Post by Rob Caprio on Jul 4, 2024 20:51:15 GMT -5
All portions are ©️ Robert Caprio 2006-2025
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Written in 2012
[Note: Since the writing of this I have become more suspicious of Kenneth O'Donnell. Every major conspiracy in history always has an inside person involved. Was he the person filling this role?]
The Warren Commission (WC) said that Lee Harvey Oswald (LHO) shot and killed President John F. Kennedy (JFK) all by himself, but a key part of the planning process would be the knowledge of the motorcade route through Dallas. The WC contented that this was a PLANNED event by LHO, thus, they had to show LHO knew JFK would be coming near his place of work. Otherwise, they had to explain why he did NOT leave work or call out of work on November 22, 1963, so he could go to where he could shoot at JFK.
This article will look at the issue of the motorcade in more detail.
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Over sixty years later I am still waiting for evidence that shows this was a premeditated act. As we saw in article #19 (Premeditation Issue) there is NO evidence showing LHO was preparing for JFK’s arrival, in fact, the opposite was true as there is much evidence showing he was WORKING all morning. What kind of assassin bothers to work all morning when they had to be ready to shoot JFK at 12:25 p.m. (JFK was running five minutes late, but LHO acting alone could NOT know this)?
There has been much discussion over the last sixty years about the motorcade route and when this was determined and published in order for LHO to learn about it. Again, there is NO evidence showing when and how LHO would have learned about this. Furthermore, we have evidence that is counter to this claim as there is testimony by a coworker showing LHO did NOT know what “all the fuss was about” the morning of November 22, 1963. This is from article #19 in the "Statements That Sink The WC's Conclusions" series.
Mr. BALL - Did you talk to him again that morning?
Mr. JARMAN - Yes, sir. I talked to him again later on that morning.
Mr. BALL - About what time?
Mr. JARMAN - It was between 9:30 and 10 o'clock, I believe.
Mr. BALL - Where were you when you talked to him?
Mr. JARMAN - In between two rows of bins.
Mr. BALL - On what floor?
Mr. JARMAN - On the first floor.
Mr. BALL - And what was said by him and by you?
Mr. JARMAN - Well, he was standing up in the window and I went to the window also, and he asked me what were the people gathering around on the corner for, and I told him that the President was supposed to pass that morning, and he asked me did I know which way he was coming, and I told him, yes; he probably come down Main and turn on Houston and then back again on Elm. Then he said, "Oh, I see," and that was all.
Now, as I said then, he could have been playacting, but why bother? Why would he even bring this up unless he really did not know as this created a witness against himself if he was caught and went to trial. This is important in understanding the context of the motorcade route and the claims made against LHO, but it is not the focal point of this particular article so if you are interested, I suggest you search the archives for #19.
Secret Service (SS) Agent Winston Lawson would testify before the WC regarding this issue and others. It should be noted that Lawson had been a former member of Army Intelligence, and this should be remembered. Here is his testimony about this.
Mr. STERN. Briefly, what was your employment experience from 1949 to 1959.
Mr. LAWSON. ...I had 16 weeks of basic infantry, basic training, went to the CIC Counterintelligence School in Holabird, Md.--Fort Holabird, Md.--outside of Baltimore, and then was assigned eventually to the Lexington field office where I did general counterintelligence work for the Army, background investigations, and some interviews of the prisoners, POW's from the Korean war…
Mr. STERN. Will you tell us of your experience in the Secret Service, describing briefly each assignment of work?
Mr. McCLOY. When you say CIC agent you mean----
Mr. LAWSON. Counterintelligence agent; yes, sir, in the Army.
Thank you Mr. McCloy as Mr. Stern was ready to just move on from this valuable information. Perhaps it is another in an endless line of coincidences, but keep in mind the 112th Military Intelligence Group out of Fort Sam Houston, Texas, was instrumental in providing the Dallas Police Department (DPD) and the FBI with the information allegedly showing LHO used the alias “A. Hidell.” Also, Lieutenant Jack Revill picked up an Army Intelligence man on the day of the assassination and took him to police headquarters.
Lawson was responsible for the trip planning including the motorcade route. Did his connection to military intelligence have any bearing on the choice of the route and site of the luncheon? He would make this cryptic comment during his testimony that has left many wondering what he meant.
Mr. STERN. It is the 19th. Had there been a meeting on the 18th at which this was considered?
Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; there was a meeting late in the afternoon of the 18th, in a private club in Dallas that I arrived at late. The meeting was called primarily as I understand it because of the various political groups that wanted certain things, and what Washington wanted, and there were various problems to work out as to who got tickets, who sat at the head table, who rode in what cars and so forth. And the local host committee had designated a certain individual to be their representative there, and then these other groups also had people represented. Mr. Puterbaugh, for example, the liaison man that went with me from Washington, was there. And I had just come from going over the route with the police earlier that afternoon, and I told them as a point of information that this was the route as we had it now, unless it was changed later.
Just a thought, but was this meeting at the Dallas Petroleum Club? Lawson said the meeting was at a private club in Dallas. If not the Dallas Petroleum Club, then where was this meeting held? For more on this place, see this article.
jfkconspiracyforum.freeforums.net/thread/1664/garrison-chronicles-dallas-petroleum-club
Who could have changed the route later once the SS and Dallas Police Department (DPD) had agreed on it? Was it changed later is the big question. Of course, the WC and its current day defenders say NO, but we will look at this in more detail in this article. Both Mr. Stern and Mr. Dulles asked if this was normal in terms of when the trip was announced as they obviously felt it was not safe to announce it three days in advance and it seems things would change after JFK’s murder, but a lot of good that did him.
Mr. DULLES. One has to do it in time so that those who want it could get it, but it seems to me that say if the party was going to move here about noon, now if the morning papers gave that that would give people plenty of time to get to the positions they wanted, but wouldn't give a prospective assassin very much time to prepare.
This is why several of the WC members had questions about the announcement being made on the nineteenth of November instead of that morning. Also, another question many have asked over the years is this--why was the Trade Mart selected for the visit instead of the Women’s Building? It is common knowledge by now that the Trade Mart was favored by Governer John B. Connally (JBC) and Frank Erwin, whereas the JFK staff preferred the Women’s Building. We can go to the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) volumes for this information.
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(34) The Kennedy staff, on the other hand, preferred the Women’s Building, which they saw as providing a better forum for contact with liberal elements in the party. Politically, the large size of the Women’s Building would have allowed 4,000 people to be admitted and would therefore have benefited Kennedy by permitting his liberal constituents to participate in the luncheon. In their view, that location, in conjunction with the motorcade, would have enhanced their ability to reach the poor, the middle class, labor and ethnic minorities.
(35) The route necessitated by the Kennedy’s staff preference for the Women’s Building would have led EASTWARD along Main Street toward the fair grounds, which lay to the southeast of the Mains Street business district. The motorcade’s access to the western end of Main Street on the western side of Dealey Plaza would have been provided by a cloverleaf exit that led into the Plaza from the expressway, just west of the Dealey Plaza triple overpass. After passing through the overpass, the motorcade would then have continued, at what [Jerry] Bruno stated was the President’s CUSTOMARILY HIGH RATE OF SPEED—40 or 50 miles per hour—into Main Street within Dealey Plaza. The distance on Main Street from the bottom of the triple overpass to the point where crowds would be gathered (at the Houston Street intersection) would have been crossed AT THAT SPEED. Deceleration of the motorcade would have commenced when the crowds were reached. (HSCA XI, p. 515) (Emphasis added)
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These two paragraphs show the power of the conspiracy in play as the Women’s Building option, the one FAVORED by JFK’s own staff, would have made the shooting of JFK nearly impossible due to the different direction of the motorcade and SPEED of the motorcade. Jerry Bruno was the ADVANCE MAN for JFK, and he said the speed the motorcades usually traveled at when there were NO crowds (and there were none INSIDE Dealey Plaza (DP)) was FORTY TO FIFTY m.p.h.! And yet, for years we have seen WC defenders claim the SS manual did NOT say the motorcade should maintain a high rate of speed or that this was rubbish, but we see here it is NOT rubbish. IF the Women’s Building was selected then the motorcade would have gone through DP so fast NO one could have shot JFK. But, despite the wishes of JFK’s staff the Women’s Building was NOT chosen. Why?
Well according to some the selection of the Trade Mart was made because it looked more “Presidential” than the Women’s Building. SS Agent-in-charge for Dallas Forest Sorrels said the Women’s building was not appealing for a President to be in.
Mr. SORRELS - …We then went to Fair Park, where we made a survey of the Women's Building. It is a place where they have exhibits during the fair of all kinds of handiwork and things like that.
That building had about 45,000 square feet in it, and you could seat about 5,000 people in it. Security wise it wasn't bad at all, because there were two end openings to the building, and there was actually an area where you could drive a car in there. But the building was not satisfactory for that type of function--the President of the United States coming there--because the ceilings were quite low, the air-conditioning equipment and everything was all exposed, there were many steel suspension supports throughout the area.
I then returned to my office and telephoned to Mr. Behn and informed him of my findings and told him that security wise the Women's Building appeared to be preferable, but that it wasn't a very nice place to take the President.
They couldn’t dress it up for the President’s visit? I find that hard to believe. Notice too how he said that “security wise it was NOT bad at all.” Compare that to what was said about the Trade Mart.
Mr. STERN - Let's see if we can relate this now to President Kennedy's trip Dallas in November. When did you first hear that he was to make this trip, Mr. Sorrels?
Mr. SORRELS - On November 4, 1963, I received a long distance call from Special Agent in Charge Gerald A. Behn, of the White House Detail, stating that the President would probably visit Dallas about November 21, and that there had been a couple of buildings suggested, one of them being the Trade Mart, which he understood had about 60 entrances to it, and six catwalks over the area where the luncheon would be. And that the second choice that had been suggested then was the Women's Building at the State Fair Grounds. That was another place referred to as a trade center, which is actually Market Hall, which is across the street from the Trade Mart. He instructed that I make a survey of these buildings and report back to him the conditions.
Mr. STERN - What did you do?
Mr. SORRELS - Accompanied by Special Agent Robert A. Stewart of my office, we went to the Trade Mart and looked the situation over there, and we did find that there were entrances coming into, you might call it, a courtyard where the luncheon was to have been entrances coming into that area. And that there were two suspension bridges or catwalks on the second floor and on the third floor.
The outside entrances were no particular problem, but it did mean that it would take quite a bit of manpower to cover each one of the entrances that could come on to the balcony, you might say, that was entirely around on the second and the third floors.
The Trade Mart had sixty entrances and six catwalks over the luncheon sight. This would have been a very difficult building to secure in terms of the number of agents needed on the ground. Could this be done?
Mr. STERN - What did you tell him about the Trade Mart?
Mr. SORRELS - I told him that there were many entrances there and that it would pose a problem manpowerwise to have the proper security there.
Mr. STERN - But did you indicate to him that this could be handled?
Mr. SORRELS - I don't recall whether I specifically said it could be or not. Definitely I was under the impression that if the place was chosen, we would take the necessary precautions and would have it properly manned.
Where would all these agents come from? Would they have had to bring them from other areas of the state or country? Why go to all this trouble when you had another viable option that was SAFER for JFK? Bruno would show Gerald Behn photographs of the catwalks prior to November 5. Again, this is from the HSCA’s volumes.
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(39) Prior to November 5, Bruno had returned from Dallas with photographs of the Trade Mart's interior to show Behn. These photographs revealed, in full detail, the catwalks suspended above the floor. Bruno was concerned about the catwalks because of an incident involving Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. Other members of the President's political staff were also well aware that, while visiting Dallas during October 1963, Stevenson had been insulted and spat upon by right-wing extremist hecklers. Bruno was concerned that someone could use the catwalks as a vantage point from which to embarrass the President.
(40) After Behn met with Bruno and Ken O'Donnell, Behn announced on November 5 that he favored the Women's Building. According to Bruno, Behn was in charge of trip security. Therefore, Behn had instructed O'Donnell that the Women's Building was his selection. Bruno stated that O'Donnell personally confirmed this version of the course of events. Behn, in his testimony before the committee, stated that O'Donnell held the power to make the ultimate decision, that Behn himself lacked such power, and that O'Donnell simply informed Belin that the Trade Mart was the final selection and ordered him to secure it. Regardless of where ultimate power resided, a consensus was reached between Behn and O'Donnell. Because of the catwalks and many entrances, Behn announced to Bruno in Washington, D.C., on November 5 his decision favoring the Women's Building. It was Bruno's impression at this time that the report from the Dallas field office was neutral, since the local office was capable of securing either place. (HSCA XI, pp. 516-517)
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What I don’t understand about this is why O’Donnell (the person being named as the “source of power”) would make this decision despite the advice he was getting from Behn of the SS. Why override the wisdom of those trained to guard the President? The HSCA recap of events would say Lawson agreed with Sorrels “that the interior decor at the Women's Building was unseemly for a President.” But if we go to his actual testimony we see this instead.
Mr. STERN. Were there particular security problems that the Trade Mart presented?
Mr. LAWSON. There were balconies there and also it was a building that would be used by other people that day. However, this is somewhat good because it wasn't exactly a public building where anyone could wander in. The lessees of the showrooms there or their customers have to be checked in. You either have to be a lessee or a bona fide customer of a showroom in order to even get in the building. They have kind of a semi-security of their own that way. So it was good in that respect. There were hanging bridges and balconies, as I have said, side corridors and what not. After we left there, we went to the Women's Building at the fairgrounds, to look that over, and in this particular case the food would have had to have been brought in because there isn't any kitchen there, which was a plus at the Trade Mart. They had a regular cafeteria there and a catering service, which the Women's Building didn't have. The Women's Building is on one floor, quite low ceilinged, and the press coverage that is usually quite in evidence when the President is anywhere, both from the traveling press with him and the local press would have required their usual press coverage, and it would not have been as good in the Women's Building, because of the low ceilings.
They usually like to be up at least as high as the President or higher, 1, 2, or 3 feet. So we could put them in a balcony at the Trade Mart but we could not do so, at least get them any higher because of the low roof at the Women's Building. There were numerous columns in the Women's Building that would have blocked everybody's view of the people at the head dinner table, guests, and the guests there. So there were pluses and minuses for both buildings, and I so informed people in Washington and Mr. Puterbaugh informed people in Washington also.
He is clearly saying here there were “pluses and minuses for BOTH buildings” and he did NOT say the Women’s Building was “unseemly for a President” as the HSCA attributed to him. In this instance Gerald Ford actually asked some very relevant questions.
Representative FORD. Who made the decision as to the Trade Mart or the Women's Building at the fairgrounds?
Mr. LAWSON. That was made in Washington, sir.
Representative FORD. By whom, do you know?
Mr. LAWSON. I am assuming by the White House. I know that Mr. Puterbaugh was in contact with the National Democratic Headquarters people, and they were in contact with the White House and with the various groups down in Texas, the Governor's office as well. When the decision was finally made, we were told that it had been made but not to tell anyone yet because the announcement would come probably from the Governor's office.
Representative FORD. Do you make a report in writing in this kind of a situation, the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two buildings?
Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.
Representative FORD. From a security point of view?
Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.
Representative FORD. How do the people in Washington make the decisions then?
Mr. LAWSON. Mr. Puterbaugh told the people he was in contact with and I told Mr. Behn's office what I saw.
He did NOT put anything into writing for Gerald Behn! Why? This is NOT customary either as he would then say this.
Representative FORD. You summarized your views on this kind of a situation to Mr. Behn?
Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. Who is your superior. By telephone, not in writing?
Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.
Representative FORD. Is this the case in all instances?
Mr. LAWSON. Well, it usually doesn't happen. Usually I know when you are going some place if the function is to be at the Statler Hotel or something like that.
Representative FORD. Do you know whether or not Mr. Behn made any recommendations on this?
Mr. LAWSON. I have no idea.
Representative FORD. You gave him your observations and your recommendations?
Mr. LAWSON. I don't know if I gave it to him. I gave his office. Now there were at that time two assistants.
And back to the claim of the HSCA, Lawson said he NEVER gave a recommendation of one place over another! So why were they saying he had? Also, we see again where the SS handled things differently from the way they were usually handled. Why? If this was NOT part of the conspiracy at work, how do you explain all these "mistakes?"
Representative FORD. Did you make a recommendation one over the other?
Mr. LAWSON. No; I did not. I said that I was sure we could effectively handle both situations. Again the motorcade was to be taken into consideration also If you went to the Trade Mart you would have certain ways to go and if you went to the Women's Building you would have certain ways to go. And so they had to decide, someone had to decide whether they wanted the Trade Mart or certain motorcade specifications also, in the 45-minute time lapse.
Clearly, we see the hidden hand moving the luncheon to the Trade Mart as this allowed the motorcade to go the way it went (west through DP), and thus, two LARGE TURNS could be added to the motorcade. IF you don’t believe this then read article #143 (Chicago, Tampa & Miami Plots to Assassinate JFK) to see the same scenario in play in Chicago and Tampa. Both had motorcades and in them had points near an expressway that involved a large, slow moving turn. IF you look at Dallas in a vacuum you will NOT see what was really going on so it is important to look at the events going on in the country and the world that LED UP TO November 22, 1963. I believe Milteer when he said “he [JFK] knows he is a marked man” as you can see the same forces in play in Chicago and Tampa (and some say Miami and Los Angeles too). LHO simply could NOT have orchestrated all of this by himself.
Bruno would note this in his personal journal.
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(46) …November 14-- The feud became so bitter that I went to the White House to ask Bill Moyers, then Deputy Director of the Peace Corps, and close to both Connally and Johnson, if he would try to settle the dispute for the good of the President and his party. On this day, Kenney O'Donnell decided that there was no other way but to go to the mart.
November 15--The White House announced that the Trade Mart had been approved. I met with O'Donnell and Moyers who said that Connally was unbearable and on the verge of cancelling (sic) the trip. They decided they had to let the Governor have his way.
(47) If Bruno's assertions are true, the role of the Secret Service is clear: Although security considerations were taken into account, in the end political considerations prevailed. The determinative factor was the desire of President Kennedy and Mr. O'Donnell not to place the President in the untenable position of appearing unable to lead the party in solving party disputes and of appearing weak in the South. (HSCA XI, p. 518)
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Why was JBC so gung-ho about the Trade Mart to the point of canceling the trip if it was NOT chosen? Of course Bill Moyers would remember none of the issues about the selection, but somehow remembered that it was all O’Donnell’s fault!
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(49) Moyers did confirm one aspect of Bruno's November 14-15 entries, however. He stated that the Presidential staff would overrule the Secret Service-when "overriding political considerations were paramount." O'Donnell would listen to the Secret Service, but not always accept their suggestions. None of the President's political advisers "ever let [the Secret Service] have the last word" 'because the advisers' interest in the President's political welfare out-weighed security factors. Moyers characterized the reaction of the Secret Service when being overruled as that of "good soldiers," that "loyal to their obligation, but they accepted the fact that the President of the United States is also the chief political figure of our society.” This seems consistent with Bruno's statement that, when faced with the political dilemma of how to react to Connally's insistence on the Trade Mart, the President and O'Donnell made a decision based on political concerns. The Secret Service was powerless to that point, much less to intervene. (HSCA XI, p. 519)
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Why were they so fast to blame Kenneth O’Donnell for all of this when the SS were the ones IN CHARGE OF SECURITY? They even say the SS was “powerless” and unable to “intervene.” Then why have them at all? Let’s save the American taxpayer a ton of money and do away with the SS then. This is pure nonsense and we see this pattern all through this case as the SS is excused for everything when they let the President die. O’Donnell, and JFK himself, should NOT override any security decision the SS made. Period. This is nonsense of the highest proportion in play here.
As for JBC’s side of it we never knew it in an official way until 1978 as the WC did NOT ask him about this at all in his testimony, but before the HSCA he was asked and admitted the choice of the Trade Mart was HIS doing.
Mr. MCKINNEY. Governor, nice to see you again. I want to thank both you and Mrs. Connally for coming and helping us.
When was the final decision made or when did you finally get your way that the speech would be made at the Trade Mart instead of the Women's Building?
Mr. CONNALLY. I don't remember, Congressman, the precise date, but I would guess it was a couple of weeks before the visit.
Mr. MCKINNEY. Basically, that was a decision on your part so that the President could appeal to the conservative faction of the party in Texas?
Mr. CONNALLY. Yes, well basically, the Women's Building is in the fairground part of the city. The Trade Mart at that time was a new, exciting building, out on the Stemmons Freeway, it is a magnificent facility, it is a beautiful facility. I thought it was the type of thing that particularly reflected the flare and the style of both President and Mrs. Kennedy. It was a new building, it is a tremendous thing with an enormous vaulted ceiling.
The Secret Service had some doubts about it because it had balconies around, but we filled all those balconies with tables. And it was just a better facility, better parking, easier to get to for everyone, because you get to it off the Stemmons Freeway, and I thought it just frankly was a much better facility in order to accommodate the crowd that we wanted to have, 1,800, 2,000 people there, to hear the President.
I didn't know at the time there was a big argument about whether we go to the Women's Building or the Trade Mart. I didn't go to either of them at the time. Most of these arguments arose at the staff level and those that they couldn't settle I would finally hear about and get a hold of and sometimes I would just make a decision we are going to do thus and so and sometimes I would call somebody at the White House and get it worked out, but this went on constantly.
This is quite different from what Bruno said about the trip being cancelled if IF the Trade Mart was NOT selected, huh? Again, look at his next comment to see the magnitude of this and why the WC defenders fight this so much.
Mr. McKINNEY. In any event, at either building, the motorcade would have had to go through some part of Dealey Plaza?
Mr. CONNALLY. Well, in any event the motorcade certainly would have gone through downtown. It would not necessarily have had to go through Dealey Plaza, no, sir. If the Women's Building had been chosen, it could have gone another route, and probably would have gone another route.
Mr. McKINNEY. I see. If you had gone through Dealey Plaza to the Women's Building, Mrs. Kennedy would have been literally in the line of fire, rather than the President. Is that correct?
Mr. CONNALLY. Yes, if you had gone by the school book depository, that is correct.
We see it clearly here that if the Women’s Building had been chosen the route would NOT have included DP at all in all likelihood, but if it had it the limousine would have been doing 40 to 50 m.p.h. with NO turns to slow it and it would have shielded JFK from a shooter in the alleged Sniper’s Nest (SN) with Jackie Kennedy! You can now see why the decision had to be the Trade Mart to get JFK. It is so clear to see, and yet, this board is loaded with deniers.
Remember, this was NOT JBC in a vacuum either, but rather JBC doing what Lyndon Johnson wanted in all likelihood.
Remember JBC’s involvement in this process and then remember his comment of “They are going to kill us all” during the shooting and later again at the hospital. How did he know it was a “they” if he had no knowledge of what was to come? JFK always said it would be a PERSON in a crowd or in a building, but not a group of shooters like we saw in DP on November 22, 1963.
Mr. SPECTER. What was the President's view expressed during those conversations?
Mr. O'DONNELL. His view was that a demented person who was willing to sacrifice his own life could take the President's life. And that if it were to happen, I think his general view was it would happen in a crowded situation. I don't think it entered his mind that it might happen in the fashion as of a motorcade.
Mr. SPECTER. When was the last conversation that you had with him on that general topic?
Mr. O'DONNELL. The last conversation I had with him on that general topic was the morning of the assassination.
Mr. SPECTER. Where did the conversation occur?
Mr. O'DONNELL. The conversation took place in his room, with Mrs. Kennedy and myself, perhaps a half-hour before he left the Hotel Texas to depart for Carswell Air Force Base.
Mr. SPECTER. That was in Fort Worth?
Mr. O'DONNELL. That was in Fort Worth.
Mr. SPECTER. And tell us, as nearly as you can recollect, exactly what he said at that time, please.
Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, as near as I can recollect he was commenting to his wife on the function of the Secret Service and his interpretation of their role once the trip had commenced, in that their main function was to protect him from crowds, and to see that an unruly or sometimes an overexcited crowd did not generate into a riot, at which the President of the United States could be injured. But he said that if anybody really wanted to shoot the President of the United States, it was not a very difficult job--all one had to do was get a high building some day with a telescopic rifle, and there was nothing anybody could do to defend against such an attempt on the President's life.
Again, as I have stated before, where was JFK getting this from since NO president had ever been shot at or shot with a rifle before he would be later that day? He had to have had knowledge of those forces out to get him. The blame for the publication of the motorcade route days in advance has been laid at the feet of Bill Moyers as the HSCA wrote this about his actions.
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(52) One function Moyers performed, as a representative of the President, was to insist that the motorcade route be published. Moyers coordinated the President's visit to Texas from Austin. He worked the Dallas situation by phone through his Dallas representative, Ms. Elizabeth Harris. He had chosen Ms. Harris because she was a Dallas native, had been married to a prominent Dallas person, and had been an associate of Moyers in the Peace Corps.
(53) Moyers stated that the only "major decision" he made with respect to Dallas was that: ... some 24 hours before the President arrived, there was a dispute as to whether or not to print in the newspapers the route, Betty Harris called me... and said they were not going to print the route of the ... [motorcade] procession and I said, "Oh, yes they are. He's not coming down here to hide. He's coming down here to get a public reaction, and the decision is to print the route of the President's procession," and I don't know what Betty did after that, but the route was printed. Moyers later amended his recollection of when this decision occurred. I think it was the second night before his--preceding his arrival... and we were printing the route in the other papers, and I couldn't see why an exception should be made in Dallas.
(54) Moyers was in contact with the Secret Service at this time, and was aware of the security implications of printing the motorcade route. He recalled asking the Secret Service agent stationed with him Austin, whom Moyers characterized as having been "in charge of Dallas trip," whether there was any reason why the route should be printed. Moyers believed the agent agreed with him that the route should be published.
(56) Ms. Harris distinctly recalled a meeting that occurred on either the Monday or Tuesday prior to the assassination. She described as a "confrontation meeting" that was attended by Governor Connally Robert Strauss (a Connally associate), Sam Bloom, a Dallas advertising man in charge of publicity for Connally, and Winston Lawson of the Secret Service, whom she described as "totally neutral". She recalled that she took one side of the argument regarding publication of the motorcade route and that Sam Bloom Strauss took the other. During this meeting, she used "pressure"--an appeal for the status and prestige of the office of the Presidency--to persuade Bloom to publish the route not on Friday morning, November 22, but a few days earlier. Her purpose in having it published ahead of time was to help "get the crowd out." Hence, the route was published in the Dallas Times Herald on Wednesday afternoon and the Dallas Morning News on Thursday morning. (HSCA XI, pp. 519-520)
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So the whole reason the motorcade route was published early was to “get the crowd out”, huh? Don’t you think a nice crowd would have come out if it had been published that morning? I sure do. Who was the agent Moyers spoke with who felt the motorcade route “should be published?” Isn’t it funny in these kind of circumstance no one ever remembers names? The publishing of the route in hindsight is really non-consequential as the real assassins already knew the route, but for the silly cover story of “lone nut” theory this is important as you can’t argue LHO learned of the route that morning and just happened to have a rifle with him to shoot JFK with!
Again, we see the broad approach of the conspiracy at work here as they prepared to kill JFK they also were laying the groundwork for their cover story to seem somewhat plausible. Newsflash—they FAILED there as there is NOTHING plausible about it if you learn the evidence.
Finally, we will look at the turns that slowed the motorcade to a near stop. In his WC testimony SAIC of Dallas Forest Sorrels said these where the decision of Lawson and himself based on the information available to him. The WC, the SS, the HSCA and current day WC defenders like to claim that the motorcade would have had to jump a divider if it had stayed on Main St. and avoided the drastic turns onto Houston and Elm Streets. Also, the claim is made that this was the most “direct route” to the Stemmons Freeway. They make this claim because this is what Mr. Sorrels told the Warren Commission when he testified.
Mr. SORRELS - …So when it was determined that there was going to be a downtown parade, Mr. Lawson, of course, wanted to know which would be the best route to take him to the Trade Mart from Love Field.
So Mr. Lawson and I drove what I thought would be the best route and the most direct route to the Trade Mart, bearing in mind that there would be a parade through the downtown section.
Sorrels claimed that the size of the motorcade made it impossible to go down Main Street as well as a built-up “island” barring the way.
Mr. STERN - Why didn't you route the motorcade on Main Street under the triple overpass and on to Stemmons Freeway that way, instead of going to Houston and Elm?
Mr. SORRELS - Well, because you cannot get to the entrance to Stemmons Expressway on Main Street. The traffic is not routed that way. It is impractical.
On the other side of the first underpass there is a section built up to prevent cars from cutting in from Main Street to get over to Elm Street there. And if a person would go from--try to go from Main Street over to Stemmons Expressway, they would have to either hurdle this built-up place there, island, you might call it, or an extension of an island----
Mr. STERN - Do you know what this built-up place is constructed of?
Mr. SORRELS - It is, I am sure, asphalt, or concrete--probably concrete. You would have to go down on Main Street, pass where you would ordinarily turn off, and then come back against traffic, which would be one way that way, and make a hairpin turn, and come back and get on there. It just is not done.
What was NOT disclosed is that the motorcade could have accessed the Freeway without trying to access it at this point. The HSCA said this about the issue.
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However, this question-and-answer process (between Sorrels and Stern) failed to make clear that the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond from the triple overpass in such a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the expressway. The motorcade could have progressed westward through Dealey Plaza on Main Street, passed under the overpass, and then proceed on Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart. (HSCA XI, p. 522)
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Why didn’t they take this? According to George Lumpkin, Assistant Police Chief, it was rejected because “…the neighborhood surrounding Industrial Boulevard was filled with winos and broken pavement.” (Ibid.)
Additionally, he blamed JFK as he claimed he wanted exposure and there would have been no crowds on Industrial Boulevard!
Everyone can see there were NO crowds in the area near the triple overpass and beyond anyway, so was this the reason or was there another reason? Also, is he telling us they could not have rounded up all the “winos” for this one special occasion? I don’t believe they couldn’t. They could have put them in jail until the motorcade passed or treated them to a hot meal at a shelter or hotel. We were talking about a very limited timeframe there.
IF the car stayed on Main Street, it would have been much harder to shoot JFK as they would have been going much faster.
I think this shows there was an option beyond the one Lawson and Sorrels chose and the WC, SS, HSCA and WC defenders claim and defend. The limousine could have taken Industrial Boulevard to the Stemmons Freeway to get to the Trade Mart or they should have selected the Women’s Building like Gerald Behn wanted! Also, Lawson was involved in this decision, and he was a "former" Army intelligence man!
[Note: As shown in a much later installment we saw the motorcade could have simply turned onto Elm Street and connected directly to the Stemmons Freeway with NO turns being involved.]
jfkconspiracyforum.freeforums.net/thread/1760/statements-sink-wcs-conclusions-495
The evidence in this article shows us JFK was moved into a position where he could be easily killed and there is NO way LHO could have been the one doing the maneuvering.
media.nbcdfw.com/2019/09/jfk-motorcade-tsbd.jpg
Written in 2012
[Note: Since the writing of this I have become more suspicious of Kenneth O'Donnell. Every major conspiracy in history always has an inside person involved. Was he the person filling this role?]
The Warren Commission (WC) said that Lee Harvey Oswald (LHO) shot and killed President John F. Kennedy (JFK) all by himself, but a key part of the planning process would be the knowledge of the motorcade route through Dallas. The WC contented that this was a PLANNED event by LHO, thus, they had to show LHO knew JFK would be coming near his place of work. Otherwise, they had to explain why he did NOT leave work or call out of work on November 22, 1963, so he could go to where he could shoot at JFK.
This article will look at the issue of the motorcade in more detail.
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Over sixty years later I am still waiting for evidence that shows this was a premeditated act. As we saw in article #19 (Premeditation Issue) there is NO evidence showing LHO was preparing for JFK’s arrival, in fact, the opposite was true as there is much evidence showing he was WORKING all morning. What kind of assassin bothers to work all morning when they had to be ready to shoot JFK at 12:25 p.m. (JFK was running five minutes late, but LHO acting alone could NOT know this)?
There has been much discussion over the last sixty years about the motorcade route and when this was determined and published in order for LHO to learn about it. Again, there is NO evidence showing when and how LHO would have learned about this. Furthermore, we have evidence that is counter to this claim as there is testimony by a coworker showing LHO did NOT know what “all the fuss was about” the morning of November 22, 1963. This is from article #19 in the "Statements That Sink The WC's Conclusions" series.
Mr. BALL - Did you talk to him again that morning?
Mr. JARMAN - Yes, sir. I talked to him again later on that morning.
Mr. BALL - About what time?
Mr. JARMAN - It was between 9:30 and 10 o'clock, I believe.
Mr. BALL - Where were you when you talked to him?
Mr. JARMAN - In between two rows of bins.
Mr. BALL - On what floor?
Mr. JARMAN - On the first floor.
Mr. BALL - And what was said by him and by you?
Mr. JARMAN - Well, he was standing up in the window and I went to the window also, and he asked me what were the people gathering around on the corner for, and I told him that the President was supposed to pass that morning, and he asked me did I know which way he was coming, and I told him, yes; he probably come down Main and turn on Houston and then back again on Elm. Then he said, "Oh, I see," and that was all.
Now, as I said then, he could have been playacting, but why bother? Why would he even bring this up unless he really did not know as this created a witness against himself if he was caught and went to trial. This is important in understanding the context of the motorcade route and the claims made against LHO, but it is not the focal point of this particular article so if you are interested, I suggest you search the archives for #19.
Secret Service (SS) Agent Winston Lawson would testify before the WC regarding this issue and others. It should be noted that Lawson had been a former member of Army Intelligence, and this should be remembered. Here is his testimony about this.
Mr. STERN. Briefly, what was your employment experience from 1949 to 1959.
Mr. LAWSON. ...I had 16 weeks of basic infantry, basic training, went to the CIC Counterintelligence School in Holabird, Md.--Fort Holabird, Md.--outside of Baltimore, and then was assigned eventually to the Lexington field office where I did general counterintelligence work for the Army, background investigations, and some interviews of the prisoners, POW's from the Korean war…
Mr. STERN. Will you tell us of your experience in the Secret Service, describing briefly each assignment of work?
Mr. McCLOY. When you say CIC agent you mean----
Mr. LAWSON. Counterintelligence agent; yes, sir, in the Army.
Thank you Mr. McCloy as Mr. Stern was ready to just move on from this valuable information. Perhaps it is another in an endless line of coincidences, but keep in mind the 112th Military Intelligence Group out of Fort Sam Houston, Texas, was instrumental in providing the Dallas Police Department (DPD) and the FBI with the information allegedly showing LHO used the alias “A. Hidell.” Also, Lieutenant Jack Revill picked up an Army Intelligence man on the day of the assassination and took him to police headquarters.
Lawson was responsible for the trip planning including the motorcade route. Did his connection to military intelligence have any bearing on the choice of the route and site of the luncheon? He would make this cryptic comment during his testimony that has left many wondering what he meant.
Mr. STERN. It is the 19th. Had there been a meeting on the 18th at which this was considered?
Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir; there was a meeting late in the afternoon of the 18th, in a private club in Dallas that I arrived at late. The meeting was called primarily as I understand it because of the various political groups that wanted certain things, and what Washington wanted, and there were various problems to work out as to who got tickets, who sat at the head table, who rode in what cars and so forth. And the local host committee had designated a certain individual to be their representative there, and then these other groups also had people represented. Mr. Puterbaugh, for example, the liaison man that went with me from Washington, was there. And I had just come from going over the route with the police earlier that afternoon, and I told them as a point of information that this was the route as we had it now, unless it was changed later.
Just a thought, but was this meeting at the Dallas Petroleum Club? Lawson said the meeting was at a private club in Dallas. If not the Dallas Petroleum Club, then where was this meeting held? For more on this place, see this article.
jfkconspiracyforum.freeforums.net/thread/1664/garrison-chronicles-dallas-petroleum-club
Who could have changed the route later once the SS and Dallas Police Department (DPD) had agreed on it? Was it changed later is the big question. Of course, the WC and its current day defenders say NO, but we will look at this in more detail in this article. Both Mr. Stern and Mr. Dulles asked if this was normal in terms of when the trip was announced as they obviously felt it was not safe to announce it three days in advance and it seems things would change after JFK’s murder, but a lot of good that did him.
Mr. DULLES. One has to do it in time so that those who want it could get it, but it seems to me that say if the party was going to move here about noon, now if the morning papers gave that that would give people plenty of time to get to the positions they wanted, but wouldn't give a prospective assassin very much time to prepare.
This is why several of the WC members had questions about the announcement being made on the nineteenth of November instead of that morning. Also, another question many have asked over the years is this--why was the Trade Mart selected for the visit instead of the Women’s Building? It is common knowledge by now that the Trade Mart was favored by Governer John B. Connally (JBC) and Frank Erwin, whereas the JFK staff preferred the Women’s Building. We can go to the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) volumes for this information.
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(34) The Kennedy staff, on the other hand, preferred the Women’s Building, which they saw as providing a better forum for contact with liberal elements in the party. Politically, the large size of the Women’s Building would have allowed 4,000 people to be admitted and would therefore have benefited Kennedy by permitting his liberal constituents to participate in the luncheon. In their view, that location, in conjunction with the motorcade, would have enhanced their ability to reach the poor, the middle class, labor and ethnic minorities.
(35) The route necessitated by the Kennedy’s staff preference for the Women’s Building would have led EASTWARD along Main Street toward the fair grounds, which lay to the southeast of the Mains Street business district. The motorcade’s access to the western end of Main Street on the western side of Dealey Plaza would have been provided by a cloverleaf exit that led into the Plaza from the expressway, just west of the Dealey Plaza triple overpass. After passing through the overpass, the motorcade would then have continued, at what [Jerry] Bruno stated was the President’s CUSTOMARILY HIGH RATE OF SPEED—40 or 50 miles per hour—into Main Street within Dealey Plaza. The distance on Main Street from the bottom of the triple overpass to the point where crowds would be gathered (at the Houston Street intersection) would have been crossed AT THAT SPEED. Deceleration of the motorcade would have commenced when the crowds were reached. (HSCA XI, p. 515) (Emphasis added)
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These two paragraphs show the power of the conspiracy in play as the Women’s Building option, the one FAVORED by JFK’s own staff, would have made the shooting of JFK nearly impossible due to the different direction of the motorcade and SPEED of the motorcade. Jerry Bruno was the ADVANCE MAN for JFK, and he said the speed the motorcades usually traveled at when there were NO crowds (and there were none INSIDE Dealey Plaza (DP)) was FORTY TO FIFTY m.p.h.! And yet, for years we have seen WC defenders claim the SS manual did NOT say the motorcade should maintain a high rate of speed or that this was rubbish, but we see here it is NOT rubbish. IF the Women’s Building was selected then the motorcade would have gone through DP so fast NO one could have shot JFK. But, despite the wishes of JFK’s staff the Women’s Building was NOT chosen. Why?
Well according to some the selection of the Trade Mart was made because it looked more “Presidential” than the Women’s Building. SS Agent-in-charge for Dallas Forest Sorrels said the Women’s building was not appealing for a President to be in.
Mr. SORRELS - …We then went to Fair Park, where we made a survey of the Women's Building. It is a place where they have exhibits during the fair of all kinds of handiwork and things like that.
That building had about 45,000 square feet in it, and you could seat about 5,000 people in it. Security wise it wasn't bad at all, because there were two end openings to the building, and there was actually an area where you could drive a car in there. But the building was not satisfactory for that type of function--the President of the United States coming there--because the ceilings were quite low, the air-conditioning equipment and everything was all exposed, there were many steel suspension supports throughout the area.
I then returned to my office and telephoned to Mr. Behn and informed him of my findings and told him that security wise the Women's Building appeared to be preferable, but that it wasn't a very nice place to take the President.
They couldn’t dress it up for the President’s visit? I find that hard to believe. Notice too how he said that “security wise it was NOT bad at all.” Compare that to what was said about the Trade Mart.
Mr. STERN - Let's see if we can relate this now to President Kennedy's trip Dallas in November. When did you first hear that he was to make this trip, Mr. Sorrels?
Mr. SORRELS - On November 4, 1963, I received a long distance call from Special Agent in Charge Gerald A. Behn, of the White House Detail, stating that the President would probably visit Dallas about November 21, and that there had been a couple of buildings suggested, one of them being the Trade Mart, which he understood had about 60 entrances to it, and six catwalks over the area where the luncheon would be. And that the second choice that had been suggested then was the Women's Building at the State Fair Grounds. That was another place referred to as a trade center, which is actually Market Hall, which is across the street from the Trade Mart. He instructed that I make a survey of these buildings and report back to him the conditions.
Mr. STERN - What did you do?
Mr. SORRELS - Accompanied by Special Agent Robert A. Stewart of my office, we went to the Trade Mart and looked the situation over there, and we did find that there were entrances coming into, you might call it, a courtyard where the luncheon was to have been entrances coming into that area. And that there were two suspension bridges or catwalks on the second floor and on the third floor.
The outside entrances were no particular problem, but it did mean that it would take quite a bit of manpower to cover each one of the entrances that could come on to the balcony, you might say, that was entirely around on the second and the third floors.
The Trade Mart had sixty entrances and six catwalks over the luncheon sight. This would have been a very difficult building to secure in terms of the number of agents needed on the ground. Could this be done?
Mr. STERN - What did you tell him about the Trade Mart?
Mr. SORRELS - I told him that there were many entrances there and that it would pose a problem manpowerwise to have the proper security there.
Mr. STERN - But did you indicate to him that this could be handled?
Mr. SORRELS - I don't recall whether I specifically said it could be or not. Definitely I was under the impression that if the place was chosen, we would take the necessary precautions and would have it properly manned.
Where would all these agents come from? Would they have had to bring them from other areas of the state or country? Why go to all this trouble when you had another viable option that was SAFER for JFK? Bruno would show Gerald Behn photographs of the catwalks prior to November 5. Again, this is from the HSCA’s volumes.
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(39) Prior to November 5, Bruno had returned from Dallas with photographs of the Trade Mart's interior to show Behn. These photographs revealed, in full detail, the catwalks suspended above the floor. Bruno was concerned about the catwalks because of an incident involving Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. Other members of the President's political staff were also well aware that, while visiting Dallas during October 1963, Stevenson had been insulted and spat upon by right-wing extremist hecklers. Bruno was concerned that someone could use the catwalks as a vantage point from which to embarrass the President.
(40) After Behn met with Bruno and Ken O'Donnell, Behn announced on November 5 that he favored the Women's Building. According to Bruno, Behn was in charge of trip security. Therefore, Behn had instructed O'Donnell that the Women's Building was his selection. Bruno stated that O'Donnell personally confirmed this version of the course of events. Behn, in his testimony before the committee, stated that O'Donnell held the power to make the ultimate decision, that Behn himself lacked such power, and that O'Donnell simply informed Belin that the Trade Mart was the final selection and ordered him to secure it. Regardless of where ultimate power resided, a consensus was reached between Behn and O'Donnell. Because of the catwalks and many entrances, Behn announced to Bruno in Washington, D.C., on November 5 his decision favoring the Women's Building. It was Bruno's impression at this time that the report from the Dallas field office was neutral, since the local office was capable of securing either place. (HSCA XI, pp. 516-517)
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What I don’t understand about this is why O’Donnell (the person being named as the “source of power”) would make this decision despite the advice he was getting from Behn of the SS. Why override the wisdom of those trained to guard the President? The HSCA recap of events would say Lawson agreed with Sorrels “that the interior decor at the Women's Building was unseemly for a President.” But if we go to his actual testimony we see this instead.
Mr. STERN. Were there particular security problems that the Trade Mart presented?
Mr. LAWSON. There were balconies there and also it was a building that would be used by other people that day. However, this is somewhat good because it wasn't exactly a public building where anyone could wander in. The lessees of the showrooms there or their customers have to be checked in. You either have to be a lessee or a bona fide customer of a showroom in order to even get in the building. They have kind of a semi-security of their own that way. So it was good in that respect. There were hanging bridges and balconies, as I have said, side corridors and what not. After we left there, we went to the Women's Building at the fairgrounds, to look that over, and in this particular case the food would have had to have been brought in because there isn't any kitchen there, which was a plus at the Trade Mart. They had a regular cafeteria there and a catering service, which the Women's Building didn't have. The Women's Building is on one floor, quite low ceilinged, and the press coverage that is usually quite in evidence when the President is anywhere, both from the traveling press with him and the local press would have required their usual press coverage, and it would not have been as good in the Women's Building, because of the low ceilings.
They usually like to be up at least as high as the President or higher, 1, 2, or 3 feet. So we could put them in a balcony at the Trade Mart but we could not do so, at least get them any higher because of the low roof at the Women's Building. There were numerous columns in the Women's Building that would have blocked everybody's view of the people at the head dinner table, guests, and the guests there. So there were pluses and minuses for both buildings, and I so informed people in Washington and Mr. Puterbaugh informed people in Washington also.
He is clearly saying here there were “pluses and minuses for BOTH buildings” and he did NOT say the Women’s Building was “unseemly for a President” as the HSCA attributed to him. In this instance Gerald Ford actually asked some very relevant questions.
Representative FORD. Who made the decision as to the Trade Mart or the Women's Building at the fairgrounds?
Mr. LAWSON. That was made in Washington, sir.
Representative FORD. By whom, do you know?
Mr. LAWSON. I am assuming by the White House. I know that Mr. Puterbaugh was in contact with the National Democratic Headquarters people, and they were in contact with the White House and with the various groups down in Texas, the Governor's office as well. When the decision was finally made, we were told that it had been made but not to tell anyone yet because the announcement would come probably from the Governor's office.
Representative FORD. Do you make a report in writing in this kind of a situation, the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two buildings?
Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.
Representative FORD. From a security point of view?
Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.
Representative FORD. How do the people in Washington make the decisions then?
Mr. LAWSON. Mr. Puterbaugh told the people he was in contact with and I told Mr. Behn's office what I saw.
He did NOT put anything into writing for Gerald Behn! Why? This is NOT customary either as he would then say this.
Representative FORD. You summarized your views on this kind of a situation to Mr. Behn?
Mr. LAWSON. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. Who is your superior. By telephone, not in writing?
Mr. LAWSON. No, sir.
Representative FORD. Is this the case in all instances?
Mr. LAWSON. Well, it usually doesn't happen. Usually I know when you are going some place if the function is to be at the Statler Hotel or something like that.
Representative FORD. Do you know whether or not Mr. Behn made any recommendations on this?
Mr. LAWSON. I have no idea.
Representative FORD. You gave him your observations and your recommendations?
Mr. LAWSON. I don't know if I gave it to him. I gave his office. Now there were at that time two assistants.
And back to the claim of the HSCA, Lawson said he NEVER gave a recommendation of one place over another! So why were they saying he had? Also, we see again where the SS handled things differently from the way they were usually handled. Why? If this was NOT part of the conspiracy at work, how do you explain all these "mistakes?"
Representative FORD. Did you make a recommendation one over the other?
Mr. LAWSON. No; I did not. I said that I was sure we could effectively handle both situations. Again the motorcade was to be taken into consideration also If you went to the Trade Mart you would have certain ways to go and if you went to the Women's Building you would have certain ways to go. And so they had to decide, someone had to decide whether they wanted the Trade Mart or certain motorcade specifications also, in the 45-minute time lapse.
Clearly, we see the hidden hand moving the luncheon to the Trade Mart as this allowed the motorcade to go the way it went (west through DP), and thus, two LARGE TURNS could be added to the motorcade. IF you don’t believe this then read article #143 (Chicago, Tampa & Miami Plots to Assassinate JFK) to see the same scenario in play in Chicago and Tampa. Both had motorcades and in them had points near an expressway that involved a large, slow moving turn. IF you look at Dallas in a vacuum you will NOT see what was really going on so it is important to look at the events going on in the country and the world that LED UP TO November 22, 1963. I believe Milteer when he said “he [JFK] knows he is a marked man” as you can see the same forces in play in Chicago and Tampa (and some say Miami and Los Angeles too). LHO simply could NOT have orchestrated all of this by himself.
Bruno would note this in his personal journal.
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(46) …November 14-- The feud became so bitter that I went to the White House to ask Bill Moyers, then Deputy Director of the Peace Corps, and close to both Connally and Johnson, if he would try to settle the dispute for the good of the President and his party. On this day, Kenney O'Donnell decided that there was no other way but to go to the mart.
November 15--The White House announced that the Trade Mart had been approved. I met with O'Donnell and Moyers who said that Connally was unbearable and on the verge of cancelling (sic) the trip. They decided they had to let the Governor have his way.
(47) If Bruno's assertions are true, the role of the Secret Service is clear: Although security considerations were taken into account, in the end political considerations prevailed. The determinative factor was the desire of President Kennedy and Mr. O'Donnell not to place the President in the untenable position of appearing unable to lead the party in solving party disputes and of appearing weak in the South. (HSCA XI, p. 518)
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Why was JBC so gung-ho about the Trade Mart to the point of canceling the trip if it was NOT chosen? Of course Bill Moyers would remember none of the issues about the selection, but somehow remembered that it was all O’Donnell’s fault!
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(49) Moyers did confirm one aspect of Bruno's November 14-15 entries, however. He stated that the Presidential staff would overrule the Secret Service-when "overriding political considerations were paramount." O'Donnell would listen to the Secret Service, but not always accept their suggestions. None of the President's political advisers "ever let [the Secret Service] have the last word" 'because the advisers' interest in the President's political welfare out-weighed security factors. Moyers characterized the reaction of the Secret Service when being overruled as that of "good soldiers," that "loyal to their obligation, but they accepted the fact that the President of the United States is also the chief political figure of our society.” This seems consistent with Bruno's statement that, when faced with the political dilemma of how to react to Connally's insistence on the Trade Mart, the President and O'Donnell made a decision based on political concerns. The Secret Service was powerless to that point, much less to intervene. (HSCA XI, p. 519)
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Why were they so fast to blame Kenneth O’Donnell for all of this when the SS were the ones IN CHARGE OF SECURITY? They even say the SS was “powerless” and unable to “intervene.” Then why have them at all? Let’s save the American taxpayer a ton of money and do away with the SS then. This is pure nonsense and we see this pattern all through this case as the SS is excused for everything when they let the President die. O’Donnell, and JFK himself, should NOT override any security decision the SS made. Period. This is nonsense of the highest proportion in play here.
As for JBC’s side of it we never knew it in an official way until 1978 as the WC did NOT ask him about this at all in his testimony, but before the HSCA he was asked and admitted the choice of the Trade Mart was HIS doing.
Mr. MCKINNEY. Governor, nice to see you again. I want to thank both you and Mrs. Connally for coming and helping us.
When was the final decision made or when did you finally get your way that the speech would be made at the Trade Mart instead of the Women's Building?
Mr. CONNALLY. I don't remember, Congressman, the precise date, but I would guess it was a couple of weeks before the visit.
Mr. MCKINNEY. Basically, that was a decision on your part so that the President could appeal to the conservative faction of the party in Texas?
Mr. CONNALLY. Yes, well basically, the Women's Building is in the fairground part of the city. The Trade Mart at that time was a new, exciting building, out on the Stemmons Freeway, it is a magnificent facility, it is a beautiful facility. I thought it was the type of thing that particularly reflected the flare and the style of both President and Mrs. Kennedy. It was a new building, it is a tremendous thing with an enormous vaulted ceiling.
The Secret Service had some doubts about it because it had balconies around, but we filled all those balconies with tables. And it was just a better facility, better parking, easier to get to for everyone, because you get to it off the Stemmons Freeway, and I thought it just frankly was a much better facility in order to accommodate the crowd that we wanted to have, 1,800, 2,000 people there, to hear the President.
I didn't know at the time there was a big argument about whether we go to the Women's Building or the Trade Mart. I didn't go to either of them at the time. Most of these arguments arose at the staff level and those that they couldn't settle I would finally hear about and get a hold of and sometimes I would just make a decision we are going to do thus and so and sometimes I would call somebody at the White House and get it worked out, but this went on constantly.
This is quite different from what Bruno said about the trip being cancelled if IF the Trade Mart was NOT selected, huh? Again, look at his next comment to see the magnitude of this and why the WC defenders fight this so much.
Mr. McKINNEY. In any event, at either building, the motorcade would have had to go through some part of Dealey Plaza?
Mr. CONNALLY. Well, in any event the motorcade certainly would have gone through downtown. It would not necessarily have had to go through Dealey Plaza, no, sir. If the Women's Building had been chosen, it could have gone another route, and probably would have gone another route.
Mr. McKINNEY. I see. If you had gone through Dealey Plaza to the Women's Building, Mrs. Kennedy would have been literally in the line of fire, rather than the President. Is that correct?
Mr. CONNALLY. Yes, if you had gone by the school book depository, that is correct.
We see it clearly here that if the Women’s Building had been chosen the route would NOT have included DP at all in all likelihood, but if it had it the limousine would have been doing 40 to 50 m.p.h. with NO turns to slow it and it would have shielded JFK from a shooter in the alleged Sniper’s Nest (SN) with Jackie Kennedy! You can now see why the decision had to be the Trade Mart to get JFK. It is so clear to see, and yet, this board is loaded with deniers.
Remember, this was NOT JBC in a vacuum either, but rather JBC doing what Lyndon Johnson wanted in all likelihood.
Remember JBC’s involvement in this process and then remember his comment of “They are going to kill us all” during the shooting and later again at the hospital. How did he know it was a “they” if he had no knowledge of what was to come? JFK always said it would be a PERSON in a crowd or in a building, but not a group of shooters like we saw in DP on November 22, 1963.
Mr. SPECTER. What was the President's view expressed during those conversations?
Mr. O'DONNELL. His view was that a demented person who was willing to sacrifice his own life could take the President's life. And that if it were to happen, I think his general view was it would happen in a crowded situation. I don't think it entered his mind that it might happen in the fashion as of a motorcade.
Mr. SPECTER. When was the last conversation that you had with him on that general topic?
Mr. O'DONNELL. The last conversation I had with him on that general topic was the morning of the assassination.
Mr. SPECTER. Where did the conversation occur?
Mr. O'DONNELL. The conversation took place in his room, with Mrs. Kennedy and myself, perhaps a half-hour before he left the Hotel Texas to depart for Carswell Air Force Base.
Mr. SPECTER. That was in Fort Worth?
Mr. O'DONNELL. That was in Fort Worth.
Mr. SPECTER. And tell us, as nearly as you can recollect, exactly what he said at that time, please.
Mr. O'DONNELL. Well, as near as I can recollect he was commenting to his wife on the function of the Secret Service and his interpretation of their role once the trip had commenced, in that their main function was to protect him from crowds, and to see that an unruly or sometimes an overexcited crowd did not generate into a riot, at which the President of the United States could be injured. But he said that if anybody really wanted to shoot the President of the United States, it was not a very difficult job--all one had to do was get a high building some day with a telescopic rifle, and there was nothing anybody could do to defend against such an attempt on the President's life.
Again, as I have stated before, where was JFK getting this from since NO president had ever been shot at or shot with a rifle before he would be later that day? He had to have had knowledge of those forces out to get him. The blame for the publication of the motorcade route days in advance has been laid at the feet of Bill Moyers as the HSCA wrote this about his actions.
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(52) One function Moyers performed, as a representative of the President, was to insist that the motorcade route be published. Moyers coordinated the President's visit to Texas from Austin. He worked the Dallas situation by phone through his Dallas representative, Ms. Elizabeth Harris. He had chosen Ms. Harris because she was a Dallas native, had been married to a prominent Dallas person, and had been an associate of Moyers in the Peace Corps.
(53) Moyers stated that the only "major decision" he made with respect to Dallas was that: ... some 24 hours before the President arrived, there was a dispute as to whether or not to print in the newspapers the route, Betty Harris called me... and said they were not going to print the route of the ... [motorcade] procession and I said, "Oh, yes they are. He's not coming down here to hide. He's coming down here to get a public reaction, and the decision is to print the route of the President's procession," and I don't know what Betty did after that, but the route was printed. Moyers later amended his recollection of when this decision occurred. I think it was the second night before his--preceding his arrival... and we were printing the route in the other papers, and I couldn't see why an exception should be made in Dallas.
(54) Moyers was in contact with the Secret Service at this time, and was aware of the security implications of printing the motorcade route. He recalled asking the Secret Service agent stationed with him Austin, whom Moyers characterized as having been "in charge of Dallas trip," whether there was any reason why the route should be printed. Moyers believed the agent agreed with him that the route should be published.
(56) Ms. Harris distinctly recalled a meeting that occurred on either the Monday or Tuesday prior to the assassination. She described as a "confrontation meeting" that was attended by Governor Connally Robert Strauss (a Connally associate), Sam Bloom, a Dallas advertising man in charge of publicity for Connally, and Winston Lawson of the Secret Service, whom she described as "totally neutral". She recalled that she took one side of the argument regarding publication of the motorcade route and that Sam Bloom Strauss took the other. During this meeting, she used "pressure"--an appeal for the status and prestige of the office of the Presidency--to persuade Bloom to publish the route not on Friday morning, November 22, but a few days earlier. Her purpose in having it published ahead of time was to help "get the crowd out." Hence, the route was published in the Dallas Times Herald on Wednesday afternoon and the Dallas Morning News on Thursday morning. (HSCA XI, pp. 519-520)
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So the whole reason the motorcade route was published early was to “get the crowd out”, huh? Don’t you think a nice crowd would have come out if it had been published that morning? I sure do. Who was the agent Moyers spoke with who felt the motorcade route “should be published?” Isn’t it funny in these kind of circumstance no one ever remembers names? The publishing of the route in hindsight is really non-consequential as the real assassins already knew the route, but for the silly cover story of “lone nut” theory this is important as you can’t argue LHO learned of the route that morning and just happened to have a rifle with him to shoot JFK with!
Again, we see the broad approach of the conspiracy at work here as they prepared to kill JFK they also were laying the groundwork for their cover story to seem somewhat plausible. Newsflash—they FAILED there as there is NOTHING plausible about it if you learn the evidence.
Finally, we will look at the turns that slowed the motorcade to a near stop. In his WC testimony SAIC of Dallas Forest Sorrels said these where the decision of Lawson and himself based on the information available to him. The WC, the SS, the HSCA and current day WC defenders like to claim that the motorcade would have had to jump a divider if it had stayed on Main St. and avoided the drastic turns onto Houston and Elm Streets. Also, the claim is made that this was the most “direct route” to the Stemmons Freeway. They make this claim because this is what Mr. Sorrels told the Warren Commission when he testified.
Mr. SORRELS - …So when it was determined that there was going to be a downtown parade, Mr. Lawson, of course, wanted to know which would be the best route to take him to the Trade Mart from Love Field.
So Mr. Lawson and I drove what I thought would be the best route and the most direct route to the Trade Mart, bearing in mind that there would be a parade through the downtown section.
Sorrels claimed that the size of the motorcade made it impossible to go down Main Street as well as a built-up “island” barring the way.
Mr. STERN - Why didn't you route the motorcade on Main Street under the triple overpass and on to Stemmons Freeway that way, instead of going to Houston and Elm?
Mr. SORRELS - Well, because you cannot get to the entrance to Stemmons Expressway on Main Street. The traffic is not routed that way. It is impractical.
On the other side of the first underpass there is a section built up to prevent cars from cutting in from Main Street to get over to Elm Street there. And if a person would go from--try to go from Main Street over to Stemmons Expressway, they would have to either hurdle this built-up place there, island, you might call it, or an extension of an island----
Mr. STERN - Do you know what this built-up place is constructed of?
Mr. SORRELS - It is, I am sure, asphalt, or concrete--probably concrete. You would have to go down on Main Street, pass where you would ordinarily turn off, and then come back against traffic, which would be one way that way, and make a hairpin turn, and come back and get on there. It just is not done.
What was NOT disclosed is that the motorcade could have accessed the Freeway without trying to access it at this point. The HSCA said this about the issue.
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However, this question-and-answer process (between Sorrels and Stern) failed to make clear that the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond from the triple overpass in such a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the expressway. The motorcade could have progressed westward through Dealey Plaza on Main Street, passed under the overpass, and then proceed on Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart. (HSCA XI, p. 522)
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Why didn’t they take this? According to George Lumpkin, Assistant Police Chief, it was rejected because “…the neighborhood surrounding Industrial Boulevard was filled with winos and broken pavement.” (Ibid.)
Additionally, he blamed JFK as he claimed he wanted exposure and there would have been no crowds on Industrial Boulevard!
Everyone can see there were NO crowds in the area near the triple overpass and beyond anyway, so was this the reason or was there another reason? Also, is he telling us they could not have rounded up all the “winos” for this one special occasion? I don’t believe they couldn’t. They could have put them in jail until the motorcade passed or treated them to a hot meal at a shelter or hotel. We were talking about a very limited timeframe there.
IF the car stayed on Main Street, it would have been much harder to shoot JFK as they would have been going much faster.
I think this shows there was an option beyond the one Lawson and Sorrels chose and the WC, SS, HSCA and WC defenders claim and defend. The limousine could have taken Industrial Boulevard to the Stemmons Freeway to get to the Trade Mart or they should have selected the Women’s Building like Gerald Behn wanted! Also, Lawson was involved in this decision, and he was a "former" Army intelligence man!
[Note: As shown in a much later installment we saw the motorcade could have simply turned onto Elm Street and connected directly to the Stemmons Freeway with NO turns being involved.]
jfkconspiracyforum.freeforums.net/thread/1760/statements-sink-wcs-conclusions-495
The evidence in this article shows us JFK was moved into a position where he could be easily killed and there is NO way LHO could have been the one doing the maneuvering.