Post by Rob Caprio on Oct 18, 2018 21:50:03 GMT -5
All portions are ©️ Robert Caprio 2006-2024
www.archives.gov/files/publications/prologue/2017/fall/images/warren-commission.jpg
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Here are some quotes regarding the Warren Commission’s (WC) conclusions and what some thought really happened on November 22, 1963.
*******************************************
The WC, it should be clear, never really conducted an investigation. ”They [sic] began with a conclusion and then worked fairly carefully to ensure that the available facts fit the pre-ordained determination”. (Jim Moore, Conspiracy of One, Ft. Worth: The Summit Group, 1991, p. 173) He is a lone-gunman theorist by the way.
”The Warren Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President. This deficiency was attributable in part to the failure of the commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government.” (HSCA Report, p. 256)
The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) would elaborate even further about the effort of the WC with this comment.
Quote on
The committee also found fault with the manner in which the conclusions of the Warren Commission were stated, although the committee recognized how time and resource limitations might have come into play. There were instances, the committee found, in which the conclusions did not appropriately reflect the efforts undertaken by the Commission and the evidence before it. In the Warren report, the Commission overstated the thoroughness of its investigation and the weight of its evidence in a number of areas, in particular that of the conspiracy investigation. The Commission did not candidly enumerate its limitations due to time pressures, inadequate resources or insufficient information. Instead the language employed in the report left the impression that issues had been dealt with more thoroughly than they actually had. This was due in part, according to attorneys who worked for the Commission, to pressure from Commission members to couch the report in the strongest language possible. As an example, the Commission declared in the beginning paragraph of its conclusions section,
"No limitations have been placed on the Commission's inquiry; it has concluded its own investigation, and all Government agencies have fully discharged their responsibility to cooperate with the Commission in its investigation."
This, in the opinion of the committee, was an inaccurate portrayal of the investigation.
On conspiracy, the Commission stated, "...if there is any ... evidence [of it], it has been beyond the reach of all the investigative agencies and resources of the United States and has not come to the attention of this Commission." Instead of such definitive language, the Commission should have candidly acknowledged the limitations of its investigation and denoted areas where there were shortcomings.
Quote off
Gary Cornwell, the former deputy chief counsel for the HSCA, has said this about the WC’s investigation.
Quote on
The purported mission of the Warren Commission was not merely to determine who may have pulled the trigger that unleashed the bullets that killed the president. Whether the bullets came from a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle that Lee Harvey Oswald had purchased, and whether he shot that rifle from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository on November 22, 1963, were only the beginning issues. Our national security, our national well being, the confidence that the rest of the world would place in our government, and our own peace of mind as citizens, dictated that the more important issue was whether there was a conspiracy behind the assassination.
That the issue of conspiracy was not adequately investigated is even more troubling since the possibility of conspiracy so obviously could not have been rejected as being unworthy of serious consideration. The Russians, with whom Kennedy came to the brink of nuclear war; the Cubans, whose leader we attempted to assassinate; the displaced anti-Castro Cubans, who hated Kennedy for breaking his promise to help them reclaim their home land; the Mafia, who saw the Kennedy family as traitors whose organized crime program was destroying their existence; the right-wing extremists in the South, who hated Kennedy's liberal civil rights agenda; and, at least potentially, even elements of our own government, were all very real suspects, who undeniably considered Kennedy to be their enemy, hated him for what he had done, and feared him for what he proposed to do. . . .
The Warren Commission's repeated failure to pursue obvious avenues of investigation related to conspiracy issues and/or rejection of evidence that did come to their attention indicating possible conspiracy, was even more troubling in light of the fact that the Commission routinely pursued its investigation in a competent and aggressive manner whenever the question was whether Oswald fired upon the president from the School Book Depository, Oswald's conduct in purchasing the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, and his activities immediately before and after the assassination, seemed to have been of great interest to the Warren Commission; whether there was a conspiracy seemed to have been an annoyance.
The typical pattern of the conspiracy investigation both within the Commission itself and within the FBI, who were the Warren Commission's investigators, was like this: Someone would come to the FBI and say that Mr. X was a close associate of Oswald. The FBI would pursue this lead until evidence discounting it was obtained. If Mr. X said he didn't know Oswald (which he was likely to do, whether or not he actually knew Oswald, since Oswald was believed to have shot the president; and no one really wanted to admit being associated with him), there was often nothing more done to pursue the issue. When more detailed witness interviews suggesting conspiracy did make it through the FBI filter, and were presented to the Warren Commission for evaluation, credibility issues were typically resolved in favor of the lone nut theory. A vivid example of such "evaluations" of witness credibility involved the Warren Commission's discounting of eyewitness reports from persons in Dealey Plaza. Appendix XII of the Warren Commission's Report, styled "Speculations and Rumors," contains a long list of what the Commission called "speculations" on the source of the shots, each of which is dismissed seriatim by cursory "Commission findings." The Select Committee reviewed much of the same evidence in its final Report. "The Committee noted that a significant number of witnesses reported that shots originated from the grassy knoll," and found that testimony was not only consistent with the acoustics data that indicated a shot from the grassy knoll, but was also corroborated by photographic data and other evidence that was consistent with the witnesses' descriptions. (Real Answers: The John F. Kennedy Assassination, Spicewood, Texas: Paleface Press, 1998, pp. 130-131, 140-142)
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Warren Commissioner John J. McCloy had serious reservations about the so-called Single Bullet Theory, according to published reports. The magazine Newsday cites a confidential document dated June 24, 1964, as a source for the claim. That's about seven months after the assassination, and some three months before the release of the Warren Report.
The document, a memorandum from McCloy to the Commission's chief counsel, J. Lee Rankin, contained a critique of a draft of the Commission's final report. "I think too much effort is expended on attempting to prove that the first bullet, which hit the president, was also responsible for all of Connally's wounds," McCloy wrote. "The evidence against this is not fully stated." He added that a section of the report dealing with the possibility of shots being fired at Kennedy's motorcade from an overpass was "not well done."
McCloy also questioned the Commission's account of a bullet found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital, where Kennedy and Connally were taken after being shot. "The statement concerning the bullet which was found on the stretcher is not particularly persuasive because there is no indication that the 'stretcher bullet' was in fact the bullet which caused the [Connally] wrist wound," he wrote.
In an interview with Jim Marrs back in 1964, General Edwin Walker said the following.
Quote on
…The Warren Commission Report was ridiculous and a sham as well as an insult to the public’s intelligence. Rubenstein (Jack Ruby) KNEW Oswald; Oswald KNEW Rubenstein. The report would have to start all over on this basic fact.
Quote off
This quote about President John F. Kennedy (JFK) assassination came from former Nazi SS officer Helmet Streikher. Streikher served both Reinhard Gehlen (the man many call the father of the CIA) and Otto Skorzeny (the man who led a team of select SS men into the mountaintop villa to free Mussolini in September 1943 and the leader of the team that dressed as Americans to mess up traffic and cause havoc during the early phases of the "Battle of the Bulge" in December 1944). He also worked for the CIA for some time, including the time G.H.W. Bush was director.
Striekher was on assignment for the CIA in late 1963 in Africa when he was quoted as saying:
“One of the worst-kept secrets in the [CIA], is the truth about the president’s murder. It wasn’t Castro or the Russians. The men who killed Mr. Kennedy were CIA contract agents. John Kennedy’s murder was a two-part conspiracy murder. One was the action end with the killers; the other was the deeper part, the acceptance and protection of that murder by the intelligence apparatus that controls the way the world operates. It had to happen. The man was too independent for his own good.” -- Helmet Streikher (Jim Marrs, "Kennedys And The Nazis", 2008)
We again see evidence and statements that contradict the WC's claims, therefore, their conclusion is not correct and sunk.
www.archives.gov/files/publications/prologue/2017/fall/images/warren-commission.jpg
cdn.quotationof.com/images/john-j-mccloy-6.jpg
Here are some quotes regarding the Warren Commission’s (WC) conclusions and what some thought really happened on November 22, 1963.
*******************************************
The WC, it should be clear, never really conducted an investigation. ”They [sic] began with a conclusion and then worked fairly carefully to ensure that the available facts fit the pre-ordained determination”. (Jim Moore, Conspiracy of One, Ft. Worth: The Summit Group, 1991, p. 173) He is a lone-gunman theorist by the way.
”The Warren Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President. This deficiency was attributable in part to the failure of the commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government.” (HSCA Report, p. 256)
The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) would elaborate even further about the effort of the WC with this comment.
Quote on
The committee also found fault with the manner in which the conclusions of the Warren Commission were stated, although the committee recognized how time and resource limitations might have come into play. There were instances, the committee found, in which the conclusions did not appropriately reflect the efforts undertaken by the Commission and the evidence before it. In the Warren report, the Commission overstated the thoroughness of its investigation and the weight of its evidence in a number of areas, in particular that of the conspiracy investigation. The Commission did not candidly enumerate its limitations due to time pressures, inadequate resources or insufficient information. Instead the language employed in the report left the impression that issues had been dealt with more thoroughly than they actually had. This was due in part, according to attorneys who worked for the Commission, to pressure from Commission members to couch the report in the strongest language possible. As an example, the Commission declared in the beginning paragraph of its conclusions section,
"No limitations have been placed on the Commission's inquiry; it has concluded its own investigation, and all Government agencies have fully discharged their responsibility to cooperate with the Commission in its investigation."
This, in the opinion of the committee, was an inaccurate portrayal of the investigation.
On conspiracy, the Commission stated, "...if there is any ... evidence [of it], it has been beyond the reach of all the investigative agencies and resources of the United States and has not come to the attention of this Commission." Instead of such definitive language, the Commission should have candidly acknowledged the limitations of its investigation and denoted areas where there were shortcomings.
Quote off
Gary Cornwell, the former deputy chief counsel for the HSCA, has said this about the WC’s investigation.
Quote on
The purported mission of the Warren Commission was not merely to determine who may have pulled the trigger that unleashed the bullets that killed the president. Whether the bullets came from a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle that Lee Harvey Oswald had purchased, and whether he shot that rifle from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository on November 22, 1963, were only the beginning issues. Our national security, our national well being, the confidence that the rest of the world would place in our government, and our own peace of mind as citizens, dictated that the more important issue was whether there was a conspiracy behind the assassination.
That the issue of conspiracy was not adequately investigated is even more troubling since the possibility of conspiracy so obviously could not have been rejected as being unworthy of serious consideration. The Russians, with whom Kennedy came to the brink of nuclear war; the Cubans, whose leader we attempted to assassinate; the displaced anti-Castro Cubans, who hated Kennedy for breaking his promise to help them reclaim their home land; the Mafia, who saw the Kennedy family as traitors whose organized crime program was destroying their existence; the right-wing extremists in the South, who hated Kennedy's liberal civil rights agenda; and, at least potentially, even elements of our own government, were all very real suspects, who undeniably considered Kennedy to be their enemy, hated him for what he had done, and feared him for what he proposed to do. . . .
The Warren Commission's repeated failure to pursue obvious avenues of investigation related to conspiracy issues and/or rejection of evidence that did come to their attention indicating possible conspiracy, was even more troubling in light of the fact that the Commission routinely pursued its investigation in a competent and aggressive manner whenever the question was whether Oswald fired upon the president from the School Book Depository, Oswald's conduct in purchasing the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, and his activities immediately before and after the assassination, seemed to have been of great interest to the Warren Commission; whether there was a conspiracy seemed to have been an annoyance.
The typical pattern of the conspiracy investigation both within the Commission itself and within the FBI, who were the Warren Commission's investigators, was like this: Someone would come to the FBI and say that Mr. X was a close associate of Oswald. The FBI would pursue this lead until evidence discounting it was obtained. If Mr. X said he didn't know Oswald (which he was likely to do, whether or not he actually knew Oswald, since Oswald was believed to have shot the president; and no one really wanted to admit being associated with him), there was often nothing more done to pursue the issue. When more detailed witness interviews suggesting conspiracy did make it through the FBI filter, and were presented to the Warren Commission for evaluation, credibility issues were typically resolved in favor of the lone nut theory. A vivid example of such "evaluations" of witness credibility involved the Warren Commission's discounting of eyewitness reports from persons in Dealey Plaza. Appendix XII of the Warren Commission's Report, styled "Speculations and Rumors," contains a long list of what the Commission called "speculations" on the source of the shots, each of which is dismissed seriatim by cursory "Commission findings." The Select Committee reviewed much of the same evidence in its final Report. "The Committee noted that a significant number of witnesses reported that shots originated from the grassy knoll," and found that testimony was not only consistent with the acoustics data that indicated a shot from the grassy knoll, but was also corroborated by photographic data and other evidence that was consistent with the witnesses' descriptions. (Real Answers: The John F. Kennedy Assassination, Spicewood, Texas: Paleface Press, 1998, pp. 130-131, 140-142)
Quote off
Warren Commissioner John J. McCloy had serious reservations about the so-called Single Bullet Theory, according to published reports. The magazine Newsday cites a confidential document dated June 24, 1964, as a source for the claim. That's about seven months after the assassination, and some three months before the release of the Warren Report.
The document, a memorandum from McCloy to the Commission's chief counsel, J. Lee Rankin, contained a critique of a draft of the Commission's final report. "I think too much effort is expended on attempting to prove that the first bullet, which hit the president, was also responsible for all of Connally's wounds," McCloy wrote. "The evidence against this is not fully stated." He added that a section of the report dealing with the possibility of shots being fired at Kennedy's motorcade from an overpass was "not well done."
McCloy also questioned the Commission's account of a bullet found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital, where Kennedy and Connally were taken after being shot. "The statement concerning the bullet which was found on the stretcher is not particularly persuasive because there is no indication that the 'stretcher bullet' was in fact the bullet which caused the [Connally] wrist wound," he wrote.
In an interview with Jim Marrs back in 1964, General Edwin Walker said the following.
Quote on
…The Warren Commission Report was ridiculous and a sham as well as an insult to the public’s intelligence. Rubenstein (Jack Ruby) KNEW Oswald; Oswald KNEW Rubenstein. The report would have to start all over on this basic fact.
Quote off
This quote about President John F. Kennedy (JFK) assassination came from former Nazi SS officer Helmet Streikher. Streikher served both Reinhard Gehlen (the man many call the father of the CIA) and Otto Skorzeny (the man who led a team of select SS men into the mountaintop villa to free Mussolini in September 1943 and the leader of the team that dressed as Americans to mess up traffic and cause havoc during the early phases of the "Battle of the Bulge" in December 1944). He also worked for the CIA for some time, including the time G.H.W. Bush was director.
Striekher was on assignment for the CIA in late 1963 in Africa when he was quoted as saying:
“One of the worst-kept secrets in the [CIA], is the truth about the president’s murder. It wasn’t Castro or the Russians. The men who killed Mr. Kennedy were CIA contract agents. John Kennedy’s murder was a two-part conspiracy murder. One was the action end with the killers; the other was the deeper part, the acceptance and protection of that murder by the intelligence apparatus that controls the way the world operates. It had to happen. The man was too independent for his own good.” -- Helmet Streikher (Jim Marrs, "Kennedys And The Nazis", 2008)
We again see evidence and statements that contradict the WC's claims, therefore, their conclusion is not correct and sunk.