Post by Rob Caprio on Feb 21, 2020 22:44:19 GMT -5
All portions ©️ Robert Caprio 2006-2024
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The House Select Committee On Assassinations (HSCA) would call a very interesting witness that had been ignored by the Warren Commission (WC) in 1964.
This witness held a very important position within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) too. At the time of the assassination he was the Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division. Simply put – he was in charge of the FBI’s internal affairs department.
The HSCA Says…James H. Gale
****************************************
One would wonder why the WC ignored this important witness if this occurred in a vacuum, but it didn’t. Obviously this witness had access to information that would have either made the official narrative more difficult or shown it to be incorrect, thus, he was ignored. Here Gale gives us his background during his HSCA testimony.
Mr. GENZMAN. What was your occupation in 1963?
Mr. GALE. In 1963, I was the Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division.
Mr. GENZMAN. Briefly, what were your duties?
Mr. GALE. As Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division, I had charge over approximately 7 inspectors and about 25 permanent inspector's aides, and it was my responsibility to make inspections of every seat of government division as well as each of the 56 field offices on at least a one-time-per-year basis.
During that time, we would go into the files, investigative files, administrative procedures, make investigative suggestions, insure that personnel was being utilized at a maximum advantage, make sure that we were not indulging in too much redtape, and check into any investigative deficiencies and make pertinent recommendations for administrative action for any administrative or investigative deficiencies.
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Mr. GENZMAN. In connection with your FBI duties, did you ever investigate the FBI's internal security case on Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. GALE. Yes, I did.
Mr. GENZMAN. Have you previously testified about your investigation of the Oswald security case?
Mr. GALE. No, I have not. (HSCA III, p. 513)
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This testimony illustrates that one of Gale’s departments main duties was to “check into any investigative deficiencies and make pertinent recommendations for administrative action for any administrative or investigative deficiencies”. Can you see now why Gale was never called by the WC? His testimony would have dwarfed both Marina Oswald and Ruth Paine’s testimony in terms of length as there were so many deficiencies to discuss regarding the FBI’s investigation into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (JFK).
At this point in the testimony JFK Exhibit F-460 was entered into evidence. This document is a memorandum from Gale to Associate Director Clyde Tolson and it is dated December 10, 1963.
JFK Exhibit F-460:
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This memorandum immediately states that the responsible FBI field office (Dallas) was negligent in not alerting the Secret Service (SS) about Lee Harvey Oswald’s (LHO) presence due to his background. The memorandum states the following.
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Field and Seat of Government employees who handled the instant case maintain suspect did not come within SI criteria. Inspector does not agree, believing that Oswald came within following category: “Investigation has developed information that an individual though not a member of or participant in the activities of subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by the national emergency to endanger the public safely as shown by overt acts or statements within the last three years, established through reliable sources, and informants or individuals.” (HSCA III, F-460, pp. 514-515; pp. 1-2 in original)
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The field office in Dallas, TX, claimed that they did not alert the SS because it was felt that LHO was not a threat to JFK, but this same office would claim posthumously that LHO brought a note claiming to due harm to the FBI office if they didn’t stop bothering Marina Oswald. (Note: See my other series entitled “Statements That Sink The WC’s Conclusions” for more details on this alleged note.)
So why was LHO not considered to be a threat? Here is what his Dallas case agent – James Hosty – had to say about this issue before the WC.
Senator COOPER. And considering that he had been engaged in this demonstration in New Orleans, and the statement that Mrs. Paine had made to you, did it occur to you at all that he was a potentially dangerous person?
Mr. HOSTY. No, sir.
Senator COOPER. Why?
Mr. HOSTY. There is no indication from something of that type that he would commit a violent act. This is not the form that a person of that type would necessarily take. This would not in any way indicate to me that he was capable of violence.
Mr. McCLOY. Don't you think the combination of the fact that you knew that he was lying and that he was a defector and that he had this record with the Fair Play for Cuba, that he might be involved in some intrigue that would be if not necessarily violent, he was a dangerous security risk?
Mr. HOSTY. He was a security risk of a sort, but not the type of person who would engage in violence. That would be the indication.
Clearly Gale disagreed as his memorandum indicates. This is what he wrote in his memorandum about LHO being a security risk.
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Oswald should have been on the security index; his wife should have been interviewed before the assassination and investigation intensified - not held in abeyance - after Oswald contacted Soviet Embassy in Mexico. HSCA III, F -460, p. 519; p. 6 in original)
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Gale was asked about what he wrote by the HSCA.
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Mr. GENZMAN. Does this sentence adequately summarize your conclusions?
Mr. GALE. Yes, it does.
Mr. GENZMAN. Did J. Edgar Hoover agree with your conclusions
Mr. GALE. Yes, he did.
Mr. GENZMAN. Why did you think Oswald came within this category?
Mr. GALE. I felt that Oswald came within this category…I felt he should be on the security index.
Mr. GENZMAN. …Did J. Edgar Hoover agree with you that Oswald met the criteria of the security index?
Mr. GALE. Yes, he did. (HSCA III, pp. 527-528)
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So why was LHO not included in this list that was given to the SS for the Dallas visit? Not only that, but how could the WC explain why they thought LHO was capable of murder when FBI Agent Hosty stated that he didn’t even consider LHO to be violent? Something isn’t adding up here.
After all this discussion regarding why LHO should have been on the security index Gale tells the HSCA that it probably would have made no difference in regards to the assassination.
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Mr. GENZMAN. What would have been the result if Oswald had been on the security index?
Mr. GALE. I don't think it would have had any result insofar as the assassination was concerned. I don't think it would have prevented the assassination. I don't think it would have had any material effect insofar as the assassination was concerned at all. It was an internal error. They did not have him on there, and I felt he definitely met that criteria and that he should have been on there. (HSCA III, 529)
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This makes no sense to me. Why did he bother addressing this if it made no difference in regards to the assassination? Furthermore, why do they bother to even keep a security index if it makes no difference in cases like this? After saying it made no difference in regards to preventing the assassination, why does he again insist that LHO’s name should have been on there?
He further stated that they inquired with the field agents and supervisors about this issue, but again, why bother if it made no difference? Why censure and put people on probation if it didn’t matter?
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Dallas
1. [blacked out] (Veteran) – Censure and probation for inadequate investigation including failure to interview Oswald’s wife until after assassination, delay reporting, failure to put subject on Security Index, and for holding investigation in abeyance after being in receipt of information that subject hsd been in contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.
2. Field Supervisor [blacked out] (Nonveteran) – Censure and probation for failing to ensure that case more fully investigated and reported, for not placing subject on the Security Index and for concurring in decision to hold investigation in abeyance. (JFK F-461, Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, September 30, 1964, p. 1; HSCA III, p. 531)
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This shows that people were censured and put on probation for not adding LHO to the Security Index, but according to Gale before the HSCA this would have made no difference in preventing the assassination. What am I missing here?
You will notice on page 3 of the memorandum that Gale wrote this about the claims made by Hosty in his WC testimony.
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Inspector feels that [blacked out but clearly referring to Hosty] testimony as quoted in the Commission report makes the FBI look ridiculous and definitely taints our public image for efficiency. If we had a proper investigation of Oswald we would not have been so vulnerable. (Ibid, p. 3; 533)
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Gale is very clear here about what he thinks of Hosty’s claims. This is what researchers have been saying for years, but official narrative defenders have said that they were incorrect. Here we see Gale agreed with them. He also says that if they had a “proper investigation of Oswald” they would not “be so vulnerable.” This statement shows that the FBI did not do a thorough or proper investigation of LHO, therefore, any claim to the contrary should be disregarded.
An example of this improper investigation is the issue of a stop order for LHO’s passport. Here is what Gale said about September 30 memorandum content.
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Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to page 5, would you read in the middle of the page the three sentences beginning with "The Bureau"?
Mr. GALE [reading]:
The Bureau by letter to the Commission, indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop on the passport as our investigation disclosed no evidence that Oswald was acting under the instructions of or on behalf of any foreign government or instrumentality thereof. Inspector feels that it was proper at that time to take this public position. However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not definitely know whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time.
Mr. GENZMAN. Why was this public position taken?
Mr. GALE. I don't know. I didn't write that particular letter to the Commission. However, I might say that in analyzing this, this was not something that was black and white. Whether or not we should have had the passport or the stop on his passport was subject to interpretation. In other words, there were shades of gray involved here and apparently those that wrote the letter to the Commission took a different view than I took, and I felt that there should have been a stop placed on that, but apparently the people who wrote the letter to the Commission did not feel that there was a--did not warrant placing a stop on his passport when they sent that to the Commission, the same as they felt that, I guess, that it was not proper to have him on the security index, and I differed and I felt that he should be on the security index. (HSCA III, pp. 541-542)
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Again, we see that he felt a stop order should have been put on LHO’s passport in 1964, but now he was doing the tap dance we have seen so many witnesses employ when they realize their earlier comments went against the official narrative. Based on LHO’s background he should not have been issued a new passport in June 1963, but clearly there was a purpose to it.
(Note: I did several posts on the passport issue in my “Statements That Sink The WC’s Conclusions” series.)
More tap dancing would begin over comments that he wrote in the September 30, 1964, memorandum (F-461).
Mr. GENZMAN. Would you reread the last sentence of that paragraph?
Mr. GALE [reading]:
However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not know definitely whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time.
Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale, according to some individuals, this sentence implies that the FBI did at some point determine that Oswald had connections with some U.S. intelligence agency.
Mr. GALE. That is not what I meant. What I meant in writing that sentence was that we did not know definitely whether he had any intelligence assignments at that time, but I felt in my mind that he possibly could have had intelligence assignments based on his Russian background, his defection to Russia, and the fact that he would not take the polygraph examination, and also because of his activities with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
However, I had no concrete information to establish any of those possibilities. (Ibid, p. 542)
Gale can tap dance all that he wants, but the point remains the same. Why would anyone think that a “loner” had any intelligence assignments? Why would that have even been entertained based on what the WC wrote and said about him?
Clearly, this statement shows that LHO was more than the WC claimed that he was.
Back to the Security Index issue. Remember that Gale told the HSCA that being on it wouldn’t prevented JFK’s assassination? So why was it such an important finding then?
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Chairman STOKES. Now, your finding that Oswald had not been placed on the security index was an important finding, was it not?
Mr. GALE. It was. I felt all the findings were important, but that was one of the important findings.
Chairman STOKES. One Of the more important ones, I would say.
How would that have changed Dallas, had he been placed on the security index?
Mr. GALE. In my opinion, it would not have changed Dallas at all.
Chairman STOKES. What is the relative importance of it?
Mr. GALE. Because we had a criteria that individuals of this type should have been placed on the security index and, therefore, the agents and employees handling that should have complied with that.
Chairman STOKES. Then had he been on the security index, in your opinion, the Secret Service or no other agency would have looked at him differently in Dallas at that time?
Mr. GALE. I don't think so. We had an awful lot of people on the security index. I don't believe that would have looked at him any differently. (Ibid., p. 545)
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What am I missing here? Why is finding out that LHO was not put on the Security Index one of the “most important things” that Gale discovered if it wouldn’t have changed anything in regard to the assassination? Wasn’t that the whole point of his overview? If not, why was he punishing people for something that wouldn’t have changed anything?
Gale is then asked about the issue of LHO being an FBI informant.
Chairman STOKES. During the course of your investigation of the assassination, did you find any evidence that Oswald had been an FBI informant?
Mr. GALE. Absolutely not. I had all the files pulled on Mr. Oswald when I made my inquiry and I received no files indicating that he had been an informant. If, of course, I had, I would have taken an entirely different attack on this thing.
Chairman STOKES. I see. So the bottom line is that you have no information?
Mr. GALE. Absolutely none of it. (Ibid.)
All this tells us is that Gale found no information in what he was given, but what if that information was not included in the files he was provided with? Do you think that this highly secret information would be provided to him? I think as soon as the assassination occurred this type of information would have either been destroyed or locked up in FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover’s personal files.
They then spent pages trying to nail down the issue of the Security Index and what was the impact of this. Gale kept dodging the issue by acting like he didn’t know the real importance of it, but come on. Despite his claims and denials that it would have had no effect on the assassination it is just common sense that if he was on it then the SS would have been aware of him and they could have checked him out.
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Mr. FITHIAN. Do you know whether it was the policy of the FBI to share the information contained on the security index with any other Federal agency?
Mr. GALE. I don't recall that offhand, no.
Mr. FITHIAN. You don't know whether it would have been policy to share that with the Secret Service?
Mr. GALE. I don't have any present recollection of that.
Mr. FITHIAN. Is it your judgment that the FBI should have shared that information with the Secret Service when the President was going to Dallas, or at any other time?
Mr. GALE. I think that there should be a free exchange of information between the FBI and the Secret Service concerning any individuals who have a subversive background. I believe that is being done now.
Mr. FITHIAN. So it would not surprise you then that the Secret Service felt that it should have indeed had that information from the FBI?
Mr. GALE. I wouldn't know what the Secret Service would be surprised at or what they wouldn't be surprised at. (Ibid., p. 552)
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Again, if none of this mattered or the SS did not need to know this information, why were 17 people censured and disciplined for not adding LHO to the Security Index?
The Chairman Stokes asks a great question.
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Chairman STOKES. Mr. Gale, is it not conceivable that when we take the deficiencies that you found relating to Oswald, and in particular the deficiencies surrounding the deficient manner in which James Hosty treated the Oswald case, is it not conceivable that had he been handled in accordance with the rules and regulations that Oswald would have been then known he was under close surveillance by the FBI and, therefore, that might have been a deterrent to his actions in Dallas on November 22, 1963? Is that not conceivable?
Mr. GALE. Well, of course, anything is conceivable, Mr. Chairman, and I think that is strictly speculative as to whether or not that would have taken place. I don't know whether the investigative deficiencies here would have caused him to reach that conclusion or not, because undoubtedly one of the things that you are doing in making an investigation is trying to handle it in such a way that the person does not know that he is under such intensive scrutiny, and most of the investigations of subversives are done in a manner whereby you do not place them under close surveillance or don't let them know that they are under investigation. You are not advertising to people you have under investigation that they are under investigation.
Chairman STOKES. Is it not also conceivable that had Hosty done his job properly, he would have been able to advise the Secret Service that Oswald was working at the Texas Book Depository which was on the direct parade route.
Mr. GALE. I don't know whether he would have done that. Just the fact that he would have discovered that, I don't know whether he would have advised them of that or not. I don't know what he would have done. In other words, I am not the proper person, I don't think, to ask what Hosty would have done.
Chairman STOKES. You see, I don't think we are dealing entirely in speculative matters because, as a result of J. Edgar Hoover feeling that the FBI had not performed their responsibilities properly, he sent you in and gave you the direct responsibility of ascertaining whether or not they had done their job properly.
Mr. GALE. Correct.
Chairman STOKES. So, then the purpose, it would seem to me, of his having taken that action and your having taken your action, was for the purpose of saying what had been done improperly and if it had not been done in this way, things might have been different.
Mr. GALE. No, I don't think that is what we were saying because I reached a conclusion that even if the investigative shortcomings and reporting shortcomings, which I had found, had been carried out that it would not have made any difference in Dallas. That was my conclusion. That is still my conclusion. What we were trying to do here was to insure that agents throughout the Bureau and these agents did not make similar mistakes in the future.
Chairman STOKES. Well, then, how do you come to the conclusion that if the Bureau had performed on par with the excellence demanded by the Director that this still would have occurred? I don't understand how you arrive at that conclusion
Mr. GALE. Of course, if Hosty knew that Oswald was going to go to the book building with a gun, naturally, he would have advised Secret Service. But he didn't know that. We are sitting back here after the fact and it is much easier to see what you would have done after the fact than it is before the fact.
I frankly do not feel that these investigative shortcomings play any part in the Dallas assassination. They were investigative errors--if we felt they had played a part in that, believe me, the disciplinary action would have been much stronger.
I frankly do not feel that these investigative shortcomings play any part in the Dallas assassination. They were investigative errors--if we felt they had played a part in that, believe me, the disciplinary action would have much stronger. (HSCA III, pp. 552-554)
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What was the purpose of the internal investigation if the deficiencies discovered “wouldn’t have changed anything in Dallas regarding the assassination?” It is clear by Chairman Stokes’ repeated questioning on this point that he did not accept Gale’s answer. I don’t either.
It seems silly to censure and put seventeen people on probation if their deficiencies made no difference in what happened on November 22, 1963, in my view or apparently Stokes’ view either. It seems to me Gale was still in a cover-up mode.
Luckily for us, Congressman Sawyer didn’t give up on this issue.
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Mr. SAWYER. I am a little puzzled, as I understand your testimony, that these deficiencies in the pre-assassination investigation had really nothing to do with the ensuing result in Dallas.
Mr. GALE. I didn't think so; no, sir.
Mr. SAWYER. And yet, your report devotes itself to some speculation whether the administrative punishment ought to be withheld because it might get to the Warren Commission or whether you should go ahead because the subpoenas probably wouldn't reach down to the agent level and, therefore, they wouldn't find out about it.
If it had nothing to do with the result in Dallas, why were you so concerned about the Warren Commission finding out about it since that was all they were concerned with?
Mr. GALE. I wasn't particularly concerned about it. There were other officials who were concerned about the administrative action being made public, I think, and embarrassing the Bureau.
Mr. SAWYER. You make mention in your recommending or suggesting you go ahead with it, you say the subpoenas of the Warren Commission probably would not reach down to the agent level. So, apparently, you were concerned, or—
Mr. GALE. I didn't feel it would and I didn't particularly care if it did. I felt the administrative action should go forward and so did Mr. Hoover. No matter who found out about it, I thought the chips should fall where they may, no matter who found out about it.
Mr. SAWYER. Yes, but you were saying they probably wouldn't find out about it which was an argument in favor of going ahead.
Mr. GALE. That is exactly right, because there were others who were opposed to it.
Mr. SAWYER. So, why would it be an argument of going ahead or not going ahead if it had nothing to do with the result in Dallas.
Mr. GALE. Because there were others in the Bureau who were opposed to that.
Mr. SAWYER. Well, then, they apparently felt differently than you did about whether it would have affected the results in Dallas; is that correct?
Mr. GALE. I don't think so. They may have felt the Warren Commission should not have had it because they didn't want it to become public at that time. They were concerned about adverse publicity insofar as our mishandling the case. It was not the practice and policy of the FBI to be airing its dirty linen in public.
Mr. SAWYER. The Warren Commission weren't interested in the procedural operations of the FBI in particular if they were connected with their charge; namely, to investigate the assassination in Dallas; isn't that correct?
Mr. GALE. You might be interested in knowing, Mr. Sawyer, that the Warren Commission found the same deficiencies that I found on the same things and right down the line…And so, the Warren Commission apparently didn't feel that these errors made any difference in Dallas, and I don't feel they did, either.
They had the same errors in front of them. They found the same exact errors that I found. (HSCA III, pp. 555-556)
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The claim that the deficiencies that Gale discovered had no effect on JFK’s assassination just doesn’t seem to add up. Hosty’s performance was horrible (I didn’t even get into the threatening note issue because Gale said that he only learned about that after he left the FBI. This makes one wonder how thorough the investigation by Gale was if he never learned about this important issue.), and surely most people realize if he had performed his job properly the SS would have been alerted about LHO at the very least when JFK came to Dallas. At best, LHO should have been under such scrutiny if he was a threat th as t he either could not complete the assassination or even be able to attempt it.
Hosty told us the truth when he testified to not believing LHO was a violent person as this is what his actions, or lack of action, shows. Gale’s assertion that the FBI didn’t have to alert the SS about dangerous people is laughable isince there would be no point in having a Security Index otherwise.
This portion of Gale’s testimony also shows that the FBI was very willing to hide things from the WC. This is something that we have seen time and time again in this series so this is no shock at this point.
Gale was asked to give a number between one and ten on the performance of the FBI agents regarding their pre-assassination handling/investigation of LHO and he gave them a “six or seven.” (HSCA III, p. 567) Do you think that they deserve that number? Do you think that they deserve a higher number?
While it was commendable of the FBI to have conducted this investigation, it was too little too late. Furthermore, Gale’s insistence that the deficiencies discovered had no effect on preventing the assassination is just not believable in my opinion (or in the opinion of some of the HSCA people).
Moreover, if Gale didn’t handle the post-assassination investigation, who did? And, where is that report? I sure would like to see that one. Does anyone know where it is if it is available?
What are your thoughts on Gale’s investigation and testimony? All thoughts and information are welcome.
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The House Select Committee On Assassinations (HSCA) would call a very interesting witness that had been ignored by the Warren Commission (WC) in 1964.
This witness held a very important position within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) too. At the time of the assassination he was the Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division. Simply put – he was in charge of the FBI’s internal affairs department.
The HSCA Says…James H. Gale
****************************************
One would wonder why the WC ignored this important witness if this occurred in a vacuum, but it didn’t. Obviously this witness had access to information that would have either made the official narrative more difficult or shown it to be incorrect, thus, he was ignored. Here Gale gives us his background during his HSCA testimony.
Mr. GENZMAN. What was your occupation in 1963?
Mr. GALE. In 1963, I was the Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division.
Mr. GENZMAN. Briefly, what were your duties?
Mr. GALE. As Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division, I had charge over approximately 7 inspectors and about 25 permanent inspector's aides, and it was my responsibility to make inspections of every seat of government division as well as each of the 56 field offices on at least a one-time-per-year basis.
During that time, we would go into the files, investigative files, administrative procedures, make investigative suggestions, insure that personnel was being utilized at a maximum advantage, make sure that we were not indulging in too much redtape, and check into any investigative deficiencies and make pertinent recommendations for administrative action for any administrative or investigative deficiencies.
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Mr. GENZMAN. In connection with your FBI duties, did you ever investigate the FBI's internal security case on Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. GALE. Yes, I did.
Mr. GENZMAN. Have you previously testified about your investigation of the Oswald security case?
Mr. GALE. No, I have not. (HSCA III, p. 513)
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This testimony illustrates that one of Gale’s departments main duties was to “check into any investigative deficiencies and make pertinent recommendations for administrative action for any administrative or investigative deficiencies”. Can you see now why Gale was never called by the WC? His testimony would have dwarfed both Marina Oswald and Ruth Paine’s testimony in terms of length as there were so many deficiencies to discuss regarding the FBI’s investigation into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (JFK).
At this point in the testimony JFK Exhibit F-460 was entered into evidence. This document is a memorandum from Gale to Associate Director Clyde Tolson and it is dated December 10, 1963.
JFK Exhibit F-460:
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This memorandum immediately states that the responsible FBI field office (Dallas) was negligent in not alerting the Secret Service (SS) about Lee Harvey Oswald’s (LHO) presence due to his background. The memorandum states the following.
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Field and Seat of Government employees who handled the instant case maintain suspect did not come within SI criteria. Inspector does not agree, believing that Oswald came within following category: “Investigation has developed information that an individual though not a member of or participant in the activities of subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by the national emergency to endanger the public safely as shown by overt acts or statements within the last three years, established through reliable sources, and informants or individuals.” (HSCA III, F-460, pp. 514-515; pp. 1-2 in original)
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The field office in Dallas, TX, claimed that they did not alert the SS because it was felt that LHO was not a threat to JFK, but this same office would claim posthumously that LHO brought a note claiming to due harm to the FBI office if they didn’t stop bothering Marina Oswald. (Note: See my other series entitled “Statements That Sink The WC’s Conclusions” for more details on this alleged note.)
So why was LHO not considered to be a threat? Here is what his Dallas case agent – James Hosty – had to say about this issue before the WC.
Senator COOPER. And considering that he had been engaged in this demonstration in New Orleans, and the statement that Mrs. Paine had made to you, did it occur to you at all that he was a potentially dangerous person?
Mr. HOSTY. No, sir.
Senator COOPER. Why?
Mr. HOSTY. There is no indication from something of that type that he would commit a violent act. This is not the form that a person of that type would necessarily take. This would not in any way indicate to me that he was capable of violence.
Mr. McCLOY. Don't you think the combination of the fact that you knew that he was lying and that he was a defector and that he had this record with the Fair Play for Cuba, that he might be involved in some intrigue that would be if not necessarily violent, he was a dangerous security risk?
Mr. HOSTY. He was a security risk of a sort, but not the type of person who would engage in violence. That would be the indication.
Clearly Gale disagreed as his memorandum indicates. This is what he wrote in his memorandum about LHO being a security risk.
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Oswald should have been on the security index; his wife should have been interviewed before the assassination and investigation intensified - not held in abeyance - after Oswald contacted Soviet Embassy in Mexico. HSCA III, F -460, p. 519; p. 6 in original)
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Gale was asked about what he wrote by the HSCA.
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Mr. GENZMAN. Does this sentence adequately summarize your conclusions?
Mr. GALE. Yes, it does.
Mr. GENZMAN. Did J. Edgar Hoover agree with your conclusions
Mr. GALE. Yes, he did.
Mr. GENZMAN. Why did you think Oswald came within this category?
Mr. GALE. I felt that Oswald came within this category…I felt he should be on the security index.
Mr. GENZMAN. …Did J. Edgar Hoover agree with you that Oswald met the criteria of the security index?
Mr. GALE. Yes, he did. (HSCA III, pp. 527-528)
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So why was LHO not included in this list that was given to the SS for the Dallas visit? Not only that, but how could the WC explain why they thought LHO was capable of murder when FBI Agent Hosty stated that he didn’t even consider LHO to be violent? Something isn’t adding up here.
After all this discussion regarding why LHO should have been on the security index Gale tells the HSCA that it probably would have made no difference in regards to the assassination.
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Mr. GENZMAN. What would have been the result if Oswald had been on the security index?
Mr. GALE. I don't think it would have had any result insofar as the assassination was concerned. I don't think it would have prevented the assassination. I don't think it would have had any material effect insofar as the assassination was concerned at all. It was an internal error. They did not have him on there, and I felt he definitely met that criteria and that he should have been on there. (HSCA III, 529)
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This makes no sense to me. Why did he bother addressing this if it made no difference in regards to the assassination? Furthermore, why do they bother to even keep a security index if it makes no difference in cases like this? After saying it made no difference in regards to preventing the assassination, why does he again insist that LHO’s name should have been on there?
He further stated that they inquired with the field agents and supervisors about this issue, but again, why bother if it made no difference? Why censure and put people on probation if it didn’t matter?
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Dallas
1. [blacked out] (Veteran) – Censure and probation for inadequate investigation including failure to interview Oswald’s wife until after assassination, delay reporting, failure to put subject on Security Index, and for holding investigation in abeyance after being in receipt of information that subject hsd been in contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.
2. Field Supervisor [blacked out] (Nonveteran) – Censure and probation for failing to ensure that case more fully investigated and reported, for not placing subject on the Security Index and for concurring in decision to hold investigation in abeyance. (JFK F-461, Memorandum from Gale to Tolson, September 30, 1964, p. 1; HSCA III, p. 531)
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This shows that people were censured and put on probation for not adding LHO to the Security Index, but according to Gale before the HSCA this would have made no difference in preventing the assassination. What am I missing here?
You will notice on page 3 of the memorandum that Gale wrote this about the claims made by Hosty in his WC testimony.
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Inspector feels that [blacked out but clearly referring to Hosty] testimony as quoted in the Commission report makes the FBI look ridiculous and definitely taints our public image for efficiency. If we had a proper investigation of Oswald we would not have been so vulnerable. (Ibid, p. 3; 533)
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Gale is very clear here about what he thinks of Hosty’s claims. This is what researchers have been saying for years, but official narrative defenders have said that they were incorrect. Here we see Gale agreed with them. He also says that if they had a “proper investigation of Oswald” they would not “be so vulnerable.” This statement shows that the FBI did not do a thorough or proper investigation of LHO, therefore, any claim to the contrary should be disregarded.
An example of this improper investigation is the issue of a stop order for LHO’s passport. Here is what Gale said about September 30 memorandum content.
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Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to page 5, would you read in the middle of the page the three sentences beginning with "The Bureau"?
Mr. GALE [reading]:
The Bureau by letter to the Commission, indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop on the passport as our investigation disclosed no evidence that Oswald was acting under the instructions of or on behalf of any foreign government or instrumentality thereof. Inspector feels that it was proper at that time to take this public position. However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not definitely know whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time.
Mr. GENZMAN. Why was this public position taken?
Mr. GALE. I don't know. I didn't write that particular letter to the Commission. However, I might say that in analyzing this, this was not something that was black and white. Whether or not we should have had the passport or the stop on his passport was subject to interpretation. In other words, there were shades of gray involved here and apparently those that wrote the letter to the Commission took a different view than I took, and I felt that there should have been a stop placed on that, but apparently the people who wrote the letter to the Commission did not feel that there was a--did not warrant placing a stop on his passport when they sent that to the Commission, the same as they felt that, I guess, that it was not proper to have him on the security index, and I differed and I felt that he should be on the security index. (HSCA III, pp. 541-542)
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Again, we see that he felt a stop order should have been put on LHO’s passport in 1964, but now he was doing the tap dance we have seen so many witnesses employ when they realize their earlier comments went against the official narrative. Based on LHO’s background he should not have been issued a new passport in June 1963, but clearly there was a purpose to it.
(Note: I did several posts on the passport issue in my “Statements That Sink The WC’s Conclusions” series.)
More tap dancing would begin over comments that he wrote in the September 30, 1964, memorandum (F-461).
Mr. GENZMAN. Would you reread the last sentence of that paragraph?
Mr. GALE [reading]:
However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not know definitely whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time.
Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale, according to some individuals, this sentence implies that the FBI did at some point determine that Oswald had connections with some U.S. intelligence agency.
Mr. GALE. That is not what I meant. What I meant in writing that sentence was that we did not know definitely whether he had any intelligence assignments at that time, but I felt in my mind that he possibly could have had intelligence assignments based on his Russian background, his defection to Russia, and the fact that he would not take the polygraph examination, and also because of his activities with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
However, I had no concrete information to establish any of those possibilities. (Ibid, p. 542)
Gale can tap dance all that he wants, but the point remains the same. Why would anyone think that a “loner” had any intelligence assignments? Why would that have even been entertained based on what the WC wrote and said about him?
Clearly, this statement shows that LHO was more than the WC claimed that he was.
Back to the Security Index issue. Remember that Gale told the HSCA that being on it wouldn’t prevented JFK’s assassination? So why was it such an important finding then?
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Chairman STOKES. Now, your finding that Oswald had not been placed on the security index was an important finding, was it not?
Mr. GALE. It was. I felt all the findings were important, but that was one of the important findings.
Chairman STOKES. One Of the more important ones, I would say.
How would that have changed Dallas, had he been placed on the security index?
Mr. GALE. In my opinion, it would not have changed Dallas at all.
Chairman STOKES. What is the relative importance of it?
Mr. GALE. Because we had a criteria that individuals of this type should have been placed on the security index and, therefore, the agents and employees handling that should have complied with that.
Chairman STOKES. Then had he been on the security index, in your opinion, the Secret Service or no other agency would have looked at him differently in Dallas at that time?
Mr. GALE. I don't think so. We had an awful lot of people on the security index. I don't believe that would have looked at him any differently. (Ibid., p. 545)
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What am I missing here? Why is finding out that LHO was not put on the Security Index one of the “most important things” that Gale discovered if it wouldn’t have changed anything in regard to the assassination? Wasn’t that the whole point of his overview? If not, why was he punishing people for something that wouldn’t have changed anything?
Gale is then asked about the issue of LHO being an FBI informant.
Chairman STOKES. During the course of your investigation of the assassination, did you find any evidence that Oswald had been an FBI informant?
Mr. GALE. Absolutely not. I had all the files pulled on Mr. Oswald when I made my inquiry and I received no files indicating that he had been an informant. If, of course, I had, I would have taken an entirely different attack on this thing.
Chairman STOKES. I see. So the bottom line is that you have no information?
Mr. GALE. Absolutely none of it. (Ibid.)
All this tells us is that Gale found no information in what he was given, but what if that information was not included in the files he was provided with? Do you think that this highly secret information would be provided to him? I think as soon as the assassination occurred this type of information would have either been destroyed or locked up in FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover’s personal files.
They then spent pages trying to nail down the issue of the Security Index and what was the impact of this. Gale kept dodging the issue by acting like he didn’t know the real importance of it, but come on. Despite his claims and denials that it would have had no effect on the assassination it is just common sense that if he was on it then the SS would have been aware of him and they could have checked him out.
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Mr. FITHIAN. Do you know whether it was the policy of the FBI to share the information contained on the security index with any other Federal agency?
Mr. GALE. I don't recall that offhand, no.
Mr. FITHIAN. You don't know whether it would have been policy to share that with the Secret Service?
Mr. GALE. I don't have any present recollection of that.
Mr. FITHIAN. Is it your judgment that the FBI should have shared that information with the Secret Service when the President was going to Dallas, or at any other time?
Mr. GALE. I think that there should be a free exchange of information between the FBI and the Secret Service concerning any individuals who have a subversive background. I believe that is being done now.
Mr. FITHIAN. So it would not surprise you then that the Secret Service felt that it should have indeed had that information from the FBI?
Mr. GALE. I wouldn't know what the Secret Service would be surprised at or what they wouldn't be surprised at. (Ibid., p. 552)
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Again, if none of this mattered or the SS did not need to know this information, why were 17 people censured and disciplined for not adding LHO to the Security Index?
The Chairman Stokes asks a great question.
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Chairman STOKES. Mr. Gale, is it not conceivable that when we take the deficiencies that you found relating to Oswald, and in particular the deficiencies surrounding the deficient manner in which James Hosty treated the Oswald case, is it not conceivable that had he been handled in accordance with the rules and regulations that Oswald would have been then known he was under close surveillance by the FBI and, therefore, that might have been a deterrent to his actions in Dallas on November 22, 1963? Is that not conceivable?
Mr. GALE. Well, of course, anything is conceivable, Mr. Chairman, and I think that is strictly speculative as to whether or not that would have taken place. I don't know whether the investigative deficiencies here would have caused him to reach that conclusion or not, because undoubtedly one of the things that you are doing in making an investigation is trying to handle it in such a way that the person does not know that he is under such intensive scrutiny, and most of the investigations of subversives are done in a manner whereby you do not place them under close surveillance or don't let them know that they are under investigation. You are not advertising to people you have under investigation that they are under investigation.
Chairman STOKES. Is it not also conceivable that had Hosty done his job properly, he would have been able to advise the Secret Service that Oswald was working at the Texas Book Depository which was on the direct parade route.
Mr. GALE. I don't know whether he would have done that. Just the fact that he would have discovered that, I don't know whether he would have advised them of that or not. I don't know what he would have done. In other words, I am not the proper person, I don't think, to ask what Hosty would have done.
Chairman STOKES. You see, I don't think we are dealing entirely in speculative matters because, as a result of J. Edgar Hoover feeling that the FBI had not performed their responsibilities properly, he sent you in and gave you the direct responsibility of ascertaining whether or not they had done their job properly.
Mr. GALE. Correct.
Chairman STOKES. So, then the purpose, it would seem to me, of his having taken that action and your having taken your action, was for the purpose of saying what had been done improperly and if it had not been done in this way, things might have been different.
Mr. GALE. No, I don't think that is what we were saying because I reached a conclusion that even if the investigative shortcomings and reporting shortcomings, which I had found, had been carried out that it would not have made any difference in Dallas. That was my conclusion. That is still my conclusion. What we were trying to do here was to insure that agents throughout the Bureau and these agents did not make similar mistakes in the future.
Chairman STOKES. Well, then, how do you come to the conclusion that if the Bureau had performed on par with the excellence demanded by the Director that this still would have occurred? I don't understand how you arrive at that conclusion
Mr. GALE. Of course, if Hosty knew that Oswald was going to go to the book building with a gun, naturally, he would have advised Secret Service. But he didn't know that. We are sitting back here after the fact and it is much easier to see what you would have done after the fact than it is before the fact.
I frankly do not feel that these investigative shortcomings play any part in the Dallas assassination. They were investigative errors--if we felt they had played a part in that, believe me, the disciplinary action would have been much stronger.
I frankly do not feel that these investigative shortcomings play any part in the Dallas assassination. They were investigative errors--if we felt they had played a part in that, believe me, the disciplinary action would have much stronger. (HSCA III, pp. 552-554)
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What was the purpose of the internal investigation if the deficiencies discovered “wouldn’t have changed anything in Dallas regarding the assassination?” It is clear by Chairman Stokes’ repeated questioning on this point that he did not accept Gale’s answer. I don’t either.
It seems silly to censure and put seventeen people on probation if their deficiencies made no difference in what happened on November 22, 1963, in my view or apparently Stokes’ view either. It seems to me Gale was still in a cover-up mode.
Luckily for us, Congressman Sawyer didn’t give up on this issue.
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Mr. SAWYER. I am a little puzzled, as I understand your testimony, that these deficiencies in the pre-assassination investigation had really nothing to do with the ensuing result in Dallas.
Mr. GALE. I didn't think so; no, sir.
Mr. SAWYER. And yet, your report devotes itself to some speculation whether the administrative punishment ought to be withheld because it might get to the Warren Commission or whether you should go ahead because the subpoenas probably wouldn't reach down to the agent level and, therefore, they wouldn't find out about it.
If it had nothing to do with the result in Dallas, why were you so concerned about the Warren Commission finding out about it since that was all they were concerned with?
Mr. GALE. I wasn't particularly concerned about it. There were other officials who were concerned about the administrative action being made public, I think, and embarrassing the Bureau.
Mr. SAWYER. You make mention in your recommending or suggesting you go ahead with it, you say the subpoenas of the Warren Commission probably would not reach down to the agent level. So, apparently, you were concerned, or—
Mr. GALE. I didn't feel it would and I didn't particularly care if it did. I felt the administrative action should go forward and so did Mr. Hoover. No matter who found out about it, I thought the chips should fall where they may, no matter who found out about it.
Mr. SAWYER. Yes, but you were saying they probably wouldn't find out about it which was an argument in favor of going ahead.
Mr. GALE. That is exactly right, because there were others who were opposed to it.
Mr. SAWYER. So, why would it be an argument of going ahead or not going ahead if it had nothing to do with the result in Dallas.
Mr. GALE. Because there were others in the Bureau who were opposed to that.
Mr. SAWYER. Well, then, they apparently felt differently than you did about whether it would have affected the results in Dallas; is that correct?
Mr. GALE. I don't think so. They may have felt the Warren Commission should not have had it because they didn't want it to become public at that time. They were concerned about adverse publicity insofar as our mishandling the case. It was not the practice and policy of the FBI to be airing its dirty linen in public.
Mr. SAWYER. The Warren Commission weren't interested in the procedural operations of the FBI in particular if they were connected with their charge; namely, to investigate the assassination in Dallas; isn't that correct?
Mr. GALE. You might be interested in knowing, Mr. Sawyer, that the Warren Commission found the same deficiencies that I found on the same things and right down the line…And so, the Warren Commission apparently didn't feel that these errors made any difference in Dallas, and I don't feel they did, either.
They had the same errors in front of them. They found the same exact errors that I found. (HSCA III, pp. 555-556)
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The claim that the deficiencies that Gale discovered had no effect on JFK’s assassination just doesn’t seem to add up. Hosty’s performance was horrible (I didn’t even get into the threatening note issue because Gale said that he only learned about that after he left the FBI. This makes one wonder how thorough the investigation by Gale was if he never learned about this important issue.), and surely most people realize if he had performed his job properly the SS would have been alerted about LHO at the very least when JFK came to Dallas. At best, LHO should have been under such scrutiny if he was a threat th as t he either could not complete the assassination or even be able to attempt it.
Hosty told us the truth when he testified to not believing LHO was a violent person as this is what his actions, or lack of action, shows. Gale’s assertion that the FBI didn’t have to alert the SS about dangerous people is laughable isince there would be no point in having a Security Index otherwise.
This portion of Gale’s testimony also shows that the FBI was very willing to hide things from the WC. This is something that we have seen time and time again in this series so this is no shock at this point.
Gale was asked to give a number between one and ten on the performance of the FBI agents regarding their pre-assassination handling/investigation of LHO and he gave them a “six or seven.” (HSCA III, p. 567) Do you think that they deserve that number? Do you think that they deserve a higher number?
While it was commendable of the FBI to have conducted this investigation, it was too little too late. Furthermore, Gale’s insistence that the deficiencies discovered had no effect on preventing the assassination is just not believable in my opinion (or in the opinion of some of the HSCA people).
Moreover, if Gale didn’t handle the post-assassination investigation, who did? And, where is that report? I sure would like to see that one. Does anyone know where it is if it is available?
What are your thoughts on Gale’s investigation and testimony? All thoughts and information are welcome.