exercised the power to make the final decision and accordingly gave orders to Bruno and Behn to implement the decision. See references at footnotes 130, 133. (Ibid, p. 517)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0262a.htm
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It would appear Behn blamed O’Donnell and O’Donnell never denied or tried to explain his role in all of this. Since there was so much confusion on this issue it is surprising that the WC did not seek any testimony from Bruno or Behn.
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(41) The Warren Commission obtained no testimony or other information from Behn or Bruno about the controversy over speech site selection that was initially resolved, according to Bruno, by the selection of the Women's Building. Hence, the Warren Commission evaluated Lawson's and Sorrels' testimony without reference to Bruno's perspective. Bruno's perception as of the period between November 6 and 12 was that: We got word that the local Secret Service agents there had looked at the site [Trade Mart] and this is coming from Governor Connally, and they saw no reasons not to go there. (Ibid)
(42) Apparently, by "local agents," Bruno was referring to Sorrels and the special agents under his supervision in the Dallas field office. Bruno stated that the local agents in Dallas had decided to withdraw their earlier objections to the Trade Mart, and instead recommended it. If any local agent did in fact make such recommendations despite Behn's prior decision on November 6 favoring the Women's Building, this would have presented a clear case of a subordinate agent contradicting the SAIC of the White House detail. Bruno insisted that this in fact took place: Jerry [Behn] got word that the local agents claim that they could secure it [the Trade Mart] and we were going to have to go with that.
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It would seem the orders for the change came from Governor John B. Connally (JBC) and was passed onto the local Secret Service (SS) agents when he had NO authority to do so. It is odd that the WC neglected to call or interview either Bruno or Behn, but perhaps this is not odd given their track record of avoiding any witness or evidence that might shed light on a conspiracy. Clearly, someone overruled Behn’s (SAIC White House detail) decision and it would appear it was JBC who had no authority to do it. It would seem poor Kenneth O’Donnell was left holding the bag as they had to blame someone since it would not sound good to say JBC insisted on the Trade Mart when the head of security for the president said he did NOT want it.
There would be tap-dancing by the HSCA too as they wrote that no report could be found that showed local agents suggested the Trade Mart at the insistence of JBC, but what else were they going to say? Keep in mind, for the vast majority of the life of the HSCA they were of the mindset that LHO was the assassin and that he acted alone. They had no choice as once again they were given this mandate when the initial leadership were replaced by subservient people. Thus, the final conclusion of a fourth shot and a probable conspiracy was not the thought of the HSCA for most of their time together (except for some of the individual investigators). Who made the decision to change the site from the Women’s Building to the Trade Mart? If it did come from JBC was it his decision or was he told to do this? These are very important questions that we have not gotten firm answers to yet and this is nearly 51 years later.
Lawson and Frank Kellerman (who was in charge of the Dallas detail) both said they got no updates from the Protective Research Service regarding any dangerous people to watch out for. (Ibid, pp. 524-525) Behn would tell the HSCA that no information was passed on to either man who were responsible for the protection of JFK.
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Behn did not recall whether PRS distributed information to Winston Lawson the October 1963 heckling and harassment of Adlai Stevenson in Dallas, Tex. Nor could he recall whether any information was distributed prior to the, November 21 Texas trip about Dallas area right-wing extremist Edwin Walker. Behn specifically stated, as to the availibility to him of information about both Walker and Stevenson, that "no one in PRS passed it on." When asked if he himself warned any agents about either one of those subjects, he said that he did "not remember any discussion with any agent? (Ibid, p. 525)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0266a.htm
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How could one expect them to do their job properly when they did not get up to date information (or any information) on possible threats to the president? The HSCA wrote this about Kellerman’s position.
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(72) The importance of Kellerman's testimony is that, as the one agent who was in direct contact with Kennedy and his innermost circle of advisers, and who was therefore ideally placed to relay information: that provided cause for alarm, he was effectively sealed off from the information that he needed to perform with maximum protective effort. (Ibid, p. 524)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0265b.htm
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Was this just another coincidence? How many coincidences add up to a plan? Most seasoned investigators don’t like coincidences at all. As for the motorcade itself Lawson would be on record for the following things.
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(81) … The Secret Service notified the DPD frequently about their joint responsibility for crowd control and crowd observation, but no follow-up instructions were made in writing nor did Lawson as the Dallas advance agent, make any written checklist of such instructions. Lawson indicated that it was not normal for there to be such written directions.
(83) Advance agent Lawson testified in 1964 that the Secret Service did not check buildings along a motorcade route except under three circumstances: Presidential inaugurations, visits by a king or a president of a foreign country, or when the motorcade route has been known for years.
(84) Some question remains concerning the conduct of Sorrels and Lawson as to possible violation of the guideline compelling inspection of buildings when a motorcade route has been standard for years…
(85) Lawson testified that standard Secret Service operating procedure required agents to watch all windows, but he could not recall giving the instructions to watch them. He stated that Sorrels' obligation to watch windows was greater than his own. His duties, while stationed in the lead car immediately in front of the Presidential limousine, included looking directly to the rear at the President in order to coordinate the motorcade's speed and maintain radio contact with Dallas Chief of Police Jesse Curry about adherence to schedule. Although Lawson may have looked at the Depository Building, he was doing too many things at once to notice it. (Ibid, pp. 525-526)
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Why was it normal procedure NOT to put instructions in writing? What were they afraid of? How can you hold anyone accountable with a verbal only system?
This shows a very casual approach was taken for the motorcade as no buildings were searched and no one was placed on roofs when this was done at Love Field.
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(82) At Love Field, the DPD put men on the roofs of buildings surrounding the landing area….The danger from rooftops was not great, since no building faced the side of the plane where the President disembarked. The next most adjacent building was only one story and was blanketed by crowds. Nevertheless, officers were placed on top of this building as well as on the ones adjacent, but there was no check made of offices providing vantage points overlooking the area where the President's plane would land. (Ibid, p. 525)
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So why was this not done in DP then? Why was there no presence of the Dallas Police Department (DPD) or the SS in DP? It would seem the ONLY presence of the SS was after the assassination when there were NO real SS agents on the ground.
We will see another change that would impact the events of November 22, 1963, as DPD Captain Perdue Lawrence was assigned traffic control for the motorcade. He would report to Deputy Chief Lunday, head of the Traffic Division, who was supervised by Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor. Batchelor would be the man who would lose both JFK and LHO after being placed in charge of their security. Instead of ending his career with the lost of both men he would become Chief of Police years later when Jesse Curry stepped down.
The HSCA would describe meetings that took place on November 19 and November 21, 1963, and the decisions made at them.
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(90) …Lawrence testified that approximately 2 days before the President's arrival, he discussed with Lunday and Batchelor the stationing of motorcycle escorts. At this meeting, no Secret Service agents were present. They agreed to use 18 motorcycles. Some of these were to be positioned "alongside" the Presidential limousine.
(91) Dallas Police Department documents indicate that at a meeting between Chief Curry, Deputy Chief R.H. Lunday, and Captain Lawrence on November 19, it was agreed that a motorcycle escort should be used, "with men on either side of the motorcade [sic], with five at the rear, four motorcycles immediately ahead, and three motorcycles to precede the motorcade by about two blocks."
(92) Lawrence was subsequently invited to a DPD/SS coordinating meeting held on November 21. At 5 p.m. he was told to report to the meeting. It was here that a change in motorcycle escort plans occurred. The coordination meeting, according to DPD documents, was attended by Curry, Batchelor, Deputy Chiefs Lumpkin, Stevenson, Lunday, and Fisher, Captains Souter, Lawrence, and King, Inspector Sawyer, and Secret Service agents Sorrels, Lawson, and David Grant. The meeting touched on various topics, however, particular emphasis was given to the use of motorcycles as Presidential escorts.
(93) Lawrence's account of the change that was introduced by the Secret Service is as follows:
...I heard one of the Secret Service men say that President Kennedy did not desire any motorcycle officer directly on each side of him, between him and the crowd, but he would want the officers to the rear.
... when it was mentioned about these motorcycle officers alongside the President's car, he (the S.S. agent) said, "No, these officers should be back and if any people started a rush toward the car, if there was any movement at all where the President was endangered in any way, these officers would be in a position to gun their motors and get between them and the Presidential car . . .
(94) Comparison reveals that the DPD document that describes the November 21 meeting is vague in contrast to Lawrence's explicit assertion that the Secret Service changed the "alongside" distribution of motorcycles to a rearward distribution. The DPD document for November 21 stated:
Lawrence then said there would be four motorcycles on either side of the motorcade immediately to the rear of the President's vehicle. Mr. Lawson stated that this was too many. that he thought two motorcycles on either side would be sufficient, about even with the rear fender of the President's car. Lawrence was instructed to disperse the other two along each side of the motorcade to the rear.
(95) In contrast to Lawrence's testimony, this document indicated that the alteration by the Secret Service of motorcycle distribution concerned the number of motorcycles, not their physical locations in relation to the Presidential limousine. Still, the DPD and Lawrence versions do corroborate one another in that they indicate a reduction of security protection in terms of number and placement of officers.
(96) Lawson's testimony in 1964 was that it was his understanding that the President had personally stated that he did not like a lot of motorcycles surrounding his limousine because their loud noise interfered with conversations taking place within the limousine. For this reason the four motorcycles were positioned "just back" of the limousine. Lawson stated to the committee that he had "no recall of, changing plans" (i.e. for motorcycles) at the Dallas Police Department/Secret Service organizational meeting of November 21. (Ibid, pp. 526-528)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0266b.htm
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We can see the number of motorcycle officers was reduced from eighteen to four by the SS. Why? Supposedly it was all JFK’s fault as he wanted to see the crowd. Perhaps eighteen were too many, but as we now know four was most definitely not enough. Lawson claimed to have no memory making the changes so perhaps it was Sorrels that did this, but clearly one of them did this as the DPD would not have had the authority to do this on their own. Just like the decision to go to the Trade Mart instead of the Women’s Building we again see that Lawson is in the middle of this in some way. This decision and the one to go to the Trade Mart both made the assassination much more possible so we have to wonder what was going on here and what role Lawson may have played in all of this. Was he simply following orders or was he more involved?
We know too that the SS made this change because the HSCA wrote this regarding Officer Marion Baker.
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Officer Marion L. Baker confirms the original Lawrence testimony as to the alteration by the Secret Service of a prior DPD plan. Baker had originally been instructed to ride right beside Kennedy. He was later informed by his sergeant that nobody was to ride beside the car, but instead the officers were to fall in beyond it. They received these instructions about 5 or 10 minutes before the motorcade left Love Field. (Ibid, p. 528)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0267b.htm
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If the decision was made at the November 21st meeting, why was Baker, and we assume the other DPD motorcycle officers, told ONLY 5 or 10 minutes BEFORE the presidential limousine left Love Field? Why were they not briefed on this that morning when they were given their assignments? Baker would say he was told to stay beyond the press bus as well.
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Baker stated that in addition to being instructed by his sergeant not to ride beside the President's car, he was also instructed by him to fall in beyond the press car. Baker interpreted this assignment as an order to place himself about six or seven cars behind Kennedy. Baker was on Houston Street at the time of the first shot. Haygood and Baker were too far from the presidential limousine to afford Kennedy any protection. They were in no position to rush forward to intercept danger had there been a street-level incident, yet the forward interception capability of the motorcycles was the basic rationale for Lawson's November 21 rearward deployment of the motorcycles. (Ibid, pp. 528-529)
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In addition to pointing out how Baker and Haygood could offer no assistance to JFK if needed due to their placement, we also see all doubt removed as to altered the original DPD plan. The HSCA clearly lays it on Lawson. Why did Lawson make these changes when they offered no real possibility of offering any assistance to JFK if need be? Also, once you read these words by the HSCA, how can you not think someone in the SS knew what was going to happen to JFK?
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(104) The Secret Service`s alteration of the original Dallas Police Department motorcycle deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible security precautions. The straggling of Haygood and Baker, on the right rear area of the limousine, weakened security that was already reduced due to the rearward deployment of the motorcycles and to the reduction of the number of motorcycles originally intended for use.
(105) Surprisingly, the security measure used in the prior motorcades during the same Texas visit show that the deployment of motorcycles in Dallas by the Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure. The Secret Service Final Survey Report for the November 21 visit to Houston stated that in all motorcade movements, "six motorcycles flanked the Presidential limousine and an additional 33 motorcycles were used to flank the motorcade and cover the intersections.” There is no mention in the Fort Worth Secret Service Final Report about the deployment of motorcycles in the vicinity of the Presidential limousine.
(106) The Secret Service knew more than a day before November 22 that the President did not want motorcycles riding alongside or parallel to the Presidential vehicle. If the word "flank"' denotes parallel deployment, and if in fact such deployment was effected in Houston, then it may well be that by altering Dallas Police Department Captain Lawrence's original motorcycle plan the Secret Service deprived Kennedy of security in Dallas that it had provided a mere day before in Houston. (Ibid, p. 529)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0268a.htm
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This shows us the procedures used in Dallas on November 22 were NOT used in Houston on November 21, 1963. Why not? Also, why did JFK have NO problem with motorcycles flanking him in Houston, but suddenly he had a problem with them doing so in Dallas if we believe the excuse given by Lawson? This makes no sense and we see can see the plan to assassinate JFK in motion in Dallas as he was stripped of his security when he was not the day before.
There would also be a dispute over a squad car full of homicide detectives being placed behind the limousine of Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) as well. The DPD thought it would be added on November 14, but on November 21 it was removed by the SS who said this was standard procedure. Here is what the HSCA wrote about this.
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(108) On November 14, 1963, Lawson met with Dallas SAIC Sorrels and Dallas Police Department Chief Jesse Curry and "laid out the tentative number of vehicles that would be in the parade and the order in which they would be." Curry stated at the organizational meeting on November 21 that he "thought we had planned that Captain Fritz [Chief of DPD Homicide] would be in the motorcade behind the Vice President's car." Sorrels spoke up at that point and stated that "nothing was discussed on that." Lawson explained that a car with Secret Service agents would follow the Vice President's car and added that the protective detail would like to have a police car bring up the rear of the motorcade. Curry then instructed Deputy Chief Lunday to take care of the matter.
(109) Lawson was asked by the committee why, in his preliminary survey report of November 19, he made no mention in the sequenced list of motorcade vehicles of the DPD homicide car that Curry believed on November 14 to have been included and whose absence Curry protested at the meeting of November 21. He answered that "the DPD could have put it in on their own"; that "he could not recall who took it out"; that he was "not sure it was scheduled to be there"; and that "he didn't know who canceled the DPD car because he didn't know who decided to include it." (Ibid, pp. 529-530)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0268b.htm
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What would have happened if Captain Fritz and a squad car full of homicide detectives were able to stop and start working immediately after the shots had been fired? What might they have found and done? Furthermore, why did the DPD think a squad car full of HOMICIDE DETECTIVES would be needed? Keep in mind, the car full of SS men following LBJ were of NO help as they had no jurisdiction or inclination to investigate the shooting inside DP. Anyway you look at this issue you have to wonder what was going on IF it was not preparing for the death of JFK?
Winston Lawson was involved in a couple of key decisions that would alter history as they both made the assassination of JFK much more likely. The only question we are left to wonder was who was giving him orders to either make these decisions or steer things in a way that they came about.
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The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) would interview people who had been interviewed by the Warren Commission (WC) as well as witnesses who were not. This post will focus on one witness who testified before the WC and the HSCA in regards to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (JFK). He was part of the motorcade and helped with planning of it.
The HSCA Says…Winston Lawson.
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The HSCA would write this about when Winston Lawson learned of his responsibilities for the Dallas portion of JFK’s trip to Texas.
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(42) In accordance with standard operating procedure in the Secret Service, a special agent from the White House Detail went to Dallas to advance the trip and arrange for the President's security once the speech site and motorcade route were selected. In this case, the White House Detail advance agent was Winston G. Lawson. Lawson testified before the Warren Commission that he arrived in Dallas on November 12, and that on the morning of November 13 he visited the Trade Mart with Dallas SAIC Forrest Sorrels, Dallas SA Robert Steuart, and with Jack Puterbaugh, an advance man serving the Democratic National Committee and the White House. Lawson gave Behn a positive report on the Trade Mart because of factors that Sorrels did not mention: (1) the Mart's internal security system, which barred entry to everyone but lessees of commercial space and their customers; (2) the absence of a kitchen at the Women's Building: and (3) the obstruction of proper TV coverage by the Women's Building interior. Lawson agreed with Sorrels that the interior decor at the Women's Building was unseemly for a President.
(67) ….Winston Lawson, advance agent for Dallas, knew of his role in the Dallas trip no later than November 8, 9 days before Kellerman, his supervisor who ostensibly had the overall responsibility, began to undertake basic trip planning. (HSCA, XI, pp. 517 & 523)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0262a.htm
www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0265a.htm
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We see that Lawson learned of the trip to Dallas on November 8, 1963, and was in Dallas by November 12 to begin planning the trip. He would recommend the Trade Mart as we saw in a post in the series “Statements That Sink The WC’s Conclusions” and this decision caused some serious opposition from JFK staff who preferred the Women’s Building. This is very important as the Women’s Building would have put the motorcade on the opposite side of Dealey Plaza (DP) and would have made shooting JFK much more difficult due to the high speed the motorcade would have been travelling at.
Here is what the HSCA wrote about this topic.
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The route necessitated by the Kennedy staff's preference for the Women's Building would have led eastward along Main Street toward the fair grounds, which lay to the southeast of the Main Street business district. The motorcade's access to the western end of Main Street on the western side of Dealey Plaza would have been provided by a cloverleaf exit that led into the Plaza from the expressway, just west of the Dealey Plaza triple overpass. After passing through the overpass, the motorcade would then have continued, at what Bruno stated was the President's customarily high rate of speed to or 50 miles per hour--into Main Street within Dealey Plaza. The distance on Main Street from the bottom of the triple overpass to the point where crowds would be gathered (at the Houston Street intersection) would have been crossed at that speed. Deceleration of the motorcade would have commenced when the crowds were reached. (HSCA XI, p. 515)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0261a.htm
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Clearly we can see that trying to shoot JFK under these conditions would have been very difficult if not impossible. Thus, the selection of the Trade Mart was a key part of the assassination. JFK’s advance man had an issue with the Trade Mart due to the many catwalks that covered its ceiling. The HSCA wrote this about Jerry Bruno and the catwalk issue.
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Prior to November 5, Bruno had returned from Dallas with photographs of the Trade Mart's interior to show Behn. These photographs revealed, in full detail, the catwalks suspended above the floor. Bruno was concerned about the catwalks because of an incident involving Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. Other members of the President's political staff were also well aware that, while visiting Dallas during October 1963, Stevenson had been insulted and spat upon by right-wing extremist hecklers. Bruno was concerned that someone could use the catwalks as a vantage point from which to embarrass the President. (Ibid, p. 516)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0261b.htm
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Gerald Behn was the Special Agent In Charge (SAIC) of the White House detail and he agreed with Bruno’s feelings and said the Women’s Building should be the site for the luncheon.
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(40) After Behn met with Bruno and Ken O'Donnell, Behn announced on November 5 that he favored the Women's Building. According to Bruno, Behn was in charge of trip security. Therefore, Behn had instructed O'Donnell that the Women's Building was his selection. Bruno stated that O'Donnell personally confirmed this version of the course of events…Regardless of where ultimate power resided, a consensus was reached between Behn and O'Donnell. Because of the catwalks and many entrances, Behn announced to Bruno in Washington, D.C., on November 5 his decision favoring the Women's Building. It was Bruno's impression at this time that the report from the Dallas field office was neutral, since the local office was capable of securing either place. (Ibid, pp. 516-517)
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This shows us that the Women’s building was agreed on as both Bruno and Behn felt the Trade Mart was more of a security risk. Despite the blame going to Kenneth O’Donnell for the change to the Trade Mart we see Bruno said the power resided with Behn.
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(41) For Bruno, the input of the Dallas field office was of secondary import. It has been his impression from working with Behn that he was the Secret Service official who had power, as SAIC of the White House detail, to make final decisions in matters of security. The basis for this assertion by Bruno was that Bruno had personally accompanied and observed Behn during the advance work for the entirety of the President's 11-State conservation tour that had begun on September 24, 1963. He and Behn had looked at every stop on that tour.*
*In his 1978 deposition (p. 35), Bruno stated that Behn disclosed to Bruno that Behn, implicity having ultimate power to decide where to send the Presidential motorcade, chose the Women's Building, and in the Nov. 6, 1963, entry in Bruno's typewritten notes (p. 8), Bruno indicated that the decision favoring the Women's Building was reached on Nov. 5. In contradiction of his 1978 deposition, however, the entry of November 6, 1963 clearly stated that O'Donnell held and exercised the power to make the final decision and accordingly gave orders to Bruno and Behn to implement the decision. See references at footnotes 130, 133. (Ibid, p. 517)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0262a.htm
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It would appear Behn blamed O’Donnell and O’Donnell never denied or tried to explain his role in all of this. Since there was so much confusion on this issue it is surprising that the WC did not seek any testimony from Bruno or Behn.
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(41) The Warren Commission obtained no testimony or other information from Behn or Bruno about the controversy over speech site selection that was initially resolved, according to Bruno, by the selection of the Women's Building. Hence, the Warren Commission evaluated Lawson's and Sorrels' testimony without reference to Bruno's perspective. Bruno's perception as of the period between November 6 and 12 was that: We got word that the local Secret Service agents there had looked at the site [Trade Mart] and this is coming from Governor Connally, and they saw no reasons not to go there. (Ibid)
(42) Apparently, by "local agents," Bruno was referring to Sorrels and the special agents under his supervision in the Dallas field office. Bruno stated that the local agents in Dallas had decided to withdraw their earlier objections to the Trade Mart, and instead recommended it. If any local agent did in fact make such recommendations despite Behn's prior decision on November 6 favoring the Women's Building, this would have presented a clear case of a subordinate agent contradicting the SAIC of the White House detail. Bruno insisted that this in fact took place: Jerry [Behn] got word that the local agents claim that they could secure it [the Trade Mart] and we were going to have to go with that.
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It would seem the orders for the change came from Governor John B. Connally (JBC) and was passed onto the local Secret Service (SS) agents when he had NO authority to do so. It is odd that the WC neglected to call or interview either Bruno or Behn, but perhaps this is not odd given their track record of avoiding any witness or evidence that might shed light on a conspiracy. Clearly, someone overruled Behn’s (SAIC White House detail) decision and it would appear it was JBC who had no authority to do it. It would seem poor Kenneth O’Donnell was left holding the bag as they had to blame someone since it would not sound good to say JBC insisted on the Trade Mart when the head of security for the president said he did NOT want it.
There would be tap-dancing by the HSCA too as they wrote that no report could be found that showed local agents suggested the Trade Mart at the insistence of JBC, but what else were they going to say? Keep in mind, for the vast majority of the life of the HSCA they were of the mindset that LHO was the assassin and that he acted alone. They had no choice as once again they were given this mandate when the initial leadership were replaced by subservient people. Thus, the final conclusion of a fourth shot and a probable conspiracy was not the thought of the HSCA for most of their time together (except for some of the individual investigators). Who made the decision to change the site from the Women’s Building to the Trade Mart? If it did come from JBC was it his decision or was he told to do this? These are very important questions that we have not gotten firm answers to yet and this is nearly 51 years later.
Lawson and Frank Kellerman (who was in charge of the Dallas detail) both said they got no updates from the Protective Research Service regarding any dangerous people to watch out for. (Ibid, pp. 524-525) Behn would tell the HSCA that no information was passed on to either man who were responsible for the protection of JFK.
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Behn did not recall whether PRS distributed information to Winston Lawson the October 1963 heckling and harassment of Adlai Stevenson in Dallas, Tex. Nor could he recall whether any information was distributed prior to the, November 21 Texas trip about Dallas area right-wing extremist Edwin Walker. Behn specifically stated, as to the availibility to him of information about both Walker and Stevenson, that "no one in PRS passed it on." When asked if he himself warned any agents about either one of those subjects, he said that he did "not remember any discussion with any agent? (Ibid, p. 525)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0266a.htm
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How could one expect them to do their job properly when they did not get up to date information (or any information) on possible threats to the president? The HSCA wrote this about Kellerman’s position.
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(72) The importance of Kellerman's testimony is that, as the one agent who was in direct contact with Kennedy and his innermost circle of advisers, and who was therefore ideally placed to relay information: that provided cause for alarm, he was effectively sealed off from the information that he needed to perform with maximum protective effort. (Ibid, p. 524)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0265b.htm
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Was this just another coincidence? How many coincidences add up to a plan? Most seasoned investigators don’t like coincidences at all. As for the motorcade itself Lawson would be on record for the following things.
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(81) … The Secret Service notified the DPD frequently about their joint responsibility for crowd control and crowd observation, but no follow-up instructions were made in writing nor did Lawson as the Dallas advance agent, make any written checklist of such instructions. Lawson indicated that it was not normal for there to be such written directions.
(83) Advance agent Lawson testified in 1964 that the Secret Service did not check buildings along a motorcade route except under three circumstances: Presidential inaugurations, visits by a king or a president of a foreign country, or when the motorcade route has been known for years.
(84) Some question remains concerning the conduct of Sorrels and Lawson as to possible violation of the guideline compelling inspection of buildings when a motorcade route has been standard for years…
(85) Lawson testified that standard Secret Service operating procedure required agents to watch all windows, but he could not recall giving the instructions to watch them. He stated that Sorrels' obligation to watch windows was greater than his own. His duties, while stationed in the lead car immediately in front of the Presidential limousine, included looking directly to the rear at the President in order to coordinate the motorcade's speed and maintain radio contact with Dallas Chief of Police Jesse Curry about adherence to schedule. Although Lawson may have looked at the Depository Building, he was doing too many things at once to notice it. (Ibid, pp. 525-526)
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Why was it normal procedure NOT to put instructions in writing? What were they afraid of? How can you hold anyone accountable with a verbal only system?
This shows a very casual approach was taken for the motorcade as no buildings were searched and no one was placed on roofs when this was done at Love Field.
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(82) At Love Field, the DPD put men on the roofs of buildings surrounding the landing area….The danger from rooftops was not great, since no building faced the side of the plane where the President disembarked. The next most adjacent building was only one story and was blanketed by crowds. Nevertheless, officers were placed on top of this building as well as on the ones adjacent, but there was no check made of offices providing vantage points overlooking the area where the President's plane would land. (Ibid, p. 525)
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So why was this not done in DP then? Why was there no presence of the Dallas Police Department (DPD) or the SS in DP? It would seem the ONLY presence of the SS was after the assassination when there were NO real SS agents on the ground.
We will see another change that would impact the events of November 22, 1963, as DPD Captain Perdue Lawrence was assigned traffic control for the motorcade. He would report to Deputy Chief Lunday, head of the Traffic Division, who was supervised by Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor. Batchelor would be the man who would lose both JFK and LHO after being placed in charge of their security. Instead of ending his career with the lost of both men he would become Chief of Police years later when Jesse Curry stepped down.
The HSCA would describe meetings that took place on November 19 and November 21, 1963, and the decisions made at them.
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(90) …Lawrence testified that approximately 2 days before the President's arrival, he discussed with Lunday and Batchelor the stationing of motorcycle escorts. At this meeting, no Secret Service agents were present. They agreed to use 18 motorcycles. Some of these were to be positioned "alongside" the Presidential limousine.
(91) Dallas Police Department documents indicate that at a meeting between Chief Curry, Deputy Chief R.H. Lunday, and Captain Lawrence on November 19, it was agreed that a motorcycle escort should be used, "with men on either side of the motorcade [sic], with five at the rear, four motorcycles immediately ahead, and three motorcycles to precede the motorcade by about two blocks."
(92) Lawrence was subsequently invited to a DPD/SS coordinating meeting held on November 21. At 5 p.m. he was told to report to the meeting. It was here that a change in motorcycle escort plans occurred. The coordination meeting, according to DPD documents, was attended by Curry, Batchelor, Deputy Chiefs Lumpkin, Stevenson, Lunday, and Fisher, Captains Souter, Lawrence, and King, Inspector Sawyer, and Secret Service agents Sorrels, Lawson, and David Grant. The meeting touched on various topics, however, particular emphasis was given to the use of motorcycles as Presidential escorts.
(93) Lawrence's account of the change that was introduced by the Secret Service is as follows:
...I heard one of the Secret Service men say that President Kennedy did not desire any motorcycle officer directly on each side of him, between him and the crowd, but he would want the officers to the rear.
... when it was mentioned about these motorcycle officers alongside the President's car, he (the S.S. agent) said, "No, these officers should be back and if any people started a rush toward the car, if there was any movement at all where the President was endangered in any way, these officers would be in a position to gun their motors and get between them and the Presidential car . . .
(94) Comparison reveals that the DPD document that describes the November 21 meeting is vague in contrast to Lawrence's explicit assertion that the Secret Service changed the "alongside" distribution of motorcycles to a rearward distribution. The DPD document for November 21 stated:
Lawrence then said there would be four motorcycles on either side of the motorcade immediately to the rear of the President's vehicle. Mr. Lawson stated that this was too many. that he thought two motorcycles on either side would be sufficient, about even with the rear fender of the President's car. Lawrence was instructed to disperse the other two along each side of the motorcade to the rear.
(95) In contrast to Lawrence's testimony, this document indicated that the alteration by the Secret Service of motorcycle distribution concerned the number of motorcycles, not their physical locations in relation to the Presidential limousine. Still, the DPD and Lawrence versions do corroborate one another in that they indicate a reduction of security protection in terms of number and placement of officers.
(96) Lawson's testimony in 1964 was that it was his understanding that the President had personally stated that he did not like a lot of motorcycles surrounding his limousine because their loud noise interfered with conversations taking place within the limousine. For this reason the four motorcycles were positioned "just back" of the limousine. Lawson stated to the committee that he had "no recall of, changing plans" (i.e. for motorcycles) at the Dallas Police Department/Secret Service organizational meeting of November 21. (Ibid, pp. 526-528)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0266b.htm
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We can see the number of motorcycle officers was reduced from eighteen to four by the SS. Why? Supposedly it was all JFK’s fault as he wanted to see the crowd. Perhaps eighteen were too many, but as we now know four was most definitely not enough. Lawson claimed to have no memory making the changes so perhaps it was Sorrels that did this, but clearly one of them did this as the DPD would not have had the authority to do this on their own. Just like the decision to go to the Trade Mart instead of the Women’s Building we again see that Lawson is in the middle of this in some way. This decision and the one to go to the Trade Mart both made the assassination much more possible so we have to wonder what was going on here and what role Lawson may have played in all of this. Was he simply following orders or was he more involved?
We know too that the SS made this change because the HSCA wrote this regarding Officer Marion Baker.
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Officer Marion L. Baker confirms the original Lawrence testimony as to the alteration by the Secret Service of a prior DPD plan. Baker had originally been instructed to ride right beside Kennedy. He was later informed by his sergeant that nobody was to ride beside the car, but instead the officers were to fall in beyond it. They received these instructions about 5 or 10 minutes before the motorcade left Love Field. (Ibid, p. 528)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0267b.htm
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If the decision was made at the November 21st meeting, why was Baker, and we assume the other DPD motorcycle officers, told ONLY 5 or 10 minutes BEFORE the presidential limousine left Love Field? Why were they not briefed on this that morning when they were given their assignments? Baker would say he was told to stay beyond the press bus as well.
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Baker stated that in addition to being instructed by his sergeant not to ride beside the President's car, he was also instructed by him to fall in beyond the press car. Baker interpreted this assignment as an order to place himself about six or seven cars behind Kennedy. Baker was on Houston Street at the time of the first shot. Haygood and Baker were too far from the presidential limousine to afford Kennedy any protection. They were in no position to rush forward to intercept danger had there been a street-level incident, yet the forward interception capability of the motorcycles was the basic rationale for Lawson's November 21 rearward deployment of the motorcycles. (Ibid, pp. 528-529)
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In addition to pointing out how Baker and Haygood could offer no assistance to JFK if needed due to their placement, we also see all doubt removed as to altered the original DPD plan. The HSCA clearly lays it on Lawson. Why did Lawson make these changes when they offered no real possibility of offering any assistance to JFK if need be? Also, once you read these words by the HSCA, how can you not think someone in the SS knew what was going to happen to JFK?
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(104) The Secret Service`s alteration of the original Dallas Police Department motorcycle deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible security precautions. The straggling of Haygood and Baker, on the right rear area of the limousine, weakened security that was already reduced due to the rearward deployment of the motorcycles and to the reduction of the number of motorcycles originally intended for use.
(105) Surprisingly, the security measure used in the prior motorcades during the same Texas visit show that the deployment of motorcycles in Dallas by the Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure. The Secret Service Final Survey Report for the November 21 visit to Houston stated that in all motorcade movements, "six motorcycles flanked the Presidential limousine and an additional 33 motorcycles were used to flank the motorcade and cover the intersections.” There is no mention in the Fort Worth Secret Service Final Report about the deployment of motorcycles in the vicinity of the Presidential limousine.
(106) The Secret Service knew more than a day before November 22 that the President did not want motorcycles riding alongside or parallel to the Presidential vehicle. If the word "flank"' denotes parallel deployment, and if in fact such deployment was effected in Houston, then it may well be that by altering Dallas Police Department Captain Lawrence's original motorcycle plan the Secret Service deprived Kennedy of security in Dallas that it had provided a mere day before in Houston. (Ibid, p. 529)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0268a.htm
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This shows us the procedures used in Dallas on November 22 were NOT used in Houston on November 21, 1963. Why not? Also, why did JFK have NO problem with motorcycles flanking him in Houston, but suddenly he had a problem with them doing so in Dallas if we believe the excuse given by Lawson? This makes no sense and we see can see the plan to assassinate JFK in motion in Dallas as he was stripped of his security when he was not the day before.
There would also be a dispute over a squad car full of homicide detectives being placed behind the limousine of Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) as well. The DPD thought it would be added on November 14, but on November 21 it was removed by the SS who said this was standard procedure. Here is what the HSCA wrote about this.
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(108) On November 14, 1963, Lawson met with Dallas SAIC Sorrels and Dallas Police Department Chief Jesse Curry and "laid out the tentative number of vehicles that would be in the parade and the order in which they would be." Curry stated at the organizational meeting on November 21 that he "thought we had planned that Captain Fritz [Chief of DPD Homicide] would be in the motorcade behind the Vice President's car." Sorrels spoke up at that point and stated that "nothing was discussed on that." Lawson explained that a car with Secret Service agents would follow the Vice President's car and added that the protective detail would like to have a police car bring up the rear of the motorcade. Curry then instructed Deputy Chief Lunday to take care of the matter.
(109) Lawson was asked by the committee why, in his preliminary survey report of November 19, he made no mention in the sequenced list of motorcade vehicles of the DPD homicide car that Curry believed on November 14 to have been included and whose absence Curry protested at the meeting of November 21. He answered that "the DPD could have put it in on their own"; that "he could not recall who took it out"; that he was "not sure it was scheduled to be there"; and that "he didn't know who canceled the DPD car because he didn't know who decided to include it." (Ibid, pp. 529-530)
www.historymatters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol11/html/HSCA_Vol11_0268b.htm
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What would have happened if Captain Fritz and a squad car full of homicide detectives were able to stop and start working immediately after the shots had been fired? What might they have found and done? Furthermore, why did the DPD think a squad car full of HOMICIDE DETECTIVES would be needed? Keep in mind, the car full of SS men following LBJ were of NO help as they had no jurisdiction or inclination to investigate the shooting inside DP. Anyway you look at this issue you have to wonder what was going on IF it was not preparing for the death of JFK?
Winston Lawson was involved in a couple of key decisions that would alter history as they both made the assassination of JFK much more likely. The only question we are left to wonder was who was giving him orders to either make these decisions or steer things in a way that they came about.