Post by Rob Caprio on Feb 12, 2024 20:57:34 GMT -5
All portions are ©️ Robert Caprio 2006-2024
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c3/John_F._Kennedy%2C_White_House_color_photo_portrait.jpg
i.pinimg.com/originals/ba/18/fb/ba18fb9ea7088e8454059a86520148ca.jpg
The Warren Commission (WC) claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald (LHO) shot and killed President John F. Kennedy (JFK) all by himself on November 22, 1963, but to reach this conclusion they had to avoid issues that could provide motive to someone else.
In the summer of 1961 JFK released three National Security Action Memorandums (NSAMs) that provided motive to both the CIA and the U.S. military.
************************************************
Much is written and discussed about NSAMs #263 and #273 in terms of what they meant for Vietnam, but not as much is discussed or written about NSAMs #55, #56 & #57.
These are key memorandums, written in June 1961. These memorandums took the steps of replacing the CIA's covert operations, which had been running unchallenged for many years, with the military being in charge of ALL "Cold War" operations.
NSAM #55:
www.jfklibrary.org/sites/default/files/archives/JFKNSF/330/JFKNSF-330-005/JFKNSF-330-005-p0002.jpg
NSAM #55 stated that President JFK regarded the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as his principal military advisors responsible for initiating advice and responding to requests for advice, and JFK expected this to reach him direct and "unfiltered." It went on to state that the JCS had a responsibility to the nation in the Cold War similar to that in conventional hostilities. It called for them to know the military, paramilitary forces, and resources available to the Department of Defense; verify their readiness; report on their adequacy; and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improvement.
It is key to point out that "paramilitary" is a reference to non-conventional forces, and this is the area the CIA had been expanding into for some time. The failure of the Bay of Pigs had left a feeling of being had with JFK and he was not going to let it happen again, therefore, he was determined to move these areas to the military.
The key sentence is, "I look to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of the Cold War programs." There it is, he is replacing the covert operations area with the JCS. The problems facing this change were enormous.
Firstly, the CIA was pissed, as they saw the area of covert operations/paramilitary operations as theirs, and they had plans of massive expansion in the works.
Secondly, JFK was passing more responsibility to men who, for the most part, hated his guts. JFK was not liked among many of the military circles and his reluctance to go into Cuba did not help this situation at all. What they were not seeing was that JFK had expanded the military in order to handle covert operations effectively as he created both the United States Navy's "Seals" and the Army's Green Berets. These groups were highly trained to handle well-planned small military covert operations instead of the CIA and their rogue forces.
JFK signed this memorandum to show the seriousness of it, and it was sent to just the Chairman of the JCS.
NSAM #56:
c8.alamy.com/comp/W5RW9M/national-security-action-memorandum-no-56-evaluations-of-paramilitary-requirements-scope-and-content-memorandum-for-secretary-of-defense-on-paramilitary-operations-W5RW9M.jpg
NSAM #56 was released by McGeorge Bundy and contained one vital paragraph:
"It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the United States Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should act in this field. Having determined the assets and the possible requirements, it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit."
It called for the Department of State and the CIA to review these matters and make recommendations. It could be viewed as a "getting the house in order" memorandum.
NSAM #57:
www.thethinkingconservative.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/JFKNSF-330-007-p0002.jpg
NSAM #57 would be a big one. Short, sweet and to the point. It called for the Special Group, 5412 Committee (CIA) to perform the functions assigned in the recommendations to the Strategic Resources Group. This memorandum was tied to a very long paper that outlined what these recommendations were. Fletcher Prouty outlined this memo very well.
Quote on
The principle behind NSAM #57 is absolutely fundamental to the whole concept of clandestine operations. It not only restates the idea that clandestine operations should be secret and deniable, but it goes beyond that to state that they should be small. It plays on the meaning of "small", in two areas of interest: First, unless they are very small, they should not be assigned to the CIA; and second, if they are not as small as possible, they have no chance of remaining secret and therefore have no chance, by definition, of being successful clandestine operations.
This latter issue flies right in the face of the CIA, which had been working for years to define all sorts of operations, large and small, secret or not, as clandestine in order that they would then, by arbitrary definition, be assigned to the CIA. This was an erosion of the principle, but it had been going on for so long and the CIA had used the game so blatantly for so long that it had become almost a matter of course. The CIA managed to declare in 1962 that the training of the border patrol police on the India-China border was a clandestine activity; then, because it was "clandestine", the whole job was assigned to the CIA. (Fletcher Prouty, "The Secret Team", Chapter 4)
ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/STchp4.html
Quote off
The CIA was moving into non-secret operations as anything beyond small could not be kept secret, and this was not their mandate when they were created. This had been, and would always be, the military's area, and JFK took action to restore this normal order of responsibility. Prouty further explains the meaning of this.
Quote on
Thus, by the very size of its activities in so many areas, the CIA had exceeded all reasonable definitions of clandestine. This new Kennedy directive hit right at the most vulnerable point in the ST [Secret Team] game at that time. No sooner had this directive been received in the Pentagon than heated arguments sprang up, wherever this order was seen, as to what was "large" and what was "small" in clandestine activities. Oddly enough the rather large and fast-growing contingent of DOD officials and personnel who had found a most promising and interesting niche in the special operations business were the loudest in support of "small" being "large".
In other words, they were much in support of more Bay of Pigs operations, and even by June 1961 there had been really significant moves of Bay of Pigs men and equipment from Latin America and the bases in the States to Vietnam. For them, it was onward and upward. What was a small Cuban failure or two? Indochina offered new horizons. (Ibid.)
Quote off
It was all circumvented anyway by a shrewd Allen Dulles, so in the end all that was accomplished may have been a death warrant for JFK. Let's finish with Prouty.
Quote on
It was never really settled, anyhow. Allen Dulles and his quietly skillful team had foreseen this possibility and had laid the groundwork to circumvent it. Opposing Dulles was like fighting your adversary on the brink of a cliff. He was willing to go over as long as he brought his opponents with him. He believed the handwriting on the wall, and he had sounded out the Kennedys. He knew that they had learned a lot from the Bay of Pigs; and he now knew where the Kennedys' Achilles' tendon was, and he had hold of that vital spot. (Ibid.)
Quote off
These NSAMs caused a fervor and outrage in people in the CIA and the military as it changed the game plan that had been in place since Dulles had become CIA director. Surely this would have caused some to have a motive to see JFK gone, but the WC took no interest in this since it didn’t point to LHO.
Again, we see that the WC ignored avenues of investigation in their rush to blame LHO, therefore, their conclusion cannot be a full reflection of the situation, so it is sunk.
The full book "The Secret Team" is available online for free at Ratical.org. This site does great work by hosting so much valuable information for free. Here is the link.
ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/
Prouty did great work for the research community. He named the power "The Secret Team" and this long predated the current "Deep State" term. Prouty was the man the "X" character in Oliver Stone's movie "JFK" was based on. He was very knowledgeable about a lot of issues and he knew how the CIA operated since he was the Air Force's liaison with them for years.
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c3/John_F._Kennedy%2C_White_House_color_photo_portrait.jpg
i.pinimg.com/originals/ba/18/fb/ba18fb9ea7088e8454059a86520148ca.jpg
The Warren Commission (WC) claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald (LHO) shot and killed President John F. Kennedy (JFK) all by himself on November 22, 1963, but to reach this conclusion they had to avoid issues that could provide motive to someone else.
In the summer of 1961 JFK released three National Security Action Memorandums (NSAMs) that provided motive to both the CIA and the U.S. military.
************************************************
Much is written and discussed about NSAMs #263 and #273 in terms of what they meant for Vietnam, but not as much is discussed or written about NSAMs #55, #56 & #57.
These are key memorandums, written in June 1961. These memorandums took the steps of replacing the CIA's covert operations, which had been running unchallenged for many years, with the military being in charge of ALL "Cold War" operations.
NSAM #55:
www.jfklibrary.org/sites/default/files/archives/JFKNSF/330/JFKNSF-330-005/JFKNSF-330-005-p0002.jpg
NSAM #55 stated that President JFK regarded the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as his principal military advisors responsible for initiating advice and responding to requests for advice, and JFK expected this to reach him direct and "unfiltered." It went on to state that the JCS had a responsibility to the nation in the Cold War similar to that in conventional hostilities. It called for them to know the military, paramilitary forces, and resources available to the Department of Defense; verify their readiness; report on their adequacy; and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improvement.
It is key to point out that "paramilitary" is a reference to non-conventional forces, and this is the area the CIA had been expanding into for some time. The failure of the Bay of Pigs had left a feeling of being had with JFK and he was not going to let it happen again, therefore, he was determined to move these areas to the military.
The key sentence is, "I look to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and paramilitary aspects of the Cold War programs." There it is, he is replacing the covert operations area with the JCS. The problems facing this change were enormous.
Firstly, the CIA was pissed, as they saw the area of covert operations/paramilitary operations as theirs, and they had plans of massive expansion in the works.
Secondly, JFK was passing more responsibility to men who, for the most part, hated his guts. JFK was not liked among many of the military circles and his reluctance to go into Cuba did not help this situation at all. What they were not seeing was that JFK had expanded the military in order to handle covert operations effectively as he created both the United States Navy's "Seals" and the Army's Green Berets. These groups were highly trained to handle well-planned small military covert operations instead of the CIA and their rogue forces.
JFK signed this memorandum to show the seriousness of it, and it was sent to just the Chairman of the JCS.
NSAM #56:
c8.alamy.com/comp/W5RW9M/national-security-action-memorandum-no-56-evaluations-of-paramilitary-requirements-scope-and-content-memorandum-for-secretary-of-defense-on-paramilitary-operations-W5RW9M.jpg
NSAM #56 was released by McGeorge Bundy and contained one vital paragraph:
"It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the United States Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should act in this field. Having determined the assets and the possible requirements, it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit."
It called for the Department of State and the CIA to review these matters and make recommendations. It could be viewed as a "getting the house in order" memorandum.
NSAM #57:
www.thethinkingconservative.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/JFKNSF-330-007-p0002.jpg
NSAM #57 would be a big one. Short, sweet and to the point. It called for the Special Group, 5412 Committee (CIA) to perform the functions assigned in the recommendations to the Strategic Resources Group. This memorandum was tied to a very long paper that outlined what these recommendations were. Fletcher Prouty outlined this memo very well.
Quote on
The principle behind NSAM #57 is absolutely fundamental to the whole concept of clandestine operations. It not only restates the idea that clandestine operations should be secret and deniable, but it goes beyond that to state that they should be small. It plays on the meaning of "small", in two areas of interest: First, unless they are very small, they should not be assigned to the CIA; and second, if they are not as small as possible, they have no chance of remaining secret and therefore have no chance, by definition, of being successful clandestine operations.
This latter issue flies right in the face of the CIA, which had been working for years to define all sorts of operations, large and small, secret or not, as clandestine in order that they would then, by arbitrary definition, be assigned to the CIA. This was an erosion of the principle, but it had been going on for so long and the CIA had used the game so blatantly for so long that it had become almost a matter of course. The CIA managed to declare in 1962 that the training of the border patrol police on the India-China border was a clandestine activity; then, because it was "clandestine", the whole job was assigned to the CIA. (Fletcher Prouty, "The Secret Team", Chapter 4)
ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/STchp4.html
Quote off
The CIA was moving into non-secret operations as anything beyond small could not be kept secret, and this was not their mandate when they were created. This had been, and would always be, the military's area, and JFK took action to restore this normal order of responsibility. Prouty further explains the meaning of this.
Quote on
Thus, by the very size of its activities in so many areas, the CIA had exceeded all reasonable definitions of clandestine. This new Kennedy directive hit right at the most vulnerable point in the ST [Secret Team] game at that time. No sooner had this directive been received in the Pentagon than heated arguments sprang up, wherever this order was seen, as to what was "large" and what was "small" in clandestine activities. Oddly enough the rather large and fast-growing contingent of DOD officials and personnel who had found a most promising and interesting niche in the special operations business were the loudest in support of "small" being "large".
In other words, they were much in support of more Bay of Pigs operations, and even by June 1961 there had been really significant moves of Bay of Pigs men and equipment from Latin America and the bases in the States to Vietnam. For them, it was onward and upward. What was a small Cuban failure or two? Indochina offered new horizons. (Ibid.)
Quote off
It was all circumvented anyway by a shrewd Allen Dulles, so in the end all that was accomplished may have been a death warrant for JFK. Let's finish with Prouty.
Quote on
It was never really settled, anyhow. Allen Dulles and his quietly skillful team had foreseen this possibility and had laid the groundwork to circumvent it. Opposing Dulles was like fighting your adversary on the brink of a cliff. He was willing to go over as long as he brought his opponents with him. He believed the handwriting on the wall, and he had sounded out the Kennedys. He knew that they had learned a lot from the Bay of Pigs; and he now knew where the Kennedys' Achilles' tendon was, and he had hold of that vital spot. (Ibid.)
Quote off
These NSAMs caused a fervor and outrage in people in the CIA and the military as it changed the game plan that had been in place since Dulles had become CIA director. Surely this would have caused some to have a motive to see JFK gone, but the WC took no interest in this since it didn’t point to LHO.
Again, we see that the WC ignored avenues of investigation in their rush to blame LHO, therefore, their conclusion cannot be a full reflection of the situation, so it is sunk.
The full book "The Secret Team" is available online for free at Ratical.org. This site does great work by hosting so much valuable information for free. Here is the link.
ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/
Prouty did great work for the research community. He named the power "The Secret Team" and this long predated the current "Deep State" term. Prouty was the man the "X" character in Oliver Stone's movie "JFK" was based on. He was very knowledgeable about a lot of issues and he knew how the CIA operated since he was the Air Force's liaison with them for years.