Post by Rob Caprio on Nov 15, 2018 18:10:00 GMT -5
All portions ©️Robert Caprio 2006-2024
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The release in 1993 of the White House telephone transcripts helps researchers to fill in more details surrounding the formation of the Warren Commission.
In the article, "The Creation of the Warren Commission", by Donald Gibson, we get the fuller details of how this commission came to be. Gibson says much has been written about the performance of the commission and of course the results of the commission, but the story of the creation of the commission has not been fully covered. He writes the following.
Quote on
Although a massive amount of work has been done on the Commission's performance, the story of how the Commission was created has remained incomplete. This story needs to be completed because both reason and the facts indicate that the formation of the Commission, like the performance of elements of the FBI and the media, was as much a part of the cover-up process as was its Report.
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Gibson says the story we all have heard of inside President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) people suggesting this commission is not the full picture.
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These transcripts demonstrate that the people who have been 'credited' with the creation of the Commission had little to do with it-like LBJ's longtime friend and advisor Abe Fortas-or were following the lead of others, as with President Johnson and Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. The transcripts show that the idea of a commission was pushed on LBJ by people who were outside of the government at that time and that this effort began within minutes of Lee Harvey Oswald's (LHO) death. Until LHO was dead, there was no way that such an effort could be undertaken.
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Robert G. Blakely, head of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), looked into this in 1979 as part of the second government "investigation" into the death of the 35th president. Here is some of the things they found out.
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The Select Committee's Report contains a section entitled 'Creation of the Warren Commission.' It begins by saying that on November 22nd, 'President Johnson was immediately faced with the problem of investigating the assassination.' This is misleading. As long as Oswald was alive, there wasn't any real question about the investigation; it would be conducted in Dallas during a trial of Oswald. Second, as the evidence will show, President Johnson 'was faced' with a problem after Oswald was killed, not 'immediately' after the assassination. The problem for LBJ was not just one of investigating the assassination. There was also a problem presented to him by people trying to shape the investigatory process.
The Committee's rendition of events goes on to say that on November 23, 1963, J. Edgar Hoover 'forwarded the results of the FBI's preliminary investigation to him [LBJ]. This report detailed the evidence that indicated Lee Harvey Oswald's guilt.' In fact, Hoover told LBJ on the morning of the 23rd that the case against Oswald was not then very good. The Committee's account goes on to say that on the 24th, Hoover called LBJ aide Walter Jenkins and said that Katzenbach had told him that the President might appoint a commission. (As the record will show, Katzenbach was not speaking for the President, who on the 24th opposed the idea of a commission.) Hoover expressed his opposition to the creation of a commission, suggesting that the FBI handle the investigation and submit a report to the Attorney General. Hoover makes a vague reference to problems a commission might cause for U.S. foreign relations. He also mentions that he and Katzenbach are anxious to have 'something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin.'
The Committee's report then summarizes parts of Katzenbach's testimony to the Committee, stating that Katzenbach was very concerned about the multitude of conspiracy theories which had already emerged.
Consequently, he wrote a memo on November 25th to LBJ aide Bill Moyers which emphasized the need to quiet these rumors. The Katzenbach memo recommends that a statement be issued immediately indicating that the evidence shows Oswald did it and that there were no conspirators. The memo suggests furthermore that the FBI would be the primary investigating body and that a Presidential commission would 'review and examine the evidence and announce its conclusions.' The memo went on to say that there is a need for 'something to head off public speculations or congressional hearings of the wrong sort.' Katzenbach did also say in his testimony that he always wanted to know the truth, including the facts concerning possible conspiracy.
The HSCA continues, stating that on November 25th President Johnson ordered the FBI and the Department of Justice (run at this time by Katzenbach instead of the distraught RFK) to investigate the assassination and the murder of Oswald. By November 27th, Senator Everett M. Dirksen had proposed a Senate Judiciary Committee investigation and Representative Charles E. Goodell had proposed a joint Senate-House investigation. Also, Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr had announced that a state court of inquiry would be established. The Committee cited a statement by Leon Jaworski, who worked for the offices of both the Texas Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney General, indicating that LBJ told him on November 25th that he (LBJ) was encouraging Carr to proceed with the Texas Court of Inquiry.
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The memorandum from November 29, 1963, and some of Katzenbach's statements before the committee imply the idea came from Katzenbach and perhaps Abe Fortas, and even Robert Kennedy, were the source for the idea of a Commission. The implication is that the memo of November 29, 1963, was a major factor in LBJ's decision making process to form a Commission and it wasn't as he had decided not later than the 28th according to Gibson. He further writes this.
Quote on
The 1979 Robert Blakey-HSCA version is certainly more elaborate than the official story circulated in 1964. The problem is that it substitutes one misleading story for another. The original suggested that LBJ initiated the process. The latter implies that Katzenbach is the most important figure.
Quote off
Nicholas Katzenbach's testimony before the HSCA implies he was a major factor in the creation of the Warren Commission, but he does also hint at some things at some undisclosed facts that the committee staff did not bother to pursue. Katzenbach hinted that there was more to the story and the release of the White House transcripts in 1993 made it clear for Gibson what he was hinting at.
Quote on
The HSCA first asked Katzenbach to explain why he was 'exerting tremendous pressure right after the assassination to get the FBI report out and to get a report in front of the American people.' A November 25, 1963, memo from Katzenbach to Bill Moyers is referenced as evidence of Katzenbach's activities. Katzenbach explains that his concern was to quiet rumors and speculation about conspiracy. Katzenbach then added that his activities were related to the idea of creating a commission 'such as the Warren Commission' and that he did not view the FBI investigation as the final or only investigation. In his testimony Katzenbach represents the commission idea as his own several times. He also says, 'I was never opposed to it.' This, of course, suggests that it was not his idea.
Later in the questioning, Katzenbach mentions that by November 25th he was aware of Oswald's stay in Russia and his visit to Mexico. He says he was also then aware that the FBI had concluded that there was no conspiracy. It is beyond any doubt that such a conclusion was completely unfounded just three days after the assassination and one day after the murder of Oswald. There is no possibility that the FBI could have eliminated the possibility that Oswald, even if guilty, could have had assistance or direction from others. A memo from Alan Belmont, an assistant director and number three man in the FBI, to Hoover's assistant, William Sullivan, dated November 25th, refers to conversations between Katzenbach and Hoover about the assassination.
The memo emphasizes that the FBI's report should cover all the areas that might cause concern with the press and the public. Belmont wrote:
'In other words, this report is to settle the dust, in so far as Oswald and his activities are concerned, both from the standpoint that he is the man who assassinated the President, and relative to Oswald himself and his activities and background, et cetera.' This and other information provided here establish Belmont as one of the primary forces in the FBI pressing for an immediate conclusion about the assassination.
Quote off
Katzenbach and Belmont would seem to work together on this part of the case in an intertwining sort of way and Katzenbach would indicate this in his HSCA testimony. He cites a letter to the Chief Justice that covered this idea, that Oswald was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Gibson elaborates:
Quote on
A 12/9/63 letter to Chief Justice Warren suggested that either the Commission or the Justice Department release a statement saying that the FBI had established 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that Oswald killed Kennedy and that the investigation had so far uncovered no information suggesting a conspiracy. Katzenbach had signed this letter, but in his deposition he said that this letter was probably drafted by the FBI. The fact that the Deputy Attorney General is signing his name to something this important that he didn't write suggests how closely interconnected his actions were with those of Belmont and, perhaps, others in the Bureau. In this oral deposition Katzenbach also reveals, in contradiction to his testimony, that he was not acting on his own when he proposed a Commission to investigate the assassination.
Katzenbach told the Committee that Hoover opposed the creation of a Commission and that President Johnson 'neither rejected nor accepted the idea. He did not embrace it. I thought there was a period of time when he thought that it might be unnecessary.' As we shall see, this understates Johnson's initial opposition.
We come now to what was an important set of statements which should have been followed by specific questions from the House staff.
Katzenbach was asked who else (presumably beyond the President and Hoover) he talked to during the time he was arriving at the idea of a commission. Katzenbach said that he believed he 'recommended it to Bill Moyers' and raised the issue with Walter Jenkins and President Johnson. Katzenbach was then asked about 'people outside the President's immediate circle' and he responded that he did talk to such people. He mentioned Dean Rusk and Alexis Johnson as two people he may have talked to. Katzenbach then said:
'I am sure I talked about it with people outside the government entirely who called me and suggested old friends or former colleagues.' Katzenbach does not identify-and is not asked to identify-those people 'outside the government entirely.' There is no naming of the old friends' and 'former colleagues.' Instead, the questioning shifted to the views of Rusk and others already mentioned by Katzenbach. Given an opportunity to actually find out how the Warren Commission came into being, the HSCA's staff decided to go on to other things. Because of the release of the White House telephone transcripts, we will now be able to identify some or most of those people who were 'outside the government entirely.'
Quote off
For the full article: kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/the-creation-of-the-warren-commission
3.bp.blogspot.com/_I4lZU0BrRsg/TPXTI3y8v1I/AAAAAAAAAE4/Hot_KJ7VKdY/w1200-h630-p-k-no-nu/warren.jpg
The release in 1993 of the White House telephone transcripts helps researchers to fill in more details surrounding the formation of the Warren Commission.
In the article, "The Creation of the Warren Commission", by Donald Gibson, we get the fuller details of how this commission came to be. Gibson says much has been written about the performance of the commission and of course the results of the commission, but the story of the creation of the commission has not been fully covered. He writes the following.
Quote on
Although a massive amount of work has been done on the Commission's performance, the story of how the Commission was created has remained incomplete. This story needs to be completed because both reason and the facts indicate that the formation of the Commission, like the performance of elements of the FBI and the media, was as much a part of the cover-up process as was its Report.
Quote off
Gibson says the story we all have heard of inside President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) people suggesting this commission is not the full picture.
Quote on
These transcripts demonstrate that the people who have been 'credited' with the creation of the Commission had little to do with it-like LBJ's longtime friend and advisor Abe Fortas-or were following the lead of others, as with President Johnson and Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. The transcripts show that the idea of a commission was pushed on LBJ by people who were outside of the government at that time and that this effort began within minutes of Lee Harvey Oswald's (LHO) death. Until LHO was dead, there was no way that such an effort could be undertaken.
Quote off
Robert G. Blakely, head of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), looked into this in 1979 as part of the second government "investigation" into the death of the 35th president. Here is some of the things they found out.
Quote on
The Select Committee's Report contains a section entitled 'Creation of the Warren Commission.' It begins by saying that on November 22nd, 'President Johnson was immediately faced with the problem of investigating the assassination.' This is misleading. As long as Oswald was alive, there wasn't any real question about the investigation; it would be conducted in Dallas during a trial of Oswald. Second, as the evidence will show, President Johnson 'was faced' with a problem after Oswald was killed, not 'immediately' after the assassination. The problem for LBJ was not just one of investigating the assassination. There was also a problem presented to him by people trying to shape the investigatory process.
The Committee's rendition of events goes on to say that on November 23, 1963, J. Edgar Hoover 'forwarded the results of the FBI's preliminary investigation to him [LBJ]. This report detailed the evidence that indicated Lee Harvey Oswald's guilt.' In fact, Hoover told LBJ on the morning of the 23rd that the case against Oswald was not then very good. The Committee's account goes on to say that on the 24th, Hoover called LBJ aide Walter Jenkins and said that Katzenbach had told him that the President might appoint a commission. (As the record will show, Katzenbach was not speaking for the President, who on the 24th opposed the idea of a commission.) Hoover expressed his opposition to the creation of a commission, suggesting that the FBI handle the investigation and submit a report to the Attorney General. Hoover makes a vague reference to problems a commission might cause for U.S. foreign relations. He also mentions that he and Katzenbach are anxious to have 'something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin.'
The Committee's report then summarizes parts of Katzenbach's testimony to the Committee, stating that Katzenbach was very concerned about the multitude of conspiracy theories which had already emerged.
Consequently, he wrote a memo on November 25th to LBJ aide Bill Moyers which emphasized the need to quiet these rumors. The Katzenbach memo recommends that a statement be issued immediately indicating that the evidence shows Oswald did it and that there were no conspirators. The memo suggests furthermore that the FBI would be the primary investigating body and that a Presidential commission would 'review and examine the evidence and announce its conclusions.' The memo went on to say that there is a need for 'something to head off public speculations or congressional hearings of the wrong sort.' Katzenbach did also say in his testimony that he always wanted to know the truth, including the facts concerning possible conspiracy.
The HSCA continues, stating that on November 25th President Johnson ordered the FBI and the Department of Justice (run at this time by Katzenbach instead of the distraught RFK) to investigate the assassination and the murder of Oswald. By November 27th, Senator Everett M. Dirksen had proposed a Senate Judiciary Committee investigation and Representative Charles E. Goodell had proposed a joint Senate-House investigation. Also, Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr had announced that a state court of inquiry would be established. The Committee cited a statement by Leon Jaworski, who worked for the offices of both the Texas Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney General, indicating that LBJ told him on November 25th that he (LBJ) was encouraging Carr to proceed with the Texas Court of Inquiry.
Quote off
The memorandum from November 29, 1963, and some of Katzenbach's statements before the committee imply the idea came from Katzenbach and perhaps Abe Fortas, and even Robert Kennedy, were the source for the idea of a Commission. The implication is that the memo of November 29, 1963, was a major factor in LBJ's decision making process to form a Commission and it wasn't as he had decided not later than the 28th according to Gibson. He further writes this.
Quote on
The 1979 Robert Blakey-HSCA version is certainly more elaborate than the official story circulated in 1964. The problem is that it substitutes one misleading story for another. The original suggested that LBJ initiated the process. The latter implies that Katzenbach is the most important figure.
Quote off
Nicholas Katzenbach's testimony before the HSCA implies he was a major factor in the creation of the Warren Commission, but he does also hint at some things at some undisclosed facts that the committee staff did not bother to pursue. Katzenbach hinted that there was more to the story and the release of the White House transcripts in 1993 made it clear for Gibson what he was hinting at.
Quote on
The HSCA first asked Katzenbach to explain why he was 'exerting tremendous pressure right after the assassination to get the FBI report out and to get a report in front of the American people.' A November 25, 1963, memo from Katzenbach to Bill Moyers is referenced as evidence of Katzenbach's activities. Katzenbach explains that his concern was to quiet rumors and speculation about conspiracy. Katzenbach then added that his activities were related to the idea of creating a commission 'such as the Warren Commission' and that he did not view the FBI investigation as the final or only investigation. In his testimony Katzenbach represents the commission idea as his own several times. He also says, 'I was never opposed to it.' This, of course, suggests that it was not his idea.
Later in the questioning, Katzenbach mentions that by November 25th he was aware of Oswald's stay in Russia and his visit to Mexico. He says he was also then aware that the FBI had concluded that there was no conspiracy. It is beyond any doubt that such a conclusion was completely unfounded just three days after the assassination and one day after the murder of Oswald. There is no possibility that the FBI could have eliminated the possibility that Oswald, even if guilty, could have had assistance or direction from others. A memo from Alan Belmont, an assistant director and number three man in the FBI, to Hoover's assistant, William Sullivan, dated November 25th, refers to conversations between Katzenbach and Hoover about the assassination.
The memo emphasizes that the FBI's report should cover all the areas that might cause concern with the press and the public. Belmont wrote:
'In other words, this report is to settle the dust, in so far as Oswald and his activities are concerned, both from the standpoint that he is the man who assassinated the President, and relative to Oswald himself and his activities and background, et cetera.' This and other information provided here establish Belmont as one of the primary forces in the FBI pressing for an immediate conclusion about the assassination.
Quote off
Katzenbach and Belmont would seem to work together on this part of the case in an intertwining sort of way and Katzenbach would indicate this in his HSCA testimony. He cites a letter to the Chief Justice that covered this idea, that Oswald was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Gibson elaborates:
Quote on
A 12/9/63 letter to Chief Justice Warren suggested that either the Commission or the Justice Department release a statement saying that the FBI had established 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that Oswald killed Kennedy and that the investigation had so far uncovered no information suggesting a conspiracy. Katzenbach had signed this letter, but in his deposition he said that this letter was probably drafted by the FBI. The fact that the Deputy Attorney General is signing his name to something this important that he didn't write suggests how closely interconnected his actions were with those of Belmont and, perhaps, others in the Bureau. In this oral deposition Katzenbach also reveals, in contradiction to his testimony, that he was not acting on his own when he proposed a Commission to investigate the assassination.
Katzenbach told the Committee that Hoover opposed the creation of a Commission and that President Johnson 'neither rejected nor accepted the idea. He did not embrace it. I thought there was a period of time when he thought that it might be unnecessary.' As we shall see, this understates Johnson's initial opposition.
We come now to what was an important set of statements which should have been followed by specific questions from the House staff.
Katzenbach was asked who else (presumably beyond the President and Hoover) he talked to during the time he was arriving at the idea of a commission. Katzenbach said that he believed he 'recommended it to Bill Moyers' and raised the issue with Walter Jenkins and President Johnson. Katzenbach was then asked about 'people outside the President's immediate circle' and he responded that he did talk to such people. He mentioned Dean Rusk and Alexis Johnson as two people he may have talked to. Katzenbach then said:
'I am sure I talked about it with people outside the government entirely who called me and suggested old friends or former colleagues.' Katzenbach does not identify-and is not asked to identify-those people 'outside the government entirely.' There is no naming of the old friends' and 'former colleagues.' Instead, the questioning shifted to the views of Rusk and others already mentioned by Katzenbach. Given an opportunity to actually find out how the Warren Commission came into being, the HSCA's staff decided to go on to other things. Because of the release of the White House telephone transcripts, we will now be able to identify some or most of those people who were 'outside the government entirely.'
Quote off
For the full article: kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/the-creation-of-the-warren-commission