Post by Rob Caprio on Nov 2, 2018 15:29:42 GMT -5
All portions are ©️ Robert Caprio 2006-2024
(Portions of this post are from the works of the late, great Lt. Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty who was a foremost expert in this subject.)
NSAM 263:
fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-jfk/nsam263.jpg
11/21/63 NSAM 273 Draft:
jfkjmn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/image23.jpeg.jpg
jfkjmn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/VERSION2.jpg
www.bibliotecapleyades.net/imagenes_sociopol/nwo176_02.jpg
If President John F. Kennedy’s (JFK) Vietnam policy didn't have anything to do with his assassination, why is there so much mystery regarding National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 263? (NSAM 273 will be discussed as well.)
NSAM 273 was drafted a day before JFK's assassination and basically reverses his policy of removing all U.S. personnel (i.e. CIA advisors) by 1965. It was also drafted by William Bundy when the normal person who wrote JFK's NSAMs was his brother McGeorge Bundy who was his National Security Advisor. Why did William Bundy draft this particular NSAM?
Notice how the draft says, "The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu...". Well, these discussions never occurred in Honolulu since they turned back for Washington, D.C., once they were alerted about the assassination. They certainly did not have them by November 21, 1963, so this shows that there was a plan in place to reverse JFK's stated objectives.
This is a lengthy story, but worth the read if you don't know the whole story of these two documents.
They are key to the bigger picture. There is a cryptic section 4 to the 273 draft (11/21/63) that is not in the final signed version, and it has nothing to do with Vietnam. Is it proof of foreknowledge of a conspiracy? You decide for yourself.
A photograph of the front page of the "Pacific Stars and Stripes", (reference a, enclosed) the official U.S. Armed Forces Newspaper, datelined October 4, 1963, with the lead headline serves to verify and date its existence in public:
"WHITE HOUSE REPORT: U.S. TROOPS SEEN OUT OF VIET BY '65."
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This photograph shows JFK, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor in the Oval Office with the "Saigon Trip Report" on the coffee table, dated October 2, 1963. This most important policy statement was approved by JFK on October 11, 1963, and the news of its existence has been available to the press since October 3, 1963. The New York Times carried the story on November 21, 1963.
Why then, of all White House policy statements, have so many newsmen and historians written vehemently that JFK's NSAM 263 does not exist?
Let's look at a part of the record of this "Cover Story", much of which has been created and sustained by elements of the U.S. Government in opposition to the Kennedy record. Here is information from Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty's book "JFK, The CIA, Vietnam & The Plot To Assassinate JFK").
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a) On June 17, 1967, Secretary Robert McNamara directed one of his senior associates, Leslie H. Gelb, to form a Pentagon task force to study the "History of United States involvement in Vietnam from World War II, September 2, 1945, to the present." Note that important date. Most people do not realize that the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam began on the same day as the end of World War II against Japan. This study was presented to Secretary Clark Clifford, McNamara's successor, on Jan 15, 1969. Because of the Daniel Ellsberg incident (Ellsberg used to work in the same Pentagon offices where Gelb worked during the sixties), this Vietnam Task Force Study became known as the "Pentagon Papers".
b) On pages 769-770, Vol II, of these "Pentagon Papers" there appears a Document 146 (c) entitled,
"NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263
TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: South Vietnam"
However only 10 lines of this long "Trip report" are published under the "NSAM 263" heading and they simply list the fact that:
"The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section 1, B (1-3)* of the Report" and that, "no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963."[/b]
fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-jfk/nsam263.jpg
*NOTE the reference to "Section 1, B (1-3)" is to the real content of NSAM 263 that appears as Document 142, (b) Vol II and is not labeled as NSAM 263. Thus, the important JFK Vietnam policy of October 11, 1963, is concealed by such omissions.
Yet, this is the only place in the entire Report that lists the title of Document #146 of this massive study as "NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263, OCT 11, 1963."
Years after JFK's death, someone had decided that historical researchers should not have any help in finding this most important Presidential document...a most significant factor itself in the decision to assassinate the JFK on November 22, 1963. This scheme to mislabel and to divide NSAM 263 into two parts confused the issue of JFK’s Vietnam policy unnecessarily.
b) On pages 751-766, VOL II, there is a Document #142:
"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, 2 October 1963,
Subject: Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam..Here, quite inconspicuously and without any reference to NSAM 263, we find those important lines about:
"2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time" i.e. 1965.
(Note with care the choice of words here. JFK planned to withdraw "U.S. personnel". He did not limit his policy to "military personnel".
This is most significant. U.S. Military units did not land in Vietnam until April 1965. From 1945 to 1965 the bulk of "U.S. personnel" in Vietnam were under the operational control of the CIA. These units were such as the CIA's "SAIGON MILITARY MISSION" under the direction of CIA's Edward G. Lansdale in those years under the "cover" of a U.S. Air Force colonel assignment. The large "U.S.M.C."-type helicopter units that had been introduced into Vietnam during the latter part of 1960 were also under the operational control of the CIA and were maintained by civilians. As a result, this policy to withdraw "U.S. personnel" was a major threat to the CIA and its suppliers along with its own massive plans for Southeast Asia warfare.) (Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty's book "JFK, The CIA, Vietnam & The Plot To Assassinate JFK", 1992)
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This NSAM 263 was JFK's plan for getting all Americans out of Vietnam and one of the main planks for his platform for re-election in 1964. As things turned out, this was another bullet for the Guns of Dallas. Yet since that time this powerful policy statement, NSAM 263, has been carefully unidentified, denied and even today there are many writers of repute and historians who swear that it does not, and never did, exist.
For example: On December 15, 1991, just after Oliver Stone's film "JFK" had been released, one of the most important writers for the New York TIMES, Tom Wicker, wrote:
"Does JFK Conspire Against Reason?" and added, "I know of no reputable historian who has documented Kennedy's intentions..."
This with respect to the business of the Honolulu Conference of November 20, 1963, and JFK's earlier policy that all American personnel would be out of Vietnam by the end of 1965.(See N.Y. Times 11/21/63 for story on this conference and a "1,000 men home by Christmas" article.)
I do not know who Wicker labels "reputable historians" and many wonder if Wicker and other writers in his business had realized that this crucial NSAM 263 appears in the "Pentagon Papers" with that statement about all U.S. personnel being out of Vietnam by the end of 1965. The editors of the "Pentagon Papers" had taken the trouble to segment this official NSAM publication to conceal it; but experienced researchers can find it, with a little assistance.
It should be noted, as above, that the Chief of the Special Group of historians who compiled the "Pentagon Papers" for McNamara was, at a later date, none other than the Editor of the New York TIMES, Leslie Gelb. He ought to have let his fine reporter, Tom Wicker, in on the story. But that is how these things are done.
Prouty continues his look at NSAM #263 and NSAM #273.
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REFERENCE DATA #1: NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM #263
a) Front page photo, "PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES" Authorized publication of the Armed Forces in the Far East, Friday, October 4, 1963.
b) Source document from Congressional Record, "The PENTAGON PAPERS" with pages #751-#766, Document 142, (b) "Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam."
c) Source document from Congressional Record, "The PENTAGON PAPERS" with pages #769-#770, Document 146,(c) "National Security Action Memorandum Number 263". This most important item is presented in only 10 lines, and says almost nothing about the content of NSAM 263. It is dated October 11, 1963, meaning that the President had approved it, and it is signed by McGeorge Bundy to confirm its authenticity.
It will be noted that it does include the lines:
"The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section 1B (1-3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963."
This brief extract from NSAM 263 says nothing about the fact that the JFK's policy was to have all U.S. personnel out of Vietnam by the end of 1965. This most important statement is buried in item B above.
d) Items B and C above are taken from Volume II of "The Defense Department History of United States Decision making on Vietnam", a.k.a. the "Pentagon Papers". This next item is an exact copy of the "NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263" as it appeared on October 11, 1963, with McGeorge Bundy's signature for authorization. It will be noted that anyone who obtained a copy of this highly classified Document, NSAM 263, October 11, 1963, on White House stationary, (d) has almost nothing to tell him what JFK had approved.
REFERENCE DATA #2: NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM #273, NOVEMBER 26, 1963.
Two copies of this NSAM 273 exist. The first, is on White House stationary and was signed by McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This signature authenticates Presidential approval. Also, it lists the primary distribution of official copies within NSC. The second copy, also dated November 26, 1963, is not on White House stationary, does not have the Bundy signature and does not have the NSC file copy names. It is either a "working draft" or a forgery.
In many ways this White House directive is the antithesis of NSAM 263. It may be vital evidence of the advance planning for the assassination. It was drafted on November 21, 1963, and therefore may be considered, technically, to have been a statement of Presidential policy...but which President? It was drafted while JFK was alive, by his National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy; yet it was not authenticated until signed by Bundy after LBJ was in office, November 26, 1963, after some significant changes on a November 24, 1963, draft. Just this sequence tells quite a story about the Presidency and about Vietnam policy between October 2, 1963, and November 26, 1963.
You will note after you have compared this draft with the most unusual first Bundy draft of November 21st, that the deletion of a portion of that first draft places a great burden upon the interpretation of these two drafts. The original November 21 draft, written by McGeorge Bundy and distributed to many of the top offices of the Government on that date created much discussion about its timing, because Bundy had attended the Honolulu Conference, November 20, 1963, with Secretary McNamara. The Conference ended on November 20 and according to Pierre Salinger, JFK's Press Secretary, McGeorge Bundy left Honolulu on the "night of the 21st".
When and where could Bundy have been to have written this draft of November 21...in Honolulu or on the airplane en route to Washington, i.e. nine hours? Other records show that he chaired a meeting in the White House at 8:00 am on the 22. No matter how we look at it, this draft and its following copies, up to its Presidential approval, represent a rare government action...when it is known that JFK was assassinated at 12:30 pm in Dallas on the 22.
NOTE: In paragraph four of Bundy's first draft of NSAM 273 it appears that he may have had something else, other than Vietnam policy, on his mind on November 21, 1963. Rather strangely, in this original draft that he circulated among many of the top echelons of the Government, with personal "Cover Letters" to the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone and to his brother William in McNamara's office, he wrote some most important lines that appear to have more to do with a potential emergency situation in the United States than any connection with Vietnam policy as described by NSAM 263, October 11, 1963. One of these powerful statements follows:
"4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and abroad." (Ibid.)
Draft: jfkjmn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/image23.jpeg.jpg
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Final: history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d331
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Read that carefully! This draft places the "highest importance" on the fact that the "U.S. Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination (FOR WHAT?) from one part of it ("it" is a singular pronoun and limits this subject to the U.S. Government, alone, and does not include Vietnam!) against another."
What did Bundy and these other top officials know on November 21,1963, that caused them to circulate such a document? Could they have been aware of the elaborate decision that had been made for the assassination planned for the very next day?
On the other hand, this hardly seems like the type of highest-level policy statement that JFK would have dictated on, or just before, November 21, 1963. He had left on a speaking tour of Texas. Certainly, if he had thought some major event that would create a massive up-rising was about to take place, he would not have gone off to Texas with Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Texas Governor John Connally and Congressman Ralph Yarborough, nor would he have authorized the majority of his Cabinet officers to fly together to Japan on November 19.
This "Mac" Bundy draft was written and circulated widely throughout the upper echelons of the government from the White House on November 21, 1963, the day before JFK was assassinated.
Keep in mind the opening lines of Bundy's draft are:
"The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned..."
Then in paragraph 4, of the November 21, 1963, first draft of this NSAM we find this Presidential policy statement....considering that the assassination took place during the next twenty-four hours, saying, "It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field."
If this policy of NSAM 273 was actually dictated by JFK, then what was Bundy's real intention with that cryptic bit of writing on the day before President Kennedy's death? Was that Bundy's secret warning of the impending assassination? Did he know about the assassination plot?
Where was Bundy himself when he wrote it? In the normal course of events that draft of an NSAM would have been circulated to other top officials and then signed by JFK as his "Vietnam Policy". Consider these choices with care:
a) was Bundy telling us what JFK wanted done, i.e. "all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to ensure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and abroad."
b) or was this a concealed warning highlighted in the draft of NSAM 273, from McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's "Special Assistant for National Security Affairs" to other top officials of the U.S. Government informing them that he believed the President was going to be assassinated? Does this mean that Bundy, among others, knew of the assassination plot on November 21? If not, why would he have written such an ominous statement without a reference to the main subject of these NSAMs: VIETNAM?
Then, in the routine processing and coordination of draft documents, and with the passing of time and other events...in this case an assassination, this strange paragraph #4 of the November 21, 1963, first draft was deleted right after the President's death. It does not appear, in its initial awesome language of November 21, in the draft documents of November 24, 1963, and it is nowhere to be seen in the final and presidentially approved draft of November 26, 1963. This important progression warrants careful study and consideration of its relevancy to the possibility of top-level knowledge of the assassination planning beforehand.
No where in the final, presidentially approved, version of the November 26 draft of NSAM 273 does that quotation from paragraph 4 of the Bundy draft of November 21, 1963, appear as written.
As written above, Bundy's paragraph 4 statement makes reference only to the "United States Government" and to its "Senior Officers" while the Johnson approved content of NASM 273 on November 24 and on November 26 directly introduces the "U.S. policy in South Vietnam".
It should be noted that the words "South Vietnam" and "Vietnam" both appear in that final document that was signed by "McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson for National Security Affairs" on November 26, 1963. As printed then NSAM 273 was all but a meaningless document. It did indicate the possibility of changes in the NSAM 263 Vietnam policy document; but the real and significant changes did not appear until the publication of NSAM 288, March 17, 1964.
The U.S. Gov't Printing Office source book, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol IV" states that both Bundys, William who worked for McNamara in the Pentagon and McGeorge who worked for JFK in the White House, were at the Honolulu Conference of November 20, 1963, with a long list of dignitaries to discuss the problems in Saigon since the assassinations of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu on November 1, 1963.
I'll quote the FRUS book:
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"When someone asked Bundy why he was going, (to this Conference in Honolulu) he replied that he had been instructed."
I possess a letter dated May 1, 1991, on Bundy's office stationery of that period, and signed by McGeorge Bundy that addressed the identical question put to him in 1991. He answered then rather interestingly, "I do not think I went to Honolulu that week." (Meaning the week that included November 20, 1963.)
Furthermore, from the official, Memorandum for the Record of Discussion at the Daily White House Staff Meeting, Washington, November 22, 1963, 8 a.m. McGeorge Bundy opened the meeting with the comment "that he was very impressed with the idea of traveling by jet to distant places and holding a conference. The fact that he was able to get a good night's sleep before arriving in Honolulu and that the whole trip was effortless and comfortable made a deep impression on him".
These are his official words about his trip to and from Honolulu; yet in his May 1, 1991, letter he writes, "I did not think I went to Honolulu that week." (My note: in normal times it could be expected for someone not to remember 27 years later if they went on a trip or not, but since this was right before the assassination he should remember.)
In fairness to McGeorge Bundy I must add that I also possess a second letter on the subject of his presence the Honolulu Conference, dated September 11,1991, on his office stationery. It includes the following statement about his attendance in Honolulu saying, "I have talked with other people who are at work on this history and now I have it clear in my head that I did indeed go to the meeting in Honolulu." So now, in his own words, he was in Honolulu on November 20, 1963, and most likely for parts of November 19 and November 21. Because of this timing, I have wondered, when did he have time to speak with Kennedy about the content of the NSAM draft and to write that "Draft of the November 21, 1963, version of NSAM 273," and who directed him to write it? This is a most important question. (Ibid.)
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At the time of JFK's death, a massive "Cover Story" had been created and orchestrated by the decision makers of a highest level "Power Elite" to provide a format of "Governmental Published Evidence" to support its theme that JFK was killed by a "Lone Gunman" who fired three shots from the Texas School Book Depository. It is their contention that there was then, and is now, no conspiracy, a single gunman did it...alone. That's all! That's not true. Two, little known, frequently misquoted but most important U.S. Government documents can be used to prove otherwise.
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They may be used as proof of the fact that JFK was the victim of a well planned and classically executed assassination as the result of a decision made--perhaps not long after his election in 1960--by members of a "Power Elite" element of the "Military Industrial Complex" and their powerful bankers, who...on many counts, they believed...had already been seriously damaged, by mid-1963, by JFK's plans and policies. Perhaps chief among these was:
"A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time."
For those who had invested deeply since the decisions of the Teheran Conference of late 1943 in official plans for that costly warfare, this National Security Action Memorandum 263 was an enormous threat. They had been busy since September 2, 1945, investing in the massive base for that warfare, and they believed that it would be entirely possible to prolong that warfare into 1975, despite the growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. By Pentagon planning experience such a "war" could easily create expenditures, at home and abroad, well into the $500 billion range. (Ibid.)
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This was the goal of the "Power Elite". But, as they realized by late 1963, with JFK most certain to be re-elected to a second term in 1964, and with the JFK Vietnam policy stated in NSAM 263 his re-election and his promise to have all American personnel out of Vietnam by the end of 1965 were assured. He had to be stopped before the 1964 election campaign, and before he left the city of Dallas.
(Portions of this post are from the works of the late, great Lt. Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty who was a foremost expert in this subject.)
NSAM 263:
fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-jfk/nsam263.jpg
11/21/63 NSAM 273 Draft:
jfkjmn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/image23.jpeg.jpg
jfkjmn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/VERSION2.jpg
www.bibliotecapleyades.net/imagenes_sociopol/nwo176_02.jpg
If President John F. Kennedy’s (JFK) Vietnam policy didn't have anything to do with his assassination, why is there so much mystery regarding National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 263? (NSAM 273 will be discussed as well.)
NSAM 273 was drafted a day before JFK's assassination and basically reverses his policy of removing all U.S. personnel (i.e. CIA advisors) by 1965. It was also drafted by William Bundy when the normal person who wrote JFK's NSAMs was his brother McGeorge Bundy who was his National Security Advisor. Why did William Bundy draft this particular NSAM?
Notice how the draft says, "The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu...". Well, these discussions never occurred in Honolulu since they turned back for Washington, D.C., once they were alerted about the assassination. They certainly did not have them by November 21, 1963, so this shows that there was a plan in place to reverse JFK's stated objectives.
This is a lengthy story, but worth the read if you don't know the whole story of these two documents.
They are key to the bigger picture. There is a cryptic section 4 to the 273 draft (11/21/63) that is not in the final signed version, and it has nothing to do with Vietnam. Is it proof of foreknowledge of a conspiracy? You decide for yourself.
A photograph of the front page of the "Pacific Stars and Stripes", (reference a, enclosed) the official U.S. Armed Forces Newspaper, datelined October 4, 1963, with the lead headline serves to verify and date its existence in public:
"WHITE HOUSE REPORT: U.S. TROOPS SEEN OUT OF VIET BY '65."
lbjthemasterofdeceit.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/2020-06-22-5.png
This photograph shows JFK, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor in the Oval Office with the "Saigon Trip Report" on the coffee table, dated October 2, 1963. This most important policy statement was approved by JFK on October 11, 1963, and the news of its existence has been available to the press since October 3, 1963. The New York Times carried the story on November 21, 1963.
Why then, of all White House policy statements, have so many newsmen and historians written vehemently that JFK's NSAM 263 does not exist?
Let's look at a part of the record of this "Cover Story", much of which has been created and sustained by elements of the U.S. Government in opposition to the Kennedy record. Here is information from Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty's book "JFK, The CIA, Vietnam & The Plot To Assassinate JFK").
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a) On June 17, 1967, Secretary Robert McNamara directed one of his senior associates, Leslie H. Gelb, to form a Pentagon task force to study the "History of United States involvement in Vietnam from World War II, September 2, 1945, to the present." Note that important date. Most people do not realize that the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam began on the same day as the end of World War II against Japan. This study was presented to Secretary Clark Clifford, McNamara's successor, on Jan 15, 1969. Because of the Daniel Ellsberg incident (Ellsberg used to work in the same Pentagon offices where Gelb worked during the sixties), this Vietnam Task Force Study became known as the "Pentagon Papers".
b) On pages 769-770, Vol II, of these "Pentagon Papers" there appears a Document 146 (c) entitled,
"NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263
TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: South Vietnam"
However only 10 lines of this long "Trip report" are published under the "NSAM 263" heading and they simply list the fact that:
"The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section 1, B (1-3)* of the Report" and that, "no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963."[/b]
fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-jfk/nsam263.jpg
*NOTE the reference to "Section 1, B (1-3)" is to the real content of NSAM 263 that appears as Document 142, (b) Vol II and is not labeled as NSAM 263. Thus, the important JFK Vietnam policy of October 11, 1963, is concealed by such omissions.
Yet, this is the only place in the entire Report that lists the title of Document #146 of this massive study as "NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263, OCT 11, 1963."
Years after JFK's death, someone had decided that historical researchers should not have any help in finding this most important Presidential document...a most significant factor itself in the decision to assassinate the JFK on November 22, 1963. This scheme to mislabel and to divide NSAM 263 into two parts confused the issue of JFK’s Vietnam policy unnecessarily.
b) On pages 751-766, VOL II, there is a Document #142:
"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, 2 October 1963,
Subject: Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam..Here, quite inconspicuously and without any reference to NSAM 263, we find those important lines about:
"2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time" i.e. 1965.
(Note with care the choice of words here. JFK planned to withdraw "U.S. personnel". He did not limit his policy to "military personnel".
This is most significant. U.S. Military units did not land in Vietnam until April 1965. From 1945 to 1965 the bulk of "U.S. personnel" in Vietnam were under the operational control of the CIA. These units were such as the CIA's "SAIGON MILITARY MISSION" under the direction of CIA's Edward G. Lansdale in those years under the "cover" of a U.S. Air Force colonel assignment. The large "U.S.M.C."-type helicopter units that had been introduced into Vietnam during the latter part of 1960 were also under the operational control of the CIA and were maintained by civilians. As a result, this policy to withdraw "U.S. personnel" was a major threat to the CIA and its suppliers along with its own massive plans for Southeast Asia warfare.) (Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty's book "JFK, The CIA, Vietnam & The Plot To Assassinate JFK", 1992)
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This NSAM 263 was JFK's plan for getting all Americans out of Vietnam and one of the main planks for his platform for re-election in 1964. As things turned out, this was another bullet for the Guns of Dallas. Yet since that time this powerful policy statement, NSAM 263, has been carefully unidentified, denied and even today there are many writers of repute and historians who swear that it does not, and never did, exist.
For example: On December 15, 1991, just after Oliver Stone's film "JFK" had been released, one of the most important writers for the New York TIMES, Tom Wicker, wrote:
"Does JFK Conspire Against Reason?" and added, "I know of no reputable historian who has documented Kennedy's intentions..."
This with respect to the business of the Honolulu Conference of November 20, 1963, and JFK's earlier policy that all American personnel would be out of Vietnam by the end of 1965.(See N.Y. Times 11/21/63 for story on this conference and a "1,000 men home by Christmas" article.)
I do not know who Wicker labels "reputable historians" and many wonder if Wicker and other writers in his business had realized that this crucial NSAM 263 appears in the "Pentagon Papers" with that statement about all U.S. personnel being out of Vietnam by the end of 1965. The editors of the "Pentagon Papers" had taken the trouble to segment this official NSAM publication to conceal it; but experienced researchers can find it, with a little assistance.
It should be noted, as above, that the Chief of the Special Group of historians who compiled the "Pentagon Papers" for McNamara was, at a later date, none other than the Editor of the New York TIMES, Leslie Gelb. He ought to have let his fine reporter, Tom Wicker, in on the story. But that is how these things are done.
Prouty continues his look at NSAM #263 and NSAM #273.
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REFERENCE DATA #1: NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM #263
a) Front page photo, "PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES" Authorized publication of the Armed Forces in the Far East, Friday, October 4, 1963.
b) Source document from Congressional Record, "The PENTAGON PAPERS" with pages #751-#766, Document 142, (b) "Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam."
c) Source document from Congressional Record, "The PENTAGON PAPERS" with pages #769-#770, Document 146,(c) "National Security Action Memorandum Number 263". This most important item is presented in only 10 lines, and says almost nothing about the content of NSAM 263. It is dated October 11, 1963, meaning that the President had approved it, and it is signed by McGeorge Bundy to confirm its authenticity.
It will be noted that it does include the lines:
"The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section 1B (1-3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963."
This brief extract from NSAM 263 says nothing about the fact that the JFK's policy was to have all U.S. personnel out of Vietnam by the end of 1965. This most important statement is buried in item B above.
d) Items B and C above are taken from Volume II of "The Defense Department History of United States Decision making on Vietnam", a.k.a. the "Pentagon Papers". This next item is an exact copy of the "NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263" as it appeared on October 11, 1963, with McGeorge Bundy's signature for authorization. It will be noted that anyone who obtained a copy of this highly classified Document, NSAM 263, October 11, 1963, on White House stationary, (d) has almost nothing to tell him what JFK had approved.
REFERENCE DATA #2: NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM #273, NOVEMBER 26, 1963.
Two copies of this NSAM 273 exist. The first, is on White House stationary and was signed by McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This signature authenticates Presidential approval. Also, it lists the primary distribution of official copies within NSC. The second copy, also dated November 26, 1963, is not on White House stationary, does not have the Bundy signature and does not have the NSC file copy names. It is either a "working draft" or a forgery.
In many ways this White House directive is the antithesis of NSAM 263. It may be vital evidence of the advance planning for the assassination. It was drafted on November 21, 1963, and therefore may be considered, technically, to have been a statement of Presidential policy...but which President? It was drafted while JFK was alive, by his National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy; yet it was not authenticated until signed by Bundy after LBJ was in office, November 26, 1963, after some significant changes on a November 24, 1963, draft. Just this sequence tells quite a story about the Presidency and about Vietnam policy between October 2, 1963, and November 26, 1963.
You will note after you have compared this draft with the most unusual first Bundy draft of November 21st, that the deletion of a portion of that first draft places a great burden upon the interpretation of these two drafts. The original November 21 draft, written by McGeorge Bundy and distributed to many of the top offices of the Government on that date created much discussion about its timing, because Bundy had attended the Honolulu Conference, November 20, 1963, with Secretary McNamara. The Conference ended on November 20 and according to Pierre Salinger, JFK's Press Secretary, McGeorge Bundy left Honolulu on the "night of the 21st".
When and where could Bundy have been to have written this draft of November 21...in Honolulu or on the airplane en route to Washington, i.e. nine hours? Other records show that he chaired a meeting in the White House at 8:00 am on the 22. No matter how we look at it, this draft and its following copies, up to its Presidential approval, represent a rare government action...when it is known that JFK was assassinated at 12:30 pm in Dallas on the 22.
NOTE: In paragraph four of Bundy's first draft of NSAM 273 it appears that he may have had something else, other than Vietnam policy, on his mind on November 21, 1963. Rather strangely, in this original draft that he circulated among many of the top echelons of the Government, with personal "Cover Letters" to the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone and to his brother William in McNamara's office, he wrote some most important lines that appear to have more to do with a potential emergency situation in the United States than any connection with Vietnam policy as described by NSAM 263, October 11, 1963. One of these powerful statements follows:
"4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and abroad." (Ibid.)
Draft: jfkjmn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/image23.jpeg.jpg
jfkjmn.com/new-page-77/
Final: history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d331
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Read that carefully! This draft places the "highest importance" on the fact that the "U.S. Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination (FOR WHAT?) from one part of it ("it" is a singular pronoun and limits this subject to the U.S. Government, alone, and does not include Vietnam!) against another."
What did Bundy and these other top officials know on November 21,1963, that caused them to circulate such a document? Could they have been aware of the elaborate decision that had been made for the assassination planned for the very next day?
On the other hand, this hardly seems like the type of highest-level policy statement that JFK would have dictated on, or just before, November 21, 1963. He had left on a speaking tour of Texas. Certainly, if he had thought some major event that would create a massive up-rising was about to take place, he would not have gone off to Texas with Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Texas Governor John Connally and Congressman Ralph Yarborough, nor would he have authorized the majority of his Cabinet officers to fly together to Japan on November 19.
This "Mac" Bundy draft was written and circulated widely throughout the upper echelons of the government from the White House on November 21, 1963, the day before JFK was assassinated.
Keep in mind the opening lines of Bundy's draft are:
"The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned..."
Then in paragraph 4, of the November 21, 1963, first draft of this NSAM we find this Presidential policy statement....considering that the assassination took place during the next twenty-four hours, saying, "It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field."
If this policy of NSAM 273 was actually dictated by JFK, then what was Bundy's real intention with that cryptic bit of writing on the day before President Kennedy's death? Was that Bundy's secret warning of the impending assassination? Did he know about the assassination plot?
Where was Bundy himself when he wrote it? In the normal course of events that draft of an NSAM would have been circulated to other top officials and then signed by JFK as his "Vietnam Policy". Consider these choices with care:
a) was Bundy telling us what JFK wanted done, i.e. "all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to ensure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and abroad."
b) or was this a concealed warning highlighted in the draft of NSAM 273, from McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's "Special Assistant for National Security Affairs" to other top officials of the U.S. Government informing them that he believed the President was going to be assassinated? Does this mean that Bundy, among others, knew of the assassination plot on November 21? If not, why would he have written such an ominous statement without a reference to the main subject of these NSAMs: VIETNAM?
Then, in the routine processing and coordination of draft documents, and with the passing of time and other events...in this case an assassination, this strange paragraph #4 of the November 21, 1963, first draft was deleted right after the President's death. It does not appear, in its initial awesome language of November 21, in the draft documents of November 24, 1963, and it is nowhere to be seen in the final and presidentially approved draft of November 26, 1963. This important progression warrants careful study and consideration of its relevancy to the possibility of top-level knowledge of the assassination planning beforehand.
No where in the final, presidentially approved, version of the November 26 draft of NSAM 273 does that quotation from paragraph 4 of the Bundy draft of November 21, 1963, appear as written.
As written above, Bundy's paragraph 4 statement makes reference only to the "United States Government" and to its "Senior Officers" while the Johnson approved content of NASM 273 on November 24 and on November 26 directly introduces the "U.S. policy in South Vietnam".
It should be noted that the words "South Vietnam" and "Vietnam" both appear in that final document that was signed by "McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson for National Security Affairs" on November 26, 1963. As printed then NSAM 273 was all but a meaningless document. It did indicate the possibility of changes in the NSAM 263 Vietnam policy document; but the real and significant changes did not appear until the publication of NSAM 288, March 17, 1964.
The U.S. Gov't Printing Office source book, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol IV" states that both Bundys, William who worked for McNamara in the Pentagon and McGeorge who worked for JFK in the White House, were at the Honolulu Conference of November 20, 1963, with a long list of dignitaries to discuss the problems in Saigon since the assassinations of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu on November 1, 1963.
I'll quote the FRUS book:
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"When someone asked Bundy why he was going, (to this Conference in Honolulu) he replied that he had been instructed."
I possess a letter dated May 1, 1991, on Bundy's office stationery of that period, and signed by McGeorge Bundy that addressed the identical question put to him in 1991. He answered then rather interestingly, "I do not think I went to Honolulu that week." (Meaning the week that included November 20, 1963.)
Furthermore, from the official, Memorandum for the Record of Discussion at the Daily White House Staff Meeting, Washington, November 22, 1963, 8 a.m. McGeorge Bundy opened the meeting with the comment "that he was very impressed with the idea of traveling by jet to distant places and holding a conference. The fact that he was able to get a good night's sleep before arriving in Honolulu and that the whole trip was effortless and comfortable made a deep impression on him".
These are his official words about his trip to and from Honolulu; yet in his May 1, 1991, letter he writes, "I did not think I went to Honolulu that week." (My note: in normal times it could be expected for someone not to remember 27 years later if they went on a trip or not, but since this was right before the assassination he should remember.)
In fairness to McGeorge Bundy I must add that I also possess a second letter on the subject of his presence the Honolulu Conference, dated September 11,1991, on his office stationery. It includes the following statement about his attendance in Honolulu saying, "I have talked with other people who are at work on this history and now I have it clear in my head that I did indeed go to the meeting in Honolulu." So now, in his own words, he was in Honolulu on November 20, 1963, and most likely for parts of November 19 and November 21. Because of this timing, I have wondered, when did he have time to speak with Kennedy about the content of the NSAM draft and to write that "Draft of the November 21, 1963, version of NSAM 273," and who directed him to write it? This is a most important question. (Ibid.)
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At the time of JFK's death, a massive "Cover Story" had been created and orchestrated by the decision makers of a highest level "Power Elite" to provide a format of "Governmental Published Evidence" to support its theme that JFK was killed by a "Lone Gunman" who fired three shots from the Texas School Book Depository. It is their contention that there was then, and is now, no conspiracy, a single gunman did it...alone. That's all! That's not true. Two, little known, frequently misquoted but most important U.S. Government documents can be used to prove otherwise.
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They may be used as proof of the fact that JFK was the victim of a well planned and classically executed assassination as the result of a decision made--perhaps not long after his election in 1960--by members of a "Power Elite" element of the "Military Industrial Complex" and their powerful bankers, who...on many counts, they believed...had already been seriously damaged, by mid-1963, by JFK's plans and policies. Perhaps chief among these was:
"A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time."
For those who had invested deeply since the decisions of the Teheran Conference of late 1943 in official plans for that costly warfare, this National Security Action Memorandum 263 was an enormous threat. They had been busy since September 2, 1945, investing in the massive base for that warfare, and they believed that it would be entirely possible to prolong that warfare into 1975, despite the growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. By Pentagon planning experience such a "war" could easily create expenditures, at home and abroad, well into the $500 billion range. (Ibid.)
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This was the goal of the "Power Elite". But, as they realized by late 1963, with JFK most certain to be re-elected to a second term in 1964, and with the JFK Vietnam policy stated in NSAM 263 his re-election and his promise to have all American personnel out of Vietnam by the end of 1965 were assured. He had to be stopped before the 1964 election campaign, and before he left the city of Dallas.